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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
  
A bonfire blazed and crackled, casting its orange glow on the twenty-plus faces clustered 
around it.  The heat from the flames warmed our fronts, while a chill threatened our backs from 
the cool Siberian night.  Although it was mid-August, birch trees were already beginning to 
yellow, and we would wake in the morning to find a crust of ice over any standing water.  
Summer was ending, and autumn would soon begin.  The smell of frost mingled with wood 
smoke on this, our last, night in the taiga, the boreal forest that covers much of Siberia.   
Although it was cold and late, no one was willing to leave the fire, as though the night 
and our time together might not end if only we kept the blaze burning and the guitar strumming.  
We had come together in this place as strangers only two weeks before, but since then had 
become fast friends. 
Now we sat together around the fire, on benches that we had made ourselves, watching as 
the remainder of our wood was consumed in the conflagration.  An invisible thread seemed to 
bind us together that night, and we communicated freely – English, Russian, gesture, facial 
expression – the myriad ways we had learned to read one another over the last two weeks. 
The night crept on, and the songsters were beginning to exhaust their repertoires. Eyelids 
were drooping, and the woodpile was low.  There was a pause in the joviality as each sat quiet. 
“It’s midnight,” Olga said.1 
                                                 
1
 Except for organization leaders, whose full names are provided, the names have been changed to protect the 
subjects’ identity. All translations from the original Russian are the author’s own. 
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“What time exactly?” Larisa asked her. 
“Exactly midnight,” Olga answered. “It just turned.” 
“We should sing the national anthem,” Larisa replied, half-joking. She was referencing 
Radio Russia, the principle radio station in the country, which goes off the air at midnight and 
ends its broadcast with the national anthem. 
“Yes, we should!” agreed Polya, and soon they were rousing the group to stand and sing.  
We all obliged; the twenty of us, standing around the campfire, began a rousing variation of 
“Rossiya – svyashchennaya nasha derzhava…,”2 a multitude of voices carrying out into the 
night.  Our non-Russian speaking companions stood and smiled in appreciation and support.  As 
the final strains of the hymn echoed in the tall pines, we laughed and seated ourselves again. 
“Hey, we should sing all our national anthems,” Olga suggested. 
“Yeah, what does your anthem sound like?” Larisa asked the brother and sister from 
Portugal. 
“Sing it!” several others urged them on. 
They began a very enthusiastic (albeit not always in key) rendition of the Portuguese 
national anthem. 
Next was the German national anthem, sung enchantingly by Silke. 
Then I followed with the “Star-Spangled Banner,” mustering more patriotism than I knew 
I possessed. 
Thomas and Emilie stole the show with the merry opening of “La Marseillaise,” with 
everyone clapping along. 
                                                 
2
 “Russia – our holy homeland,” is the opening line of the Russian national anthem, formally named the State Hymn 
of the Russian Federation. 
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Antonio sang the Italian national anthem, which none of us knew, but all were glad to 
hear. 
“Now for the British!” Vadim said.  
Peter and Jane exchanged glances. “I don’t know it, do you?” they both muttered between 
themselves, outing their lack of interest in the monarchy. 
“Oh, we all sang, you have to sing it,” and similar lines of encouragement came out of the 
crowd. Obligingly, they managed between the two of them to sing the first two lines of “God 
Save the Queen,” and then hummed the rest. 
“Is that all?” Larisa asked. 
“I think so,” Katya answered. 
“Do you know the Buryat national anthem?” Polya asked Roma, a young Buryat man 
living in the Irkutsk oblast [region]. Roma shook his head. 
“I do,” said a small voice.  We all looked, surprised, at Fedya, a dark, quiet man from 
Moscow. 
“Well, sing it!” Olga said.  There was a pause, and then Fedya’s thin voice carried forth a 
hauntingly beautiful hymn to the Republic of Buryatia, an ethnic state within the Russian 
Federation.  The slow, lyrical, minor key was a sedate contrast to such rousing hymns as “La 
Marseillaise” and the “Star-Spangled Banner.”  Roma listened, his eyes down on the fire, his 
face looking pleased.   
*** 
This anecdote tells one story of globalization.  It reflects the optimism of a world united, 
where individuals from many different cultures and backgrounds could come together in peace 
for mutual benefit.  The twenty-three people around the fire were all volunteers with the Great 
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Baikal Trail project, a nonprofit organization based in Irkutsk, Russia, whose goal is to promote 
sustainable eco-tourism by building a network of hiking trails around Lake Baikal.  Recruits 
from around the world to participate in two-week “volunteer vacations” to help build and 
maintain wilderness trails. In the process, as the above anecdote suggests, participants receive the 
bounty of cultural exchange and form bonds of friendship, breaking down prejudicial barriers 
and expanding the “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) to peoples worldwide.  
But this is not the only story.  The ease with which these international volunteers came to 
Russia, to join an ecological trail-building project, is a testament to another process of 
globalization, one which has its roots in the ever-expanding reach of the capitalist marketplace.  
International tourism is a major industry, and it is one that the Great Baikal Trail seeks to 
channel into its own backyard, albeit as sustainably as possible.  The frequency and affordability 
of international travel and the communicative reach of mass media have both played a role in 
“space-time distanciation” (Giddens 1984) and in the global reach of projects such as the one 
described above. 
Yet, according to some scholars, many economic benefits of this process have accrued to 
the already developed world (Dowrick and Golley 2004, Reinert 2007).  While there is a 
surprising array of countries represented amongst the volunteers in Siberia’s taiga that night, 
they are uniformly European or American.  These are the individuals best poised to take 
advantage of all that globalization has offered.  As free trade and foreign direct investment 
replaced the previous import substitution models of development, ownership of productive 
enterprises has concentrated still further in the Global North (Harvey 2005).  Meanwhile, 
financialization in Western countries has maintained national economic growth and high 
purchasing power among their broad middle classes, even as their economies de-industrialized 
5 
 
(Krippner 2012).  That the people around the Siberian bonfire have used their disposable income 
to volunteer their time, energy and resources in helping another distant country is certainly to 
their credit.  But the economic globalization that has brought it about has other effects on distant 
lands that may be less benign. 
 Meanwhile, the political realm has also become more attuned to the tides of global social 
forces.  Global governance institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, which formed in the wake of World War II to support national economies, have since 
become instrumental in setting national policy, often to the benefit of international financial 
institutions and to the detriment of national sovereignty (Stiglitz 2002).  Non-state actors, such as 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) likewise operate for changes in state 
policy, irrespective of national borders (Keck and Sikkink 1996).  Institutions such as the United 
Nations, the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and the International Criminal 
Court have continued to problematize the relationship between the unitary state and supra-
national governance bodies which simultaneously hold sway. 
Globalization is not one process, but all of these at once.  All of these forces – 
transnational migration, cultural interconnection, economic integration, and global governance – 
become instantiated in the everyday lives of local citizens, who confront the particularities of 
their unique circumstances in dialogue with intersecting global trends.  In so doing, the public 
must orient itself to the interconnected world that is unfolding, subjectively determining their 
pathway to the good society that is made both more and less feasible by these multiple 
intersections. 
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This dissertation explores globalization at the ends of the Earth.  It follows chains of 
ownership and ideology that cross continents, and it traces the footsteps of individuals along 
similar transnational trajectories.  Reaching from San Francisco, South Lake Tahoe, Seattle, 
London, Berlin, and Moscow, these pathways finally touch down in Irkutsk, the city by the 
Sacred Sea, the capital of Siberia.   
The pin-point on the map that holds these global chains in place is theoretically 
important.  Not only is Siberia geographically distant, it was also politically isolated for decades 
under Soviet rule.  The Iron Curtain that blockaded East from West ensured that foreign 
influence would have only the slightest effect on the ideas and activities of Siberia’s denizens.  
To that extent, the arrival of global forces to Eastern Siberia is not only a testament to the power 
and reach of our contemporary interconnection; it also can give a precise date to its origin.  The 
opening of the Soviet Union to the West in 1989 and the Union’s subsequent collapse in 1991 
provide a before-and-after image of globalized modernity that is not readily available in most 
other contexts.  To that end, while many dimensions of Siberia’s introduction to globalized 
capitalism are idiosyncratic to the region, certain tendencies may be generalizable and illustrative 
of processes that are affecting areas throughout our increasingly globalized world. 
 
Data and Methods 
To explore the terrain of local environmental civil society in post-Soviet Russia, I spent 
ten months conducting field work in Irkutsk, Russia. My primary method was ethnographic, but 
it is an ethnography that takes time seriously and is invested with a historical imagination 
(Comaroff and Comaroff  1992).  At the same time, I draw upon Michael Burawoy’s 
ethnographic methodology, which pays attention to broader social structures operating on 
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multiple spatial scales, all of which act upon and become visible in the local context (Burawoy 
2000).  My analysis goes between local observations, national and transnational intersections, 
and the historical moment in which events are taking place. 
I selected Irkutsk because of its proximity to Lake Baikal, the world’s deepest, oldest and 
most voluminous lake.  Baikal has fostered a unique ecosystem and is home to thousands of rare 
endemic species. As such, it is a focal point for activist attention.  The city of Irkutsk is the 
regional capital of Eastern Siberia, home to multiple scientific institutes and a youthful, highly 
educated population.  It has a long history of dissent, as it was the home for hundreds of 
Imperials exiles, including the Decembrists and their wives.  That edge of dissidence carries over 
today, and makes Irkutsk a hub for environmental activism to protect Lake Baikal.  This activism 
stretches back to the Soviet era, and continues through the present.  Finally, because of the 
importance of Lake Baikal, the city has attracted myriad international actors who collaborate 
with local activists.  These relatively permanent networks render Irkutsk a transnational activist 
space, which contrasts with Irkutsk activism as it existed under the Soviet Union.  It is a site that 
well captures both the historical and transnational dimensions in the development of local 
environmental civil society in Russia. 
I traveled to Irkutsk for ten months, immersing myself in the multi-organizational field of 
environmental activism throughout the region, focusing particularly on the three strongest 
organizations in the community.  The bulk of my data come from participant observation.  I 
supplemented these with 52 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders: environmentalists, 
government workers in the system of protected territories, corporate sponsors, and transnational 
supporters.  In addition to this fieldwork, I traveled to partner organizations in Moscow, Seattle, 
San Francisco and South Lake Tahoe, following the footsteps of people and the flow of resources 
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from these distant sites to the shore of Lake Baikal.  Additionally, I draw upon archival data to 
illustrate the contours of environmentalism in the Soviet Union.  I gathered newspaper data from 
four local newspapers from the late Soviet period through 2012, and I examined the archives of 
the All-Soviet Society for Nature Protection (VOOP) in Irkutsk from 1980 through the mid-
1990s.  The data collectively tell a story of activism invigorated and imperiled as activists find 
themselves pulled by the strong tides of an ever-shifting political economic structure: one that is 
now unrelentingly global in scope.   
 
The Question and the Case 
The question that animated my journey to Irkutsk was this: what is the effect of 
globalization on local civil society?  In what ways does the global impact how ordinary citizens 
imagine and work toward “the good society?” 
This question I pose is one that could be asked in many contexts, and it is of both 
theoretical and practical import for societies that are increasingly pulled into the orbit of 
globalization.  I have chosen to examine this interaction amongst environmental activists in 
Russia.  There are several reasons that justify my choice. First, there is the clearly demarcated 
time period for the advent of globalization in Russia.  While much of the rest of the world 
evolved slowly toward a more integrated global community, in Russia the global was thrust upon 
it, pre-formed and well-developed.  The fall of the Soviet Union represents a temporal break, by 
which previously isolated communities were thrown suddenly and dramatically into the waves of 
transnational activist networks and multinational corporations.  Secondly, the history of state 
repression in Russia would show contemporary changes in civil society in stark relief.  The long 
shadow of authoritarianism offers a conservative bias to the subjective dispositions of 
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contemporary Russians.  After decades of ingrained perceptions of personal powerlessness and 
state dependency, any role that globalization might play in fostering civil society would be more 
evident in post-Soviet Russia, where civil society is historically much weaker (Howard 2003). 
 To operationalize civil society, I focus on local environmental non-governmental 
organizations.  Of all the sectors within civil society, why do I study environmental organizations 
specifically? There are three reasons.  First, the environment, more so possibly than any other 
social cause, knows no national boundaries.  Climate change is a global problem. Regardless of 
its source, carbon dioxide mixes freely in the planetary atmosphere and its effects are felt 
worldwide.  Even end-of-pipe pollution seldom stays comfortably near the sullying enterprise, as 
problems such as acid rain have shown.  Use of one of the few remaining global commons – the 
open sea – has caused dangerously low levels of fish stock and a floating island of garbage in the 
Pacific Ocean that is larger than Australia in size.  The political realities of transnational 
pollution have resulted in an increasing number of treaties and international cooperative 
agreements aimed at addressing the disconnect between cause and effect when one country’s 
practices impact another country’s ecosystem (e.g. The Helsinki Convention on the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area; the Kyoto Protocol; the Great Lakes Compact).  
In the study of transnational movements, there may be no cause as transnational as planet Earth. 
 Secondly, the environment is one of the few movements that can, at least symbolically, 
overcome the particularist interests of various groupings in civil society.  The environment exists 
materially outside of human divisions.  And the unarguable material dependence that humanity 
has upon the air, water and food that the natural environment alone can provide gives it a kind of 
ideological transcendence in activist claims-making.
3
  Should any group in civil society be most 
                                                 
3
 However, just because the environment provides the opportunity to transcend ideology does not mean that it 
necessarily does.  Environmentalists in the Soviet Union were able to use this quality to bypass the ideological 
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articulate in imagining and promoting the common good, it would be environmentalists, whose 
chief constituent is both non-human and ubiquitous.   
My final reason for honing in on environmental organizations specifically is the world-
historical importance of their subject matter.  Simply put, environmental issues are, I would 
argue, the defining issues of our time.  Since the dawn of industrialization, the ability of humans 
to impact the natural world has increased dramatically, and in the 21
st
 century the legacy of this 
damage has reached crisis levels on multiple fronts.  Global climate change as a result of burning 
fossil fuels is currently set to raise temperatures an average of 4.5 degrees Celsius by the end of 
the century – more than double the number of degrees of warming that is considered ecologically 
safe by climate scientists.  Industrial pollution and toxic chemicals remain untested and under-
regulated.  Deforestation and desertification continue at alarming rates, impacting carbon sinks, 
biodiversity levels, and access to fresh drinking water.  Meanwhile, the world is facing the 
greatest mass extinction since the dinosaurs, due largely to anthropogenic habitat loss.  Human 
civilization cannot continue at its present pace, using present means, without undermining its 
material existence and posing an existential threat to itself and the natural world that surrounds 
and supports it. There is no social realm that is as in-need of a flourishing civil society as this 
one. 
 The source of the contemporary environmental crisis is in the production of goods for the 
fulfillment of human needs and wants.  However, the solution to environmental crisis is not 
likewise simply a matter of the mode of production.  The wanton environmental destruction 
perpetrated by the Soviet Union should put to rest any suggestion that ecocide is solely a 
                                                                                                                                                             
repression the Communist Party normally reserved for dissidents (Weiner 1999). The environment was also the 
common cause of both Republicans and Democrats in the United States until the 1970s (Dowie 1995).  However, in 
the contemporary United States, the environment is so ideologically divided that one’s belief in the science of 
climate change is predicted more strongly by political party than by any other indicator (McCright and Dunlap 
2011). 
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property of capitalism.  But neither need we seek explanations for Soviet environmental 
degradation strictly within its own, unique productive system.  In their exhaustive review of 
Soviet environmental crimes, Feshbach and Friendly (1992) list a relentless stream of crises in 
land, water, air and, subsequently, human health.  In many instances they claim, along with their 
native informants, that the problem stems from the command economy.  Without market prices, 
they explain, there is no way to assess the value of those squandered natural resources. 
 What Feshbach and Friendly (1992) conveniently forget is that the capitalist West had 
functioning market prices throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century and still managed to 
degrade its environment and bring forth its own ecological catastrophes.  The market did not 
save the West from the errors of the Soviet Union.  If nature was less ravaged in the United 
States and Western Europe, it was not due to the market, but rather to the collected efforts of 
committed individuals, determined to prevent the wanton abuse of nature and its gifts.  It was 
civil society’s intervention in the normal “treadmill of production” (Schnaiberg 1980) that ebbed 
the speed of environmental destruction in the capitalist West, not market mechanisms.  Nearly 
every progressive environmental action taken in the United States and Europe came at the behest 
of environmental activism.  When we contrast the state of the environment in the Soviet Union 
with that of the “Free World,” the principle variable at play is not production, planned or 
otherwise. It is the relative weakness of Soviet civil society that sets it apart, environmentally, 
from the West. 
 Given the importance of civil society in the protection of nature, its ecosystems, and its 
resources (whether for human use or for its own intrinsic value), we now must ask: how does the 
current globalized political economy impact local movements that seek to protect the 
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environment in the name of the common good?  In endeavoring to answer this question, I 
critically engage theories of civil society. 
 
 In the face of social resistance to authoritarianism in Eastern Europe and Latin America, 
scholars began to discuss “civil society” as a political phenomenon that exists outside of the 
state.  Cohen and Arato (1992) were among the first to attempt a major theoretical codification of 
this revived concept.  They propose a triadic model that separates civil society from the 
economic and political spheres.  Civil society, in their view, is institutionalized by means of 
individual rights.  The system of political rights creates a perpetuating, protected civil sphere, 
that then can self-reflexively operate to contain the overreach of the economic and political 
spheres. 
 Jeffrey Alexander (2006) critiques Cohen and Arato (1992) as actually undermining the 
autonomy of civil society by suggesting that it is created by the state through the institution of 
rights.  Instead, Alexander (2006) puts forward the civil sphere as a “social fact” in the 
Durkheimian tradition.  It is a sphere of solidarity that can be delimited by the shared meaning 
that members ascribe to it.  It finds its identity in the “Other,” the out-group that can only be 
incorporated via civil repair.  The bulk of his empirical analysis hinges on boundary negotiation 
within the civil sphere; he addresses the slow extension of the American civil sphere to include 
women, blacks and Jews.  One concern with Alexander’s (2006) theory of civil society is that, in 
his desire to emphasize the existence of an autonomous civil sphere sui generis, he neglects its 
relationship between the economy and the state that was so central to Cohen and Arato’s (1992) 
model.  While Alexander (2006) recognizes that there must also be negotiated boundaries 
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between the civil and “uncivil” spheres such as the economy and the state,4 the negotiation of 
these boundaries remains largely un-theorized in his text. 
 
My Contribution 
 Like Alexander (2006), I view civil society as a social fact, but unlike him, I grant the 
sphere less autonomy.  Instead, I return to Cohen and Arato’s (1992) triadic model, precisely 
because it calls for an analysis of interaction between social spheres. The boundaries between 
various social spheres, civil or “uncivil,” are necessarily overlapping and interpenetrating.  
Indeed, these spheres are analytically inseparable.  When we consider the interpenetrations of 
social spheres, the question of power becomes suddenly of greater concern. 
 These various spheres within society – the economic, the political and the civil – are not 
simply social spheres; they are also spheres of power.  The power inherent to these spheres is 
well-known, and an exhaustive review of the careful considerations scholars have given to their 
influence and capacity for action is not necessary here.  A brief summary will suffice: 
 Economic Power: The ability to produce or withhold goods and services from the 
market, and to exercise influence via the distribution of wealth. 
 Political Power: The ability to enshrine the law and to exercise the legitimate use of 
force. 
                                                 
4
 Alexander (2006) would place a number of institutions that are normally considered within civil society as 
“uncivil” and outside the civil sphere. These include: the family, religious organizations, professional associations, 
for example.  While I concur with Alexander that these are not spheres of solidarity, neither do I examine their 
relationship to civil society as alternate spheres of power.  They do not operate as power spheres in 
environmentalism in Russia, and therefore they fall largely outside the purview of the present study.  That being 
said, religion, especially, is a sphere of power and it is very clearly global in scope. (Indeed, religion was among the 
first globalizers). One might imagine the question of globalization and civil society looking very differently when 
examining Islamic microfinancing in the Middle East, or the anti-poverty work of the Catholic Church in Latin 
America.  Russian Orthodoxy has made a tremendous resurgence in Russia, and it operates as a pillar of support for 
the Putin regime, provisioning the symbolic arsenal of Russian nationalism.  The state helps the church by limiting 
evangelism by other denominations within Russia – and some of these missionaries had made strong inroads during 
the 1990s.  Fascinating as this case is when considering globalization, civil society and power, religion was simply 
not a variable in my data, and so I constrain my analysis to the market and the state.   
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 Civil Power: The ability to mobilize bodies and change minds renders civil society, not 
just a phenomenon sui generis, but also as a sphere of power in its own right.   
The strength of these forces together make up a totality, which I will be analyzing as a “field of 
power,” following Bourdieu (1989, 1993, 1998).   
  
 In this dissertation, I will be examining a local group of environmental activists based in 
Irkutsk, Russia, as they seek to preserve and protect Lake Baikal, a natural, environmental 
wonder of local, national and global significance. Groups have coalesced around this goal 
repeatedly since the mid-20
th
 century, when Soviet industrial projects began to raise the specter 
of irreparable anthropogenic harm to the lake.  These activists were attempting to use social 
power to curb the environmentally destructive activities of the economy and the polity, once 
conjoined as a single power sphere in the Soviet Union, and separated as two semi-autonomous 
spheres in the decades following.  Through a close examination of this local site in the heart of 
Siberia, I explore the cultural, ideological, organizational, and legal arsenals of competing 
players in the field of power over time, from the end of the Soviet Union through the globalized 
present.  I also examine the different spatial levels at which power is acquired and manifested in 
the relationship between the economy, the state and civil society. The data show the 
interpenetration of spheres of power, and they emphasize the problematic status of autonomy for 
the civil sphere, beyond a system of checks and balances. 
 In presenting this case, it is not my intention to repudiate what many others have claimed 
is the emancipatory potential of civil society (e.g. Kaldor 2003, Smith 2008); but by 
reintroducing power into our conceptions of Cohen and Arato’s (1992) triadic model, and into 
Alexander’s (2006) cultural constitution theory of the civil sphere, we can appreciate the very 
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real constraints placed upon civil society, even in liberal Western regimes.  The point is not to 
consign away civil society as inherently corrupted or as incapable of overcoming the powers of 
the market or the state.  Instead, these findings clarify the operation of civil society within the 
field of power,
5
 bearing in mind that the field of power itself is layered in multiple spatial scales.  
Finally, these findings also point to a new normative theory of democracy, one that recognizes 
power differentials in the allocation of rights. 
 
About the Chapters 
 After reviewing extant literature on globalization, activism and the environment in Russia 
in Chapter 2, and introducing Lake Baikal and its history of environmental struggle in Chapter 3, 
I begin my empirical investigation by examining the role or transnational activism on the 
ideological terrain surrounding Baikal environmentalism. Chapter 4 examines the creation of 
three principle transnational activist organizations in Irkutsk, Russia, and their relationship to the 
power forces at play over time.  Chapter 5 shows how these organizations become nodes in the 
global network, bringing the experience of cosmopolitanism to denizens of Siberia and, in so 
doing, expanding their perceptions of possibility.   
In the next section, I show how the field of power operates as a counterbalance to the 
expansive imaginative capacity brought by transnational activism.  Chapter 6 describes the 
emergence of Russian oligarchs as a unified class that operates for its own interests, and in 
accordance with the logic of global capitalism.  Enterprises may enter the field of environmental 
protection to acquire symbolic capital that can be transferred into economic capital in the field of 
global business. Chapter 7 continues the examination of the nexus between the fields of business 
and the environment, paying particular attention to the effect of this intersection on the scope of 
                                                 
5
 And perhaps clarify the operations of the field of power itself in the process – a concept that is under-theorized. 
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legitimate action within the field.  Chapter 8 examines the reconsolidation of the Russian state 
under Vladimir Putin and how this change in the field of power impacts environmental civil 
society.  My conclusion discusses the implications of these findings, suggesting a normative 
theory of democracy and rights. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This dissertation aims to expand the scope of investigation into the concept of civil 
society through an investigation of environmental activism around Lake Baikal in Russia. The 
rich and ancient examinations of civil society have presented a number of different definitions 
for the concept and delineated various roles that it plays in the body politic.  However, much of 
the contemporary conception of civil society views it as a check on the concentrated power of 
political and economic elites. I argue that, rather than emphasize a Montesquieuian system of 
checks-and-balances, it is more apt to analyze civil society as a player in a Bourdieuian “field of 
power” (Bourdieu 1989, 1993, 1998).  Doing so has several benefits: 1) it considers civil society 
to be a source of social power in its own right; 2) it allows us to look at the strength and 
weakness of this power source relative to other power sources over time; and 3) it brings 
multiple spatial scales into play in the field of power when examining the strength and weakness 
of civil society. 
By examining environmental activism as a case study of the relationship between players 
in the field of power, my research also makes important contributions to additional scholarly 
literatures. I encourage the literature on social movements to move beyond questions of the 
“how” and “why” mobilization, and instead to look at social movements as embodiments of 
larger, historical processes, such as globalization and modernity.  Moreover, I encourage the 
literature on transnational activism to consider more carefully the unique contribution of the 
“transnational.”  Current scholarship on transnational activism generally suffers from a lack of 
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comparison: there is no “non-networked” or “non-globalized” Other in such studies to provide 
contrast, such as my case provides in Soviet environmentalism. 
Finally, I add to the empirical literature on environmentalism in Russia, which has traced 
the movement – its organizations, tactics, motivations, and outcomes – over the course of the last 
century and a half.  From Imperial hunting ground parks, to scientific preservation, from forest 
management to youth nature clubs, from the formation of national parks to the rise of “green” 
national separatists, from the political ecology of social collapse to the social ecology of 
environmental civil society, scholars have provided a wealth of data on the state of the 
environment in Eurasia, and especially Russia.  My work contributes to this long tradition, 
bringing back detailed, in-depth ethnographic description of activism around Lake Baikal, and 
the larger political-economic processes in which the fate of the lake is bound.   
 
Civil Society 
 The concept of civil society is a very old one, and it has been expressed in many forms. 
Ancient Greek philosophers regularly debated the appropriate structure for the polity. Chief 
among these debates for theories of civil society is that between Plato and Aristotle.  In response 
to Plato’s idealized image of the perfect state with a unitary conception if “the Good,” Aristotle 
argues that states arise out of people, who are inherently social and political in nature (Aristotle 
1995).  Governments can take a wide array of forms, but people acting in groups will strive 
toward creating the state as a space that allows for their own flourishing.  The best government is 
the one that people build together with broad, and generally disinterested, participation, for the 
betterment of the common good.    
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However, despite these deep philosophic roots, civil society as it is discussed today is a 
concept intimately connected to the rise of modernity.  Civil society filled the minds of 
intellectuals seeking to explain and to justify the liberal transition that was taking place in 
governments and economies during the late 18
th
 century.  Rejecting absolutism, but wanting to 
avoid anarchy, political thinkers of the Enlightenment accepted the rational state and the rule of 
law as necessary to provide for the free flourishing of individuals’ private lives. These 
aggregated private interests were collectively considered to be “civil society.”  As such, early 
theorists of civil society placed the economy within the civil sphere (Locke 1980, Smith 2003).   
The conflation of economic interests with civil society persisted into the 20
th
 century, but 
not without some dissenters.  Adam Ferguson (1995) accepted human sociability and altruism as 
innate; these moral sentiments acted throughout history to preserve and enshrine a calling toward 
a common good.  Presaging Durkheim’s (1979) concern with anomie, Ferguson worried that the 
division of labor and the reduction of relationships to a series of contracts would eventually 
prove more powerful than the norms and ethos of civil society, losing for the modern era the 
moral progress that had helped give rise to modernity itself. 
Eventually, study of civil society reached its 19
th
 century empirical peak in the work of 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1981).  After his extensive “fieldwork” exploring American political 
culture, Tocqueville emphasized Americans’ tendency to form civil associations as one of the 
principle reasons for their successful democratic revolution. Extra-political associations foster 
the practice of self-sufficiency, public discourse, and affective ties amongst fellow citizens. In so 
doing, they create “habits of the heart” that carry forth into public life within the polity. 
Association creates a taste for liberty and the disposition to sustain it. 
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 Despite this rich early history, by the 20
th
 century civil society as a concept had fallen out 
of favor in scholarly circles.  Perhaps the strongest intellectual influence that would consign civil 
society to a dusty back shelf was Karl Marx.  According to Marx’s theory of historical 
materialism (Marx 1998), the dominant mode of production in a given society fosters particular 
ideological structures to justify its existence, and these would have their homologies in all social 
spheres – from the state, to religion, to the arts, to the education system, and so forth. Civil 
society is not autonomous, but is rather a reflection of the economic base and its inherent 
inequalities.  Civil society, in Marxist thought, would be an ideological tool of elite domination 
and highly suspect for that reason.   
Although civil society was not a primary subject of scholarly attention in the mid-
twentieth century, there were still important intellectuals making in-roads into a greater 
understanding of the concept, and these would prove vital for the concept’s recovery in the last 
decades of the century.  Arguably the most important was the Italian Marxist and political 
theorist Antonio Gramsci (1971), who, although retaining a Marxian analysis, made a critical 
breakthrough by acknowledging the semi-autonomous status of civil society.  Gramsci noted that 
the absorption of elite ideology amongst the lower classes is not automatic. Instead it is a project 
geared toward creating hegemony through consent.  To that end, the work of social change is 
possible precisely in the civil sphere.  It is in civil society that these cultural and ideological 
projects take place, and these can become loci of revolutionary contention.  
Another important work in the “proto-civil society” literature of the mid-twentieth 
century was Almond and Verba’s (1963) study of political culture or “civic culture.” In their 
cross-national comparison, they find that membership in voluntary associations correlates to 
more robust citizenship outcomes, such as participation, trust, and a sense of political 
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competence.  Essentially, a strong civil society outside the state does result in stronger 
democratic outcomes within the state, as Tocqueville had theorized over a century prior. 
However, these two important works stand out largely as exceptions to the tide of social 
thought in the twentieth century. The rise of Marxism in the twentieth century combined with 
other important intellectual movements to edge out civil society. New governments that arose in 
Europe after the First World War provoked interest in strong state theory; the “end of ideology” 
postwar consensus in the democratic West fostered a technocratic approach to policy and 
statecraft; and the creation of the European welfare state likewise pointed to the structural 
dynamics of human outcomes.  For much of the twentieth century, civil society was largely 
ignored as epiphenomenal. 
 It was not until the last decades of the twentieth century that civil society experienced its 
intellectual revival. Propelled by the anti-authoritarian movements taking place at the time in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America, civil society experienced a dramatic resurgence in the 1980s 
as a subject of study in its own right. Civil society was the language used by these dissidents to 
describe themselves and the rights that they yearned for in their home countries. Vaclav Havel 
made an impassioned appeal to the need for “the independent, spiritual, social and political life 
of society,” and the belief that government should arise up from the grounded experience of 
human life rather than be imposed as ideological structures (Havel 1978). Ernest Gellner (1994) 
likewise described free functioning civil society as the very “condition of liberty” in Eastern 
Europe and in the world. 
 In the wake of these outpourings of participatory fervor in authoritarian regimes, many 
scholars began to acknowledge that civil society may be a necessary condition for democracy.  
Following Tocqueville (1981), and Almond and Verba (1963), Robert Putnam (1994) conducted 
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studies of social capital in Italian provinces, showing their relationship to pro-democratic 
outcomes. He then carried this same formula to the United States, and uncovered a similar effect 
(Putnam 2000).  More troubling for Putnam was his concomitant finding that social capital – by 
which he meant the amount of membership in civil association in the United States – was on a 
steady decline since the 1950s, with worrying implications for the future of American 
democracy.  Bellah et al. (1985) expressed similar concerns with the role of individualism in 
American culture, noting that the cultural and discursive underpinnings for “the common good” 
may be less accessible now than they had been previously. Theda Skocpol (2003) studied the 
history of American membership organizations, finding that the broad base of their membership 
had two important democratizing outcomes. First, members could form affective ties and 
identities that spanned other social fissures, most notably that of class.  Also, these federated 
membership associations schooled individuals from all walks of life in the operation of meetings, 
procedures, and federated structures – all of which are transferable skills in the realm of 
citizenship. Essentially, it was becoming increasingly apparent that cultural dispositions and 
social norms were necessary for functional, stable, democratic governance. 
 But civil society is not synonymous with democracy itself, and there are good reasons 
that the concept is separated from that of the state.  Not only does this allow a better analysis of 
the boundaries between citizenship and statehood, it also helps transcend what some have termed 
the “dark side” of civil society (Alexander 2013).  Alexander (2006) defines the “civil sphere” 
culturally, as a shared meaning system of inclusion and exclusion.  Bound up in his concept of 
the civil sphere are norms and beliefs that appear to exist sui generis, but that are constantly 
negotiated and re-negotiated.  But there is always an “out-group” to Alexander’s civil sphere, 
and those deemed outside the sphere of solidarity renders solidarity itself partial at best.  In its 
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more ugly variants, scholars point to voluntary association in, for example, the Ku Klux Klan as 
a rather doubtful guarantor of democratic governance.  Nationalism and religious 
fundamentalism are also movements that take place within the civil sphere, but their contribution 
to the creation of the “good society” is highly questionable. 
 It is here, however, that Cohen and Arato (1992) enter with their theory of civil society. 
While positing the civil sphere as separate and opposed to the economic and political spheres in 
the broader social order, they also fundamentally describe civil society as derivative of the state, 
to the extent that it is constituted through a system of legal rights.  Civil society can overcome 
the social anxiety of rampant associational factionalism because of the general rights that are 
enshrined in law.  Civil society can remain civil as long as the state maintains the legal space for 
such pluralism. 
 The problem with a legally-constituted civil society is that is cannot account for what is 
called “global civil society” (e.g. Clark 2003, Friedman, Hochstetler and Clark 2005, Kaldor 
2003, Laxer and Halperin 2003, Walzer 1995), “transnational civil society” (Florini 2000) or 
“international civil society” (Colás 2002).  As Jackie Smith (2008) has shown, there is a 
dramatic, exponential increase in social organizations that operate across borders.  Activists 
make use of transnational networks and appeal to global institutions much more so than ever 
before. How can civil society exist as a global phenomenon if it is created by democratic 
governance and legal rights regimes at the national level? 
 Kaldor (2003) answers this question by emphasizing the use of global norms.  She returns 
to the language of “social contract,” by which social relations are negotiated, re-negotiated, and 
reproduced.  These shared agreements on behavior need not be tied to the nation-state.  Indeed, 
they are produced at any and every level of social interaction, and can thus constitute a global 
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civil sphere.  For Kaldor, these norms do not constitute a legal contract, but rather a “’good-
tempered’ conversation” (Kaldor 2003: 45).  In this, she follows a Habermasian (1990) notion of 
deliberative democracy, but from her perspective, the ‘conversation’ is socially emergent rather 
than normative. 
  
 In these debates over civil society, there are several key questions at stake.  One central 
question involves how civil society is to be defined. What gets to count and what does not?  How 
one answers this question is often influenced by the answer to a second question, which is: what 
is the purpose, or the role, of civil society in society as a whole?  In briefly addressing how 
others have answered these two questions, I will also address the definition of civil society that 
informs my research and the problematic of its role in society that I seek to engage. 
 Kaldor (2003) defines five types of “civil society” in the scholarly discourse, and I 
generally agree with her schematic, although I disagree with some of the actual terminology she 
employs.
6
  I will address each definition in her schema in turn: 
1. Societas civilis: The oldest approach to civil society, the term societas civilis is found in 
two strands of ancient and early modern theories of society and the state. The first 
concerns the civil society as the society that best produces civil human beings.  It is 
chiefly concerned with the creation of virtue and the subjective disposition of members 
                                                 
6
 Specifically, I think it is misleading to refer to a “Neoliberal” and “Postmodern” conception of civil society 
because it puts the cart before the horse. Yes, neoliberal theorists hold up the voluntary association as an alternate, 
and they would say better, means to address the general welfare than the state; but there are ample scholars working 
in the tradition of voluntary association who preceded this particular ideological agenda. I would probably refer to 
this stream as the “Social Capital” approach to civil society rather than “Neoliberal.”  As for “Postmodern,” I do not 
think that there is anything particularly postmodern about acknowledging the existence of exclusionary associations.  
I would refer to this strain of scholarship as the “Dark Side” of civil society, following Alexander (2013), or perhaps 
simply the “Exclusionary” approach.  “Activist” is an appropriate moniker because it is descriptive and does not tie 
the phenomenon of social movements or advocacy groups to the political end that they may individually be striving 
to achieve, such as is done in the use of “Neoliberal.” A precise, descriptive term is more analytically useful, and it 
saves us from the dangers of terminology creep, whereby concepts like postmodernism lose their meaning in vague 
overuse. 
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within the social body. This definition of civil society emerges in Aristotle (1995), but 
also includes Ferguson (1995) and Kant (1991). Alternately, thinkers in the vein of 
societas civilis are wholly uninterested with the subjective disposition of virtue, believing 
that individuals are corrupt at best, and instead emphasize the rule of law as the best 
means to foster a “civil” society.  Such thinkers include Augustine (2009), Thomas 
Hobbes (1982), and James Madison (Madison, Hamilton and Jay 1987). Despite the fact 
that modern theories of civil society have developed in a very different direction, aspects 
of these early ideas still permeate modern thought, for example in communitarian 
theorists, such as Etzioni (1993) and MacIntyre (1981) for the former and Dewey (1984) 
and Bellah et al. (1985) in the latter. 
2. Burgerliche Gesellschaft: Following Tönnies (2011), there is a definition of civil society 
that demarcates it as the space between the family and the state.  Civil society is more 
than a purely personal life, and less than the dictates of structural authority.  In this 
perspective, the economy remains within civil society. At the time of early liberalism, the 
practice of trade was bound up in the concept of civil society. There are still scholars who 
would retain this notion – that the economy and free society are, in fact, synonymous (c.f. 
Friedman 2002).  Because of the importance of the trading class in the creation of modern 
liberalism, and their long-standing call for laissez faire, it was more intuitive for early 
modern thinkers to posit a state-society binary.  Breaking the economic out of civil 
society was an important development in the modern conception of civil society, but one 
that is analytically necessary to explain many dynamics within modern civil society. 
3. Activist: The activist approach to civil society emphasizes the non-structural attempts by 
members of the public to bring about change in the society around them.  Civil society 
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from this perspective is most clearly embodied in social movements and in other types of 
advocacy association.  Contemporary scholars working in this vein include Cheema and 
Popovski (2010), Florini (2000, 2003), Kaldor (2003), and Taylor (2004) for example. 
4. Neoliberal: If the activist view of civil society is symbolized in the social movement, the 
neoliberal view is enshrined in the voluntary association. From this perspective, civil 
society is mostly an antidote for a bloated welfare state.  Charity and volunteerism are 
heralded as better, leaner, more personal means to alleviate social suffering than direct, 
state-based redistribution of wealth. The thought and writings of Eberly (2008) and 
Cahoone (2002) most clearly exemplify this model. But there are many scholars that are 
precisely interested in volunteerism and altruism, without the neoliberal political edge. 
These scholars frequently operate from a religious or quasi-religious perspective (e.g. 
Wuthnow 1996, 2004; Berger and Neuhaus 1996) and are concerned with the erosion of 
morality when people detach themselves and their personal actions from the needs of 
others.  Giving through charity and volunteerism not only produce betterment in the 
social body, but also in the moral dispositions of the individuals themselves.
7
 
5. Postmodern:  The postmodern approach to civil society is one that emphasizes the “dark 
side” and views association as a force, but not one necessarily promoting the “good 
society.”  The postmodern approach to civil society discusses the rise of fundamentalist 
and nationalist groups, who may have high levels of social capital but put it to use in 
projects of exclusion and often violent extremism. Concerns with exclusionary 
association in the civil sphere have animated thinkers for centuries (e.g., Alexander 2006, 
2013; Hobbes 1982; Madison, Hamilton and Jay 1987) 
                                                 
7
 The neoliberal thinkers who would replace the welfare state with personal charity also frequently cite this moral 
argument as well, which is likely why Kaldor lumps these two threads together under the same title. 
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My research is most aligned with the activist stream of civil society.  The present work also 
takes its roots from the same discourse that witnessed the revival of the “civil society” concept 
during the waning years of authoritarianism in Latin America and Eurasia.  Civil society was 
posited as something lacking in these regimes, and something without which tyranny could 
flourish (Gellner 1989).  While voluntary associations and homophilous groups can be 
considered parts of civil society, the active attempt to bring about change, as is characteristic of 
activist groups, more clearly sets civil society apart from the state on the state’s own turf.  It is in 
activist society that the relationship between civil society and the state can be most clearly 
defined. 
 
Among the oldest and most established approaches to the problem of tyranny in 
administrative governments is Montesquieu’s theory of the separation of powers (Montesquieu 
1989).  In many respects, scholars working in the triadic model of civil society examine the 
interrelationship between the economy, the polity, and civil society as a Montesquieuian system 
of checks and balances.  Because the concept of civil society was revived in the wake of 
democratic organizing in authoritarian regimes, its power was seen principally as a check.  Civil 
society holds the power of the state at bay. Work on the spread of human rights around the world 
via non-governmental organizations is a testament to this role for civil power (Tsutsui and 
Wotipka 2004).  Civil society has also been analyzed as a check on the power of corporations in 
the economic realm.  The success of social movements in forcing the enactment of global 
standard practices in the environment and labor rights, and, as we will discuss later in the book, 
the ubiquity of Corporate Social Responsibility, all point to the power of the civil sphere as a 
check on the power of economic elites (Bartley 2007). 
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And the system of checks and balances can operate in both directions.  The power of the civil 
sphere need not be benign.  There is a “dark side” to civil society (Alexander 2013).  Early 
democratic theorists were as frightened of the ability of willful majorities to trample the rights of 
minorities as they were of the despotism that preceded democracy (Madison, Hamilton and Jay 
1987, Mill 1978). The state, then, serves as balance against the power of the civil sphere, 
preserving the social body from the “dark side” of civil society – lynch mobs, pogroms, populist 
movements, and so forth – by the legal preservation of individual rights.8    
 These Montesquieuian theories of civil society are not inaccurate – but they are also 
incomplete.  “Separation of powers” is a principle in the constitution of a state; governments may 
be designed according to the principle of checks and balances.  But spheres of power are not 
created according to a pre-designed constitution; they exist sui generis.  For this reason, I suggest 
that a better approach is to analyze these spheres as operating in a “field of power” (Bourdeiu 
1993), where each jockeys with or against the other in a battle for greater control over social 
outcomes.   
 
Bourdieu’s “Field of Power” and Civil Society 
Bourdieu’s theory of “fields” was his solution to the problem of structure and agency in 
social analysis. Humans are not trapped in a lock-step march of structured determinacy; but it 
would be equally erroneous to pretend that each individual is fully free for pure agentic action to 
create one’s life and circumstance.  Instead, Bourdieu examines particular arenas of social 
action: art, education, literature, etc.  These he likens to games: there is a field, and on the field 
there are various players. The game operates according to certain agreed upon rules that 
                                                 
8
 For this system of spheres to fully enact a kind of “checks and balances,” one would expect economic power to 
serve as some kind of check on civil society run amok, but I cannot see how it might do so, without reverting to the 
state.  Perhaps the calculus of exchange-value can serve as a check on the normative appeals of civil society. 
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constrain activity within the field. However, unlike typical games, one of the plays that players 
can perform is to attempt to alter the rules of the game while in action.  The outcome of any 
game is indeterminate (agency), but the field and its rules are beyond the dictates of any one 
particular player (structure). Bourdieu also recognizes that the stakes within a field are sources of 
power and influence that he refers to as “capital.” But monetary capital is only one “species”—
others include cultural capital, social capital, and myriad other forms that an individual may 
possess in greater or lesser amounts.  Players may strive to collect greater amounts of capital, or 
they may try to change the relative value of the capital that they presently possess.  The 
competition over capital guides most of the activity within a particular field.  
According to Bourdieu, the limits of a field coincide with the end of that field’s 
influence. But there is one field that does not face such limits: Bourdieu talks about a “field of 
power” that exists above and beyond the power struggles within any solitary field.  The field of 
power is a kind of meta-field that encompasses all other fields. 
 
“The field of power is a field of forces defined by the structure of the existing 
balance of forces between forms of power, or between different species of capital.  
It is also simultaneously a field of struggles for power among holders of different 
forms of power.  It is a space of play and competition in which the social agents 
and institutions which all possess the determinate quantity of specific capital 
(economic and cultural capital in particular) sufficient to occupy the dominant 
position within their respective fields…confront one another in strategies aimed at 
preserving or transforming this balance of forces” (Bourdieu, unpublished 
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lecture,” The Field of Power,” University of Wisconsin at Madison, April 1989, 
as cited in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology pg. 76 note 16). 
 
Bourdieu suggests that the dominant actors in any particular field are players in the field of 
power, but here I disagree. Not all species of capital are equally generalizable. In fact, in many 
cases, capital is highly field-specific.   
I suggest that it is not the players that are important in a field of power, but the arsenal at 
their disposal.
9
  Herein lies the rationale for the common reliance upon the economy and the state 
as powerful actors in social analysis: the generalizability of their power sources.  The state holds 
the legitimate use of force (Gerth and Mills 1958) and the ability to determine the law. These act 
upon all other players, regardless of the field, up to the geographic limit of the state’s domain.  
The dominant players in the field of politics are then also players in the field of power because of 
the generalizability of their power source.  So, too, for dominant economic players.  Money is an 
abstraction of exchange; it has the power to acquire in any context.  To quote from Karl Marx, 
“As money is not exchanged for any one specific quality, for any one specific thing, or for any 
particular human essential power, but for the entire objective world of man and nature, from the 
standpoint of its possessor it therefore serves to exchange every quality for every other” (Marx 
1964: 169) Therefore, those who dominate the economic field are also those in possession of the 
greatest wealth.  This abstraction of exchange can and must play a role in every social field, 
rendering the economic elite players in the field of power.   
                                                 
9
 Bourdieu would use the term “capital” rather than “arsenal,” but I am abandoning the “capital” metaphor because it 
serves to confuse how different species of capital may have intrinsically distinct properties.  The analogy to capital 
is useful to highlight the homologies of action in very different fields of action, and to emphasize their 
convertibility, one to another. But when discussing the field of power, I claim that not all “capitals” are, in fact, 
exchangeable therein.  In this case, a better analogy is an arsenal, where different weapons serve different purposes 
depending on the context. 
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 Enter civil society.  Actors in civil society spend most of their time playing in smaller, 
issue-specific fields, such as the field of environmental preservation, or homelessness alleviation, 
or HIV/AIDS prevention, and so forth.  But all these disparate actors have the knowledge, ability 
and infrastructure to mobilize the public.  Actors in civil society can alter public opinion, get 
bodies on the streets in protest, produce signatures on the page for petitions, or foster boycotts.  
Civil society is a power source that involves human capital, or what Foucault (1990) called “bio-
power.”  But its power goes beyond these concepts, because it is also has a power that comes to 
it by virtue of virtue.  Tilly’s (2004) first requirement of a social movement is that it display 
“Worthiness.”  There is a symbolic power that comes from social engagement, a kind of morality 
for modernity.  Civil power is the combination of the ability to influence minds and bodies both 
through capacity and virtue.  Because there are minds and bodies in all social fields, civil power 
also plays a role in the meta-field: the field of power. 
Because civil society is a power in itself (as well as a collection of smaller, more specific 
fields), there are other players on the field who have an interest in altering the balance of power 
within the field.  To accomplish this, other power spheres may colonize civil society.  Civil 
power may then be used for “uncivil” purposes.  Alternately, these players can work to suppress 
civil society and limit civil power within the field at large. 
Viewing civil society as a player in a field of power has a number of advantages that 
elucidate problems in existing models of civil society that are more static in structure: 1) it 
considers civil society to be a source of social power in its own right; 2) it allows us to look at 
the strength and weakness of this power source relative to other power sources over time; and 3) 
it brings multiple spatial scales into play in the field of power when examining the strength and 
weakness of civil society.  Civil society is not simply a “check” on the authority of the state or 
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the power of concentrated capital. Neither is it a cultural artifact, a sentiment of belonging.  It 
heralds more agency that the latter construct would allow, but neither is it purely an embodiment 
of intention and will.  Civil society is in a delicate dance with other social actors, and the dance 
floor can be crowded at times. 
 The field of power need not be globalized, but ours is a global age.  In the chapters that 
follow, I show that civil society, even local groups contending with place-based problems, are 
necessarily bound up in national and transnational phenomena, and the intersections of these 
spatial scales allow for the entry of new sources of power – which may operate for the benefit or 
to the detriment of civil society within the field of power.  To that end, it is time to discuss how 
scholars have grappled with the increasing importance of these scalar intersections – namely, in 
the literature on globalization. 
 
Globalization 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 represented for many, not just the end of 
communism in Russia, but the end of the “short twentieth century,” as Hobsbawm (1994) aptly 
names it.  Beginning with World War I and the Russian Revolution of 1917, this abbreviated 20
th
 
century was characterized by competing visions for human society that often took the form of 
all-encompassing ideologies.  Each of these was both a response to and a prescription for the 
problems that had arisen out of the social epoch called “modernity.”  Chastened by the Great 
Depression, free-market capitalism gave way to regulated capitalism in those countries that 
continued to ascribe to the ideology of liberal democracy.  Nationalism reared its head as an 
alternate path out of an economic and political wasteland, before it was put down, along with its 
shadowy racism and chauvinism, after the Allied victory in World War II.  But the more durable 
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ideological opponent to welfare capitalism was communism, which first found its political reality 
in Russia in 1917.  The geopolitical terrain that emerged from the Second World War was bi-
polar, demarcated by two superpowers and their attendant ideologies: the United States, 
champion of democracy and capitalism, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, purveyor of 
the planned economy and universal social provision.  Each worked tirelessly to court or compel 
other counties into its sphere of influence.  Despite the ideological imperative toward 
internationalism, the Soviet Union under Stalin pulled back to an aim of “socialism in one 
country,” avoiding an all-out conflict with the West.  And capital, for all its potential valorization 
in new markets, was held in check geographically by the Iron Curtain and the regulatory 
mechanisms of the post-Depression era.  There existed an open ideological struggle throughout 
this period between these competing visions for the organization of society. 
 Thus, the degradation and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 was hailed as 
the victory of liberal ideology over that of state socialism.  And with this political fall, so too fell 
the artificial constraints that had dammed up the flow of international and transnational 
connectivity.
10
 Suddenly, it seemed as though countries around the world were on the same page: 
no longer would there be an ideological counterweight to liberal capitalism.  There was only one 
way forward – into a new, fully globalized, capitalist political economy. 
 In these heady days, social observers rushed to theorize the meaning behind the creation 
of the new geopolitical landscape, a phenomenon which has come to be called globalization.  For 
some, the narrative was unabashedly triumphant.  The collapse of the Soviet Union represented 
the “end of history,” as Francis Fukuyama (1992) titled his book on the subject, ironically 
twisting Marx’s prediction into a paean to the victory of liberalism as the only viable or 
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 To paraphrase Marx: the legal and ideological constraints that had been put into place in the 20
th
 century to 
prevent class warfare and economic depression became so many fetters. They had to be burst asunder; they were 
burst asunder. 
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legitimate economic and political system.
11
  The end of the Cold War, with its supposed 
consensus of rational liberalism would also bring forth a new era of perpetual peace.  This 
viewpoint was trumpeted most loudly by the public intellectual Thomas Friedman (1999).  
Noting that no two countries with a McDonald’s restaurant have ever gone to war with one 
another, he suggests that economic globalization not only promotes prosperity and development, 
but actively discourages conflict and instability, since these interrupt the integration that enables 
participation in the global system of wealth creation.  Moreover, Friedman (2005) views the 
advent of globalization as an era of unfettered opportunity for individuals willing to make the 
most of the new integrated circumstances.  “The world is flat,” he argues, and anyone with 
access to the Internet can bypass traditional confines of geography and become players in the 
global economy as individuals.  Globalization 3.0, as he terms it, is not a story of corporations 
seeking new markets and bringing the world closer through trade.  Rather it is a liberal utopia, 
ushered in by a technological revolution, where each man or woman becomes an entrepreneur, 
equal in access, unequal by merit.  It is individualism triumphant in the form of a modem. 
However, not all social thinkers drew the same conclusions as the early apologists of the 
new world economy, presaged by the Soviet collapse.  While acknowledging that individuals 
were indeed free to compete with one another, unimpeded by geographic location, this more 
critical voice focused on the competition rather than the freedom.  For scholars working in the 
tradition of Marxian analysis, globalization was the not-entirely-unexpected fruition of 
capitalism’s natural trajectory.  The “short 20th century” may have slowed capital’s natural 
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 Indeed, Fukuyama’s chief concern with the advent of historylessness is his fear of boredom, the obviousness of 
rationally calculated action precluding a diversity of options or opinions.  One is reminded of the liberals of 
yesteryear who lamented the growth of the middle class society for fear it would enshrine mediocrity (Mill 1978).  
Indeed, Schumpeter (2008) expresses deep concern that human civilization will no longer be beautiful, should 
income inequality be mitigated, since it will lack palatial estates which require maintenance by a servant class. (And 
to which Lenin might answer, ‘Beautiful for whom?’  And to which an industrial laborer might add, ‘We want 
bread, but we want roses, too!’)  
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tendency toward expansion, but it could not stop it.  And just as Marx’s “reserve army of labor” 
operated to keep wages to a minimum in relation to the profits of capital within a national 
economy, so now would reserve armies abroad operate to depress wages in developed countries. 
From this general perspective, critics discuss globalization as a “race to the bottom,” whereby 
countries, in competition for the employment possibilities opened by rootless multinational 
corporations, would continuously undercut one another on labor costs, workers’ rights, 
environmental protection and so forth (Chan 2003, Mazur 2000, Rodrik 1997). 
 For others, also working in the Marxian vein, it is not merely cold competition that brings 
valorization to capital in the global era, but also a return to primitive accumulation though  a full-
on pillaging of resources in under-developed countries, justified by the philosophy of 
neoliberalism.  Globalization may be a movement of capital, but it requires transnational 
institutions of global governance to ensure seamless trade.
12
  Geographer David Harvey (2005) 
shows how, repeatedly and in many different contexts, pressure (or even coercion) by global 
governance institutions on to sovereign states to conform to a state-model that benefits freer 
trade has resulted in windfall profits to Western financial institutions and a drain on the national 
wealth in underdeveloped economies.  In the name of markets, states are transformed, and the 
transformation often entails a fire-sale of national industries to private companies of the 
developed West.  For Harvey, this transfer of wealth is not an unintentional effect of global 
integration, but instead is its very purpose. 
 These economic processes are only one aspect of globalization, however. Another 
dimension exists in our transformed relationship to space and place. The nation-state did not 
                                                 
12
 Although the Bretton Woods global governance organizations – the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
and the World Trade Organization – have been roundly criticized for their role in neoliberal globalization, their 
origin was far from neoliberal.  The organizations are the brain-children of John Maynard Keynes and were 
conceived as a sort of global safety net.  
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“wither away” as globalization advanced.  Instead, states determined the variable means by 
which globalization proceeded (Basinger and Hallerberg 2004).  But the role of the nation-state 
in this new era is decidedly ambivalent. The nation-state wanes in importance as “global cities” 
emerge and become the key locus of new transnational power centers (Sassen 2002). 
Globalization represents a new ways of thinking about space and time, the latest advance in 
modernity’s time-space compression (Giddens 1990).  Technology has linked distant 
geographies into networks that play an increasingly important role in the construction of society 
(Castells 1996).  We conceive ourselves as connected to people around the world in a 
“globalization of empathy” that fosters a subjectivity of cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006).   
 But the local is not lost in the wide berth of cosmopolitan feeling. The local becomes the 
site of expression of globalization in diverse and idiosyncratic encounters (Appadurai 1996).  It 
is in localities that ordinary citizens must confront the changes wrought by globalization, and, in 
some instances, organize against them as activists in social movements. 
 
Social Movements and Society 
 The field of social movement studies was indelibly altered in the 1960s in response to the 
Civil Rights Movement.  Prior study of collective behavior was steeped in social psychology, 
emphasizing the “strain” that affected certain groups in society or the relative disparity that 
encouraged radical revolt.  In light of the Civil Rights Movement, such theories lost their 
applicability: the strain of racism and discrimination were certainly not new in the 1950s, and the 
organized, nonviolent character of the protest belied the “irrationality” of reaction that was 
predicted by functionalist approaches to collective action.  Young scholars began to put forward 
new approaches to social movements that represented nothing less than a paradigm shift in the 
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discipline.  Social movements became a normalized practice in a pluralist society where varied 
interest groups compete to achieve their aims outside official channels.  Movement participants 
were rational actors whose success was based upon the mobilization of financial resources 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977), the building of organizational structures (Minkoff 1995, but see also 
Piven and Cloward 1977), and the recognition and use of political opportunities (McAdam 
1982).   
This paradigm shift produced a flourishing and lively scholarship while the various 
dimensions of mobilization were unpacked and explored.  But, as Andrew Walder (2009) points 
out, this new emphasis on mobilization came at a cost.  “In a way that very few appear to have 
recognized,” he writes, “the emerging resource mobilization tradition did not simply offer a 
different perspective on social movements; it changed the question that was being asked, 
radically narrowing the intellectual horizons of the field” (Walder 2009, pp. 398).  Once the 
subjective political and ideological orientation of movements was made relative under an 
assumption of normalized interest-group politics, and also once the overarching social structure 
was removed from the theoretical scope of social movement studies, the field necessarily limited 
itself to questions about which conditions spur or inhibit mobilization. 
 After several decades of research in resource mobilization and political process, the field 
of social movements made another major shift in focus.  The new dramatic flourishing in social 
movement scholarship came to be called the “cultural turn,” because its emphasis was on the 
symbolic work of movement activity.  Principle among these was framing theory (Snow et al. 
1986).  Framing theory borrowed its principle idea from Goffman (1974), that people use 
interpretive schemata to make sense of new encounters or information.  Snow et al. (1986) made 
the connection between the claims that movements make and their ability to recruit participants.  
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This connection gave new life to social movement studies, as the dimensions of movement 
rhetoric could now be taken apart and examined for resonance and subsequent probabilities of 
success.  Framing studies became the new dominant paradigm in social movement studies and 
the bulk of new studies incorporated framing theory into their analyses.
13
  Moving beyond 
framing, other scholars used narrative analysis to explore the cultural work of activists, seeking 
the meaning in the plot line that activists tell themselves (e.g. Polletta 2006). 
Continuing into the cultural turn, scholars looked at the role of identity in the formation 
of movements.  With the rise of the New Social Movements (Melucci 1980, Pichardo 1997), 
which formed around identity issues like gender, sexuality, ethnicity and disability, the notion of 
mobilizing identity became increasingly topical (Polletta and Jasper 2001).  Moreover, as the 
Regan Democrats left scholars of class analysis wondering why people were not motivated to 
vote according to their economic interests, the motivational power of identity, particularly 
identities held in common – collective identities – became of analytic importance.  The interest 
in identity led from there to an interest in emotions in protest (Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta 
2001).  Attachment to identity is affective, and some scholars looked to other affective responses 
in the mobilization, such as neighborhood affiliation (Gould 1995) or moral shocks (Jasper and 
Poulsen 1995).   
Framing, narrative, emotions and identity have been thoroughly explored to explain who 
joins movements, how movements mobilize and why they succeed.  Often, these cultural 
analyses focus upon “micro-mobilization,” which considers the appeal of particular movements 
to particular target groups and distinguishes itself from the “macro-mobilization” of shifting 
opportunity structures.  But whether the object of analysis exists at the macro or micro level, the 
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 The literature on movement framing is far too exhaustive to list and review here, but several key sources include: 
Benford 1997, Benford and Snow 2000, Clemens 1996, Johnston and Noakes 2005, McCammon et al 2004, 
Steinberg 1998, Zald 1996. 
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question still centers upon mobilization.  The fixation on mobilization has limited the 
sociological imagination of social movement studies, such that there has not been a major 
theoretical advancement since the cultural turn a quarter century ago. The nuances of framing 
and identity work have been so thoroughly exhausted that one critic has proclaimed that “the 
field needs new questions more urgently than it needs new answers” (Walder 2009, pp. 407).  
There have been some key exceptions, however, from the mobilization paradigm since 
the 1970s.  Haines’ (1984) study of the radical flank effect in the Civil Rights Movement took 
the ideological position of movements seriously as a point of analysis.  Polletta (2002) has 
explored the organizational form of consensus as a symbol with a shifting representation over 
time.  McAdam’s  (1988) book Freedom Summer and Isaac’s (2009) research on the labor 
problem novel have paved the way for the possibility of important innovations in the effect of 
social movements on the larger national culture and on cultural production.  We are just 
beginning to see the cultural importance of movements, but there has been little study of the 
importance of culture for movements; in other words, how the shape, form and expression of 
movements may be derivative of larger social practice. Swidler (1995) made a similar point in 
her review of social movements and culture, saying: 
 “Rethinking how culture might work from the outside is a large task…But I am 
convinced that if interest in culture is restricted to studying the inner meaning 
systems of deeply committed activists, or if culture is relegated to a vague – or 
“constitutive” – penumbra, we will sacrifice more incisive ways of thinking about 
its power” (pp. 39).   
The current literature only studies movements as vehicles of cultural expression; but movements 
exist within societies, and can be studied sui generis, as historically contingent expressions in 
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themselves.  The absence of such studies represents a sizable gap in the current literature on 
social movements, one which this dissertation aims to fill. 
 
Transnational Activism 
 When we bring to mind civil society in the context of globalization, the study of 
transnational activism is natural to follow. The term “transnational” has become the established 
sub-disciplinary jargon (e.g. Tarrow 2005), but what exactly is “transnational” about 
transnational movements?  When immigration scholars discuss “transnationalism,” they are 
referring to individuals whose lives take place in two different countries.  In their personhood, 
they straddle borders, their lives affected by and affecting both countries simultaneously (e.g. 
Levitt 2001). Transnational movements often do have their roots in particular individuals, who 
have the capability to mobilize in one location but a conscience tuned to another locale. Tarrow 
(2005) calls these “rooted cosmopolitans,” in an ironic inversion of Stalin’s anti-Semitic 
campaign. But what is “transnational” in the study of movements is not any particular individual 
who straddles borders, but rather the project or goal that is held in common amongst actors in 
multiple countries. 
 One of the seminal works in the field of transnational activism was Keck and Sikkink’s 
(1998) book Activists Beyond Borders. They showed how groups in different countries formed 
networks around their shared interest, be it environmental issues, women’s issues or human 
rights.  Once united, these networks could use their different geographic locations to overcome 
barriers that were insurmountable alone. They describe the “boomerang” model, whereby 
activists in non-democratic regimes can ask their peers in more democratic states to lobby their 
own governments to put pressure on the non-democratic state to bring about change. 
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 By the late 1990s, it was clear to scholars that more and more movements were involved 
in these transnational networks.  But the scholarship of transnational activism exploded 
following the 2001 “Battle of Seattle,” where coordinated activist groups from multiple 
countries, representing diverse constituencies, came together to protest the annual convention of 
the World Trade Organization. This protest gave new meaning to the phenomenon of 
transnational activism. While there were historical examples of transnational advocacy work in 
the abolitionist movement, for example (Stamatov 2010), the dramatic increase in these linkages 
now had a new urgency and origin – global movements were necessary to fight a global foe (e.g. 
Foust 2010, McDonald 2006, Smith and Johnston 2002).  Additionally, the creation of the 
European Union, and the rise of the World Trade Organization, suggested that movements now 
must appeal to institutions of supra-national or even “global” governance (Fox and Brown 1998, 
Graubart 2008, Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997, Waterman 2004).  Finally, the creation of 
the World Social Forum as a civil society counterweight to the World Economic Forum in Davos 
gave embodiment to the transnationality of protest in the modern globalized era (e.g. de Sousa 
Santos 2006, Escobar 2004, Fisher and Ponniah 2003, Smith and Reese 2008). 
To a large extent, though, the study of transnational activism uses the same theoretical 
roots as its progenitor, social movement studies, and has been constrained by the same 
limitations that currently affect that field.  Its central organizing questions remain the “how” and 
“why” of mobilization, and it answers these questions with variations on resource mobilization 
(Bagic 2006,Coy 1997, Pagnucco 1997), political opportunity structure (Lewis 2000, Marks and 
McAdam 1999, Passy 1999), framing (Alvarez 2000, Olesen 2006, Smith 2002), tactical 
repertoire diffusion (Ayers 2005, Chabot 2000, McAdam and Rucht 1993), and the creation of 
collective identities (della Porta 2004, Dufour and Giraud 2007, Ferree and Pudrovska 2006) and 
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other coalition-building practices (Bandy and Smith 2005, Nepstad 2002).  In other words, 
transnational activism is social movement activism with some necessary adaptations to 
accommodate greater cultural divides and a supra-national opportunity structure.  Social 
movement theories, therefore, are usefully employed in order to tell us more about transnational 
activism; but the transnational dimension of transnational activism provides us little value-added 
theoretically. 
Studies of transnational activism would be helped by examining a comparative case – one 
where the contrast between a purely national and a globally interconnected movement would be 
clearly delineated.  Such a contrast can be found between the Soviet Union and contemporary 
Russia. 
 
Social Movements in Russia 
 The stamp of Communist rule weighs heavily on the literature of citizen action in post-
Soviet area studies.  Frequently, scholars isolate the importance of historical communism by 
contrasting the experiences of Eastern Europe to those of the West.  The prevailing view is that a 
“Soviet legacy” has placed a damper on movement activity and civic engagement (Dawson 1999, 
Laitin 2000, Howard 2003).   
 Among the more empirically robust of these studies comes from Howard (2003) who 
used a large data set to compare social engagement in Russia, the former East Germany and the 
former West Germany.  He found that former East German’s participation in voluntary 
associations and civic activities was significantly less than their Western counterparts, despite 
having the same opportunity structure.  Instead, East Germans more closely resembled Russians 
in their level of activity.  He attributed the low levels of engagement to the “Soviet legacy.”  He 
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suggests that the forced participation that was demanded by the Soviet government in the form of 
“work weekends” [subbotniki] or union membership has resulted in a mentality that sees 
volunteerism as exploitation.  Gill and Markwick’s (2000) study is also emblematic of the 
common claim that a Soviet legacy stifles the development of civil society. Their version of the 
Soviet legacy is the historical lack of democratic institutions.  But these authors also argue that 
civil society is necessary as a check on authoritarian power.  Without a robust civil sector, 
democracy in Russia is “stillborn.”  Other “legacies” that are criticized as hindering civil society 
include: the Soviet personal patronage system (Rose 2000) the “good-tsar” mentality, which 
predates even the Soviet era in Russia (Bova 2003) and the dual-state repressive apparatus 
(Sakwa 2011).  
 Soviet legacy is not the only culprit in the literature for the lackluster state of civil 
society.  Among those studying social movements, an oft-repeated refrain is that foreign funding 
diminishes the vitality of civil society by divorcing activists from the population at large.  The 
seminal work in this vein is Henderson’s (2003) study of women’s organizations in Russia.  She 
finds that the reliance on foreign funding reduces the need to reach out to local populations and 
convince them to support women’s issues.  Moreover, activists who receive foreign funds are 
often required to focus on issues that are important to foreign granting agencies, which may 
leave neglected those concerns that actually matter to the population that is ostensibly being 
served.  It also leaves activists open to attack by the state as being “un-Russian” or in foreign 
employ (Henry 2010).  Hence, the legacy of the past is only half the story, as new conditions, 
such as transnational activism, also alter dynamics on the ground for activists seeking change 
and must be taken into account. 
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The Russian Environmental Movement 
 Although contemporary scholars may bemoan the lackluster state of Russian civil society 
today, there was great excitement amongst observers at the outpouring of civic activity during 
perestroika, and at the vanguard of this outpouring of activism was the environmental 
movement.  More so than many other contemporary social movements, environmentalism has a 
long history of continuous activism in Russia.  By the nineteenth century, Russian nobles had 
begun preserving large tracts of land, mainly for game reserves, but also with a sentimental 
consideration for the natural world (Weiner 1988).  Following the 1917 revolution, 
environmentalists, who mainly drew their ranks from the natural sciences, began to lobby key 
Bolsheviks on behalf of environmental preservation.  This resulted in the zapovedniki, the largest 
system of pristine preservation lands in the world.  The justification for the zapovedniki was not 
on behalf of nature in and of itself, but rather on behalf of science.  Ecosystems needed to be 
studied as contained systems in themselves, without human interference, or so the scientists 
argued in order to gain Bolshevik support for their environmentalist endeavor.  Science, unlike 
environmentalism, fit the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the time and worked to preserve the 
natural world from wanton domination and rapid industrialization.   
 Environmentalism preserved itself in the Soviet era, also, by attaching itself to the official 
state apparatus.  Activist scientists established the All-Russian Society for the Protection of 
Nature (VOOP), the Moscow Society of Naturalists (MOIP), and the All-Union Botanical 
Society.   For the most part, the Soviet government allowed environmentalists to continue their 
activism because protecting the environment was not viewed as politically threatening to the 
elite, as other dissident groups were.  Environmental activists could frame themselves as patriotic 
and as being good communists, since they were defending the motherland and working for the 
45 
 
greater good (Weiner 1999).  While environmentalists did not completely escape Stalin’s purges, 
and the zapovednik system faced major threats and incursions during the 1950s, the movement 
continued its low levels of activity.  It succeeded in preserving large tracts of pristine lands from 
human encroachment, but it remained a fairly elitist movement, peopled with scientists and 
sympathetic members of the intelligentsia and it generally did not interact with or engage the 
public at large. 
 This began to change in the 1960s and 1970s as the movement again began to grow.  
These years saw the formation of the student-led nature protection brigade, called the druzhiny, 
under the auspices of the Komsomol.  This student club involved itself in many activities geared 
toward nature protection.  It was particularly known for its efforts to end poaching and to enforce 
hunting, fishing and lumber licensing.  Through Komsomol publications and congresses, the 
student movement fostered a national campaign for environmental protection (Weiner 1999).   
 Despite the efforts of committed activists, the Soviet Union could hardly be called a good 
steward of the Earth.  Rapid development often came at the expense of nature.  Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, as it was painted during the Stalin years, suggested man’s mastery over nature, bending 
the physical world to the proletariat’s will (DeBardeleben 1985).  Dams, river diversions, clear 
cut logging, industrial effluvia and nuclear waste dumping were only some of the examples of 
Soviet development projects undertaken without thought to environmental consequences  (for 
more information on Soviet environmental mismanagement and exploitation, see Feshbach and 
Friendly 1992, Jancar-Webster 1987, Peterson 1993, Pryde 1991) 
 Because of these legitimate and pressing environmental problems, it is not entirely 
surprising that environmental movements became the mouthpiece for social discontent in the late 
Soviet period.  By the time Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist 
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Party in 1985, a large number of problems simmering in the background of Soviet society – from 
corruption, to economic stagnation, to military breakdown, to the environment –came suddenly 
to the fore.  Gorbachev shocked the nation by initiating his program of perestroika, or 
“restructuring” to address the problems in the fraying Soviet system.  A critical component of 
this plan was his call for glasnost – or openness and transparency – in a society that had been 
controlled by censors for decades.  For the first time in modern memory, critics could vocalize 
their dissent without reprisal; political prisoners were pardoned; corrupt officials were exposed 
and removed; the press finally published what had previously been repressed (Hosking 2001; see 
also Yurchak 2006).  These were heady days of hope and uncertainty, and it proved a good 
climate for environmentalism to grow. 
 In the wake of perestroika and glasnost, a civil eruption took place calling for 
environmental protection, and environmentalism became the first truly mass movement in Soviet 
Russia (Pryde 1991, Yanitsky 1993).  When the liberalizing Soviet government under Gorbachev 
decided to allow citizens to form informal organizations independent of the state, hundreds of 
local groups appeared in cities across Russia for the protection of nature (Yanitsky 2002).   
Environmental public meetings and rallies saw participation figures in the tens of thousands 
(Green 1990).  In 1989, the Socio-Ecological Union mobilized the first Soviet nationwide protest 
that successfully prevented construction of a planned canal (Weiner 1999).  During this time, 
environmental protest successfully closed or prevented the construction of more than fifty 
nuclear reactors, as well as a number of hydroelectric stations and gas pipelines (Henry 2006).  
When the Soviet Union held its first open elections in 1990, environmentalists put forward 
candidates and won offices (Pickvance 1997, Rihoux and Rudig 2006).  
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 Scholars have put forth a few theories to explain the sudden explosion in environmental 
activism in the 1980s.  Historian Douglas Weiner (1999) makes a strong case for what social 
movement scholars call “indigenous organization.”  After tracing the environmental movement 
in the Soviet Union from the revolution to the collapse, he suggests that environmentalists 
became the voice of discontent mainly because they were there; the authoritarian Soviet 
government made an effort to quell and dispel other dissident groups, but left the 
environmentalists alone as they were seen as eccentric and non-threatening.  Their very presence 
allowed them to be in the right place at the right time. 
 Political scientist Jane Dawson (1996) studied environmental groups in Ukraine, 
Lithuania, Tatarstan and Russia and determined that environmental claims often cloaked and 
gave legitimacy to another movement that was building at the time: nationalism.  Again, it was 
the safety of environmentalist claims that allowed other movements that were more politically 
threatening to the Soviet government to “piggy-back” on the environmental movement to reach 
their own ends.  She calls this “eco-nationalism,” and she shows how these movements used the 
language of nuclear waste and environmental hazard to express outrage at Moscow’s imperial-
like control over their allegedly national resources.  But Dawson (1996) notes that eco-
nationalism was less likely to explain environmental movements in Russia itself, since Russians 
were less likely to feel ethnic hostility toward the Soviet government, which was dominated by 
ethnic Russians.   
Nevertheless, Russia, too, witnessed an explosion of environmental activism in the 1980s.  
Nationalism and indigenous organization themselves cannot fully account for this activity.  Not 
to be dismissed among the causes of the sudden growth of the environmental movement is the 
very legitimate concern among Soviet citizens with environmental problems and the existential 
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threat that environmental degradation posed.  Within six months of Gorbachev’s speech 
announcing glasnost, unit four of the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl exploded, releasing a 
cloud of radioactive particles that spread from Western Europe to Japan (Petryna 2002).  
Additional disclosures of industrial pollution and its effects on public health also made 
environmental protection a top priority among the public at large. Among the most pressing was 
the radioactive waste released from the Mayak nuclear facility near Chelyabinsk (Dalton, Garb, 
Lovrich, Pierce and Whiteley 1999) and the disease-causing effluvium from a factory in Kirishi 
(Weiner 1999).  These disclosures sounded the bell-weather for Soviet-style industrialization 
and, indeed, for the Soviet system itself. 
The end of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era as the government attempted the largest 
transfer of ownership from public to private hands ever attempted in modern history.  Called 
“shock therapy,” the theory was that sudden and total privatization would be the quickest route to 
a functional market-based economy.  The result was a near total economic collapse.  But the 
economy was not the only part of Russian society to begin a downward spiral: environmental 
activism, too, faced a rapid decline in the post-Soviet years.  The momentum that had reached a 
crescendo during perestroika suddenly came to a halt.  The decline in movement activity was 
certainly not due to improvements in environmental conditions after the Soviet Union dissolved.  
While rates of pollution fell precipitously during these years, the change can be entirely 
attributed to industrial collapse.  But pollution as measured per unit of GNP actually increased 
during the 1990s (Oldfield 2005).   
In exploring the decline in environmentalism, one must account for the political and 
economic changes in Russia at the time.  Russia in the 1990s was characterized by industrial 
decay, massive unemployment, hyperinflation, speculation, profiteering, fraud, tax evasion, 
49 
 
mafia capitalism, and finally bankruptcy, default and currency devaluation in 1998.  For this 
reason, it seems reasonable to assume that the sudden decline in environmental activism is 
related to the economic crises of the 1990s and the existential insecurity that comes from 
problems of unemployment, hyperinflation and payment arrears.  Russians in the 1990s would 
fall very low on the scale of Inglehart’s “postmaterialist values” (Inglehart 199514)  Few seem to 
question that environmental issues would take a backseat to putting food on the table and 
keeping a roof over one’s head.  In a country plagued by economic woes such as Russia in the 
1990s, one could only expect environmental movement decline.  
However, political scientist Stephen Whitefield (2003) has refuted this easy answer.  He 
has suggests instead that it is a problem of poor movement framing.  Using survey response data, 
he finds that willingness to pay for environmental protection fell 20 percent between 1993 and 
2001, from 58.5 percent to 38.3 percent, and that willingness to trade environmental protection 
for employment opportunities tripled.  This would seem like evidence for the postmaterialist 
values hypothesis, but he dismisses this claim because environmental values declined for all 
segments of the population, including those who saw their standard of living increase after the 
fall of the Soviet Union.  He suggests that the movement has suffered because it could not 
successfully reframe environmentalism for the post-Soviet context.  Previously, the Soviet 
government had been the target of the movement; and once the target was removed, there was no 
enemy to blame for continuing ecological degradation.  
                                                 
14
 Interestingly, Russia confounded Inglehart’s models of environmentalism as a post-materialist value in the early 
1990s because support for environmentalists and concern for environmental issues were equally high for people 
ascribing to materialist values as to postmaterialist values in Russia at the time (Inglehart 1995).  He attributes this 
to Chernobyl, but it also reinforces the importance of the environmentalist explosion that took place in the period of 
late perestroika. To emphasize the disastrous consequences of the Soviet collapse in the 1990s, it is also worthwhile 
to consider Inglehart’s value surveys, where he found a significant and precipitous drop in subjective well-being 
among Russians between 1985 and 1995, to the extent that Russia and other post-communist countries held the 
lowest levels of subjective well-being ever recorded. 
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Still others suggest that actions by the Russian state have worked against environmental 
activism.  While the Soviet government was no friend of the Earth, the post-Soviet Russian 
government has made environmental activism more difficult.  State hostility towards 
environmentalism has been especially virulent since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000.  In 
that year, by presidential decree, Putin abolished the State Committee for Environmental 
Protection as well as the State Forestry Committee, placing their duties under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Natural Resources.  Putin argued that this was necessary to minimize bureaucracy 
and eliminate redundancy, but the eliminated committees were focused on protecting natural 
resources, while the ministry that was empowered was geared toward their extraction and 
exploitation (Massa and Tynkkynen 2001, Peterson and Bielke 2001, Henry 2002, 2006).  And, 
indeed, heavy resource extraction and export has become the linchpin of the post-Soviet Russian 
economy (Turnock 2001). 
The state has tried to paint environmentalists and other progressive activists as “un-
Russian” and in the employ of foreign governments (Henry 2010).  The state has also shown a 
willingness to prosecute those who speak out against environmental misconduct, as the trials of 
Alexander Nikitin and Grigory Pasko, two environmental whistleblowers, clearly show.  Both 
Nikitin and Pasko had spoken to foreign media about nuclear waste dumping, and both were 
charged with treason (Henry 2002).  On a local level, environmental groups have reported 
harassment by the state through police break up of demonstrations and bureaucrats intentionally 
causing difficulties with tax inspection and registration filing (Henry 2010).  Signatures on 
petitions or referenda supporting environmentalism are routinely disqualified by the Central 
Election Commission (Henry 2002).  A law on nonprofit funding has made it extremely difficult 
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for organizations to raise money from abroad, which has been a chief source of revenue for many 
environmental groups (Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow 2014, Henry 2010). 
Meanwhile, the government’s manipulation of nature protection on the international 
scene is often described as cynical, at best.   The Soviet government actively sought 
environmental cooperation with the West, but in the post-Soviet era, treaties with the West are a 
kind of “smokestack diplomacy” (Darst 2001), where governments in Eastern Europe hold 
nature hostage, only agreeing to clean up cross-border pollution in exchange for western 
financial resources, facility upgrades or technology sharing.  Unlike the United States, Russia 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2004; however, this support came less from concern about global 
warming than from financial self-interest.  The Protocol stated that participating countries should 
cut their greenhouse gas emissions to 5.2 percent their 1990 level.  Because of the post-Soviet 
industrial collapse, Russia had already achieved this reduction without altering any 
infrastructure.  Additionally, by threatening to walk away from the Kyoto Protocol, Russia 
successfully negotiated to double its allotted number of carbon “sinks” from the 17 megatons per 
year stipulated at Bonn to 33 megatons per year granted at Marrakesh (Raghunandan 2003). 
Carbon “sinks” can be used to offset a nation’s emissions or may be traded to other nations for 
carbon credit.  Russia could thus continue its industrial development while also earning revenue 
through the sale of its high carbon credits, all within the rubric of the Kyoto Protocol.  
Meanwhile, Russian submarines have planted flags under the ice sheet in the Arctic Ocean to 
claim the off-shore oil and gas deposits that will open up once the polar caps melt (Zarakhovich 
2007).
15
  Perhaps the most cynical move by the Russian government was its plan to import 
approximately 21,000 tons of radioactive nuclear waste from foreign governments for storage in 
                                                 
15
 To be fair, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway have also been struggling to claim deposits under the 
Arctic ice sheet (Krauss et al. 2005). 
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Siberia to earn a sum of US$ 20 billion.  This plan was phenomenally unpopular with the 
Russian people and environmental activists initiated a nationwide campaign to hold a 
referendum.  With 93 percent of the public expressing disapproval for the plan, the legislation 
was finally withdrawn (Henry 2010). 
Sociologist Oleg Yanitsky (2000), the foremost authority on the Russian environmental 
movement provided a more structural analysis for the plight of environmental activism.  He 
would agree with those who, like Inglehart, would expect activism to subside during periods of 
crisis, but Yanitsky suggests that two forces operated simultaneously to make the situation in 
Russia in the 1990s much worse.  He draws upon the “risk society” theory of Ulrich Beck (1992) 
to describe Russia as the “society of all-encompassing risk.”  In the risk society, risk is produced 
for the advancement of wealth, but in the society of “all-encompassing risk” the production of 
risk has so outstripped the production of wealth that risk becomes the dominant currency.  He 
also theorizes the existence of an “energy of collapse” that began with the original failure of the 
Soviet system, but then took on a life of its own and became exponentially worse, as one 
collapse started a chain reaction.  He describes it as the inverse of resource mobilization.  When 
the energy of collapse begins to spiral, it cannot but drag the environmental movement down 
with it. 
Yet Yanitsky’s analysis also places blame at the feet of the state, or at least of the elites in 
the nomenklatura.  He sees the 1991 reform as a lost opportunity for ecological revolution. The 
consciousness was there, the demand for an environmentally sustainable state was there, but 
elites, eager to shore up their own power and position, only morphed the Soviet regime so far as 
they absolutely had to in order to maintain their power and privilege.  What might have been a 
green revolution, Yanitsky claims, ended up being the same wolf only now in sheep’s clothing.   
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However, Yanitsky also presents a typology of green activists in Russia that crosses the 
spectrum of ecological dispositions.  He lists them as: the conservationists, the alternativists, the 
traditionalists, the civil initiatives, the ecopoliticians, the ecopatriots, and the ecotechnocrats.  
Each has a disposition toward the new post-Soviet regime that affects its valuation of the 
ecological crisis and what can be done about it. 
 In her recent book on the Russian environmental movement, political scientist Laura 
Henry (2010) provides an organizational analysis of the contemporary environmental movement 
in Russia.  She separates movement organizations into a typology of grassroots, professional and 
governmental-affiliate organizations.  Each fills a niche in post-Soviet society, but the lack of 
cooperation between them keeps them all weak.  Grassroots organizations have the support of 
the local populace, but they have few financial resources and seldom tackle large initiatives.  
Professional organizations raise money from international donors to tackle large or abstract 
environmental problems such as biodiversity loss or climate change, but they have little support 
from the general population and have a hostile relationship with the state.  Government affiliates 
work closely with the state, but for that reason lack the critical edge that is needed to bring about 
change.  Henry goes on to suggest an elective affinity between organizations, their leaders’ 
background, their funding sources, and their tactics. 
 The legacy of socialism and totalitarianism are ever-present tropes in the study of 
Russian civil society in general, and in the turbulent history of environmentalism in particular. 
However, the journey of this movement from one context to another opens the door for scholars 
to explore how civil society acts and interacts, and what this, in turn, means for human freedom, 
in the past and in our globalized present. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
LAKE BAIKAL AND THE HISTORY OF BAIKAL ACTIVISM 
 
 This chapter introduces us to the case that will ground this investigation into civil society 
and its relationship to the structures in which it is embedded.  Lake Baikal, located in Eastern 
Siberia, is the oldest, deepest and most voluminous lake on Earth, filled with exceptionally pure 
freshwater. Activists have been struggling to protect the lake since the 1950s and have continued 
to do so across rapidly changing political and economic terrains.  In the Soviet Union, civil 
society was largely constrained by a state that desired to control all the social fields of action – 
not just the field of power itself.  Environmental civil society managed to coalesce to confront 
this force when its environmentally destructive tactics threatened to encroach upon Baikal. 
However, without more ability to access power, the public outcry of environmental civil society 
had little influence on developmental outcomes. 
 
Lake Baikal 
 While visiting Ulan-Ude, the capital of Buryatia, to interview environmental activists on 
the lake’s eastern shore, I stopped into a poznaya16 for dinner.  The little café was about 15 feet 
by 10 feet and had only eight tables that were flimsy contraptions.  I went up to a window in the 
far wall to place my order: two pozi and a cup of black tea.  The lady behind the window 
informed me that it would be a 20 minute wait for the pozi, but I assured her I was in no hurry.  I 
                                                 
16
 A poznaya is an eating establishment that serves Buryat cuisine, particularly the regional specialty – pozi.  Pozi 
are beef dumplings. While there are a number of ways to prepare pozi, the most common is to steam the dumpling.  
The proper way to eat steamed pozi, as every local will inform you, is to nibble a small hole in the pastry and suck 
out the fatty juices within before eating the meat and pastry together. 
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chose the smallest of the tables against the wall and began scribbling notes from my recent 
conversation. 
 The poznaya was not empty.  There was a party of five men, ranging in age from early 20 
to late 40s, two Russians and three Buryats. It was evident that they had been drinking and were 
still at it.  Their jocularity and frivolity were also entwined with bouts of anger, and the volume 
of their ejaculations was consistently increasing.  A babushka with grey hair cast hateful glances 
in their direction each time their noise level increased. A mother with two small children finished 
her meal and scurried her brood past the raucous table, scolding the men for their language as she 
passed.  I was also beginning to wish that I had not agreed to wait the 20 minutes for the pozi.   
 One of the men at the table began to call out in my direction, “Devushka! Devushka! Ty 
menya ni znaesh, chto li?” [Girl! Girl! Don’t you know me?]  I buried my face in my field notes 
and pretended not to hear.  The calling continued, and I continued to ignore it.  Suddenly, the 
voice was standing beside me – a Buryat man with a large build, in his late 30s. He swayed 
slightly and spoke too loudly for comfort, his drunkenness showing through.  “Why didn’t you 
call me?” he demanded. 
 “Leave me alone,” I replied. 
 “Don’t you remember me?  You promised you would call and you never called.” 
 “I don’t know you,” I said. “We are not acquainted.” 
 “Yes, we are. We met at the discothèque in November. Don’t you remember me?” 
 “Here in Ulan Ude?” I asked him. 
 “Yes,” he said.  
 “That is impossible,” I told him. “Today is the first time I have ever been in Ulan Ude. I 
have never been here before.” 
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 “Really? Today is your first time in Ulan Ude?” I nodded, and began to worry I had said 
too much. “Forgive me. You look just like a lady I met in November. So what brings you to 
Buryatia?” 
 I told him that I was a graduate student and that I was studying environmental protection 
around Lake Baikal.  His eyes suddenly widened. 
 “Baikal? You are here to study Baikal?”  
 “Yes.” 
 “Let me tell you about Baikal!” He said, now seating himself beside me, his tone 
suddenly very serious.  “People come from all over to study Baikal, but they will never know it.  
It is immeasurable!  They try to measure it, but they can’t.  It is always changing.  Do you know 
how deep it is? You can’t even imagine it, it’s so deep!” His slurred speech punctuated certain 
words with enthusiasm and wonder.  “Baikal is incomprehensible! So you should just go home.  
You came here to study Baikal, but you will never know Baikal. Never.” 
*** 
Baikal occupies a unique place in the Russian psyche.  Everyone knows Baikal, and 
increasing numbers of Russians make the pilgrimage to see it.  It is a landmark of national pride.  
The name “Baikal” is affixed to various Russian products, from computer chips, to vodka, to 
firearms. For those who live near its shores, the lake is regarded with reverent awe, bordering on 
religious mysticism.  The lake is frequently personified and treated as a kind of god or 
supernatural entity.  Themes about the lake’s unknowability and its life force weave through 
discourse about Baikal.  In addition to the ecstatic drunk quoted above, a number of other 
conversations about Baikal that I observed during my time there reiterated the very special 
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attitude locals hold for this treasured place. The following are two more such examples I 
recorded, from a teacher in Irkutsk and a librarian in Baikalsk: 
Teacher: For me, Baikal is that place where all life’s worries and internal stresses 
[disappear]. Thanks to Baikal, I can quickly calm them.  So, for me, first and 
foremost is the living essence that is Baikal. For me, Baikal is alive.  Not only 
that, he is my friend, with whom I come to talk, and who will understand, who 
will support me and give me strength and energy.  Baikal is many things for me.  
Most importantly, when I travel places, when I am abroad, I am always connected 
to it. I always want to return to it. Because, when you spend time at Baikal, you 
will never see the same thing. It is always different.  It is, for me, something 
incomprehensible.  It is impossible to ever really know it, to the end, because it is 
always changing.  This is his character. 
*** 
Librarian: The idea [behind shamanism] is that there are different spirits that 
reside in nature and in particular places.  On Baikal, this is particularly obvious 
and visible [yarko i vidno].  Baikal is a living thing, a living organism. He thinks, 
he understands.  The Buryats and the Evenks understood this. No matter how 
much we study the Lake, we can only understand 1/1000th of it. Baikal is patient 
and loving, but he also has power. And he has great patience with us for our 
stupid acts.  So far, Baikal has been patient with us, but maybe not forever.  He 
hasn’t punished us yet, but he is great and he could punish us. But so far he is 
patient. 
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If Baikal looms large in the public mind, there is good reason.  Lake Baikal is like no 
place else on Earth.  The lake and its environs are ecologically unique, unmatched in the natural 
world.  Baikal bears an enviable list of superlative titles.  It is the oldest, deepest and most 
voluminous lake on the planet.  Its water is amongst the purest in the world.  It is home to 
thousands of endemic species.  The lake is a source of local legend and historical lore, a 
definitive aspect of Eastern Siberia.   
Baikal was formed approximately 25 to 35 million years ago when the Indian 
subcontinent collided with Asia.  The impact caused a split between two fault lines, fracturing 
the earth just north of Mongolia.  The same process that gave rise to the Himalayan mountains 
also brought forth Lake Baikal.  And just as the Himalayans continue to rise, so does Baikal 
continue to widen, growing at a rate of 2 centimeters per year.  However, it is not the width of 
Baikal that astounds, but rather its depth.  Its present depth reaches more than 2 kilometers to its 
sediment floor – the deepest lake on the Earth.  Scientists estimate that the sediment alone 
continues another seven kilometers beneath this.  The astonishing depth of Lake Baikal allows it 
to pool water from more than 330 inflowing streams and rivers, rendering it the most voluminous 
lake on Earth.  Twenty percent of all the Earth’s unfrozen surface freshwater can be found in 
Lake Baikal; it is a freshwater reservoir of global proportions. 
Not only is Baikal shockingly deep, it has still another surprising secret that is not 
repeated elsewhere on the planet: Baikal’s water is oxygenated all the way to its maximum depth 
and supports life even at the lake floor, some 5,387 feet below the surface.  No other deep lake 
can make such a claim.  Other deep lakes show that water below 650 feet is “dead” – it lacks 
oxygen and cannot support life.  Baikal defies this rule.  While scientists have some theories to 
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explain the hospitality of Baikal’s depths, no one can say conclusively the answer to this 
geological, biological and hydrological mystery.
17
 
The secret of Baikal’s purity can be found in one of its astonishing array of endemic 
species – nearly 3,000 in all.  The epicshura baykalensis is a microscopic shrimp that lives 
exclusively in Baikal.  The lake holds literally billions of these tiny creatures who filter-feed for 
organic matter and, in so doing, remove impurities from the water.  The power of these countless 
miniscule crustaceans, and the speed at which they feast on organic matter, defies expectation: a 
carcass of a dead cow that was thrown into the lake would be reduced to a skeleton in a week.  
The result is a water purity that is almost unmatched.  Frozen Baikal water is as transparent as 
glass. The lake’s water is so clean that it is not even recommended for use as drinking water: it 
lacks the vital minerals that human drinking water normally contains.   
While the water of Baikal is miraculously clean, the biota that enacts this miracle is 
decidedly not.  Any harmful toxins, the effluvia of modern industry and development, that find 
their way into Baikal’s watershed are quickly consumed by the epischura, and other small 
crustaceans, and subsequently conveyed into the food chain. As bigger fish eat the smaller fish, 
in increasing quantities, pollutants build up in the bodies of the animals.  The health effect of 
these accumulated pollutants becomes especially consequential in Baikal’s other famous 
endemic denizens: the omul’, the golumyanka, and the nerpa. 
Omul’ is a relative of the salmon and is a Baikal delicacy.  Omul’ is a “must-eat” for 
pescaterian tourists to the region.  Train stops and bus stops are host to kerchiefed babushki 
[elderly women] hocking their family’s catch – steamed or smoked.  Fishing for omul’ is 
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 Although the cause of Baikal’s thorough oxygenation is not known for certain, most scientists agree that the 
intense cold of Siberian winters, which annually causes meter-thick ice to form at the lake’s surface, likely plays a 
role. For this reason, climate change poses a significant threat to Lake Baikal and its thousands of endemic species 
who are uniquely adapted to its oxygenated depth (Thomson 2009).  
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regulated, although poaching is still a common occurrence.  Locals fish for personal 
consumption, as one dimension of subsistence homesteading, and many also fish commercially 
for the resale value.  Because of the heavy human consumption of omul’, and other Baikal fish, 
the toxins and industrial effluvia that find their way into the lake, and subsequently into the food 
chain, become problematic, not only for the environment, but also for human health.  
Golumyanka, another important Baikal endemic, is a highly unusual fish in many 
respects.  It lives throughout the entire depth of Lake Baikal – even a mile below the surface. The 
fish can survive this intensity of water pressure because it has no swim bladder.  Also, its body is 
made almost entirely of fat.  The fish is so translucent that a person can read newsprint through 
its body.  Local fisherman claim that, if you bring the fish to the surface and leave it in the sun, it 
will melt into a puddle of oil.  The golumyanka is also one of the few fish in the world that gives 
birth to live young.  This fatty, deep-swimming fish is the staple diet of the nerpa, and the toxins 
that build up through its own feeding get passed along in this manner to the lake’s largest 
endemic predator. 
The Baikal seal, known locally as the nerpa, is a freshwater seal that is the virtual 
emblem of Lake Baikal.  The nerpa is a close relative of the northern ringed seal, but it resides in 
a freshwater lake that is literally hundreds of miles from the nearest ocean.  No one knows for 
sure how the nerpa arrived in Lake Baikal, but it is believed that their ancestors swam up the 
Yenisei and Angara rivers from the Arctic sea – a journey of some 3,000 miles.  Now 
permanently ensconced, the nerpa are a veritable totem for Lake Baikal.  Their face and likeness 
adorn souvenir stands: embroidered onto tee-shirts, molded out of clay, stuffed as plush toys.  
Seldom seen in the wild, there are two “Sea World” style aquariums near the lake where tourists 
can watch trained nerpa frolic and play.  While they are still hunted for meat and fur, the seals 
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are also protected and their populations are regulated by the government.  But the effects of built 
up toxins in seal blubber has been a greater worry for the species in recent decades than the 
threat of hunting.  Toxins are thought to have caused a massive die-off of nerpa in 1986.  With 
immune systems weakened by toxins, hundreds of these unique animals succumbed to an 
epidemic in canine distemper that year.  The epidemic helped establish the nerpa not only as the 
face of Baikal, but also the frequent face of Baikal environmental activism.   
 
The History of Environmental Activism around Lake Baikal 
The public reverence for Baikal is both a cause and a product of decades of struggle by 
committed environmentalists to protect the lake from anthropogenic harm. When Soviet 
industrial projects first began to encroach on the Baikal basin in the mid-1950s, the lake already 
held a significant sway on the public mind.  The indigenous peoples who had lived in the region 
for centuries had a religious reverence for Baikal that provided a cultural appreciation for the 
lake.  The many scientific institutions in Irkutsk were steadily producing greater knowledge that 
confirmed the lake’s ecological uniqueness and scientific importance.  Moreover, the region 
already had faced the consequences of human overindulgence; in the early 1900s, the Baikal 
sable was hunted to near extinction for its fur. In response, the Imperial government established 
the first zapovednik,
18
 or state nature preserve, on the shore of Lake Baikal in 1917 so as to 
protect and preserve the endangered sable.  Baikal was considered both beautiful and sacred – it 
was a gift, something wondrous, with which rational science and industry should not meddle.   
                                                 
18
 Zapovednik, which translates roughly as “territory where it is forbidden to go,” is one of several designations for 
protected territory in Russia.  Others include national parks, state forests, game reserves and natural monuments.  
Zapovednik is the highest level of preservation and the strictest form of protection, with the aim of completely 
isolating ecosystems from any human interference. Under the Soviet government, the zapovedniki became the 
largest system of nationally protected lands in the world.  For a thorough history of the zapovednik in Russia, see 
Weiner (1999). 
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When the long arm of Soviet industry reached the shore of Baikal, it faced, for the first 
time, massive public opposition, making the lake the national symbol for nature protection. 
Writes historian Nicholas Breyfogle:   
From the late 1950s on, Lake Baikal became the centre of one of the most visible, 
powerful and successful environmental movements in the Soviet Union, which 
deeply influenced environmentalism throughout the USSR (and now Russia). 
Until Chernobyl´ in 1986, and in many respects even after that too, Baikal was the 
environmental cause of the post-World War Two period. Others may have been 
worse in terms of their impact on the natural world (such as the draining of the 
Aral Sea or Chernobyl´), but none grabbed the Soviet imagination more strongly 
or deeply than Baikal (Breyfogle 2015: 147). 
Baikal represents a unique case in Soviet history where public opinion came out actively against 
the state.  As historian Douglas Weiner writes: 
Unlike any previous environmental struggle, the fight to protect the vast lake from 
physical alteration and industrial pollution embraced not only the various 
branches of committed nature protection activists but a broader public as well.  
Such public participation imbued the struggle around the lake with a larger 
meaning as an incipient general protest against the rulers’ abuses of power 
(Weiner 1999: 356). 
The first fight began in 1958 over increasing water flow out of the lake to better feed the Irkutsk 
hydroelectric station.  It was only the first of many. 
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The Grigorovich Plan 
 Over 330 rivers flow into Lake Baikal.  Only one flows out: the Angara.  According to 
Buryat legend, Baikal has 330 sons, but only one daughter, named Angara.  She fell in love with 
Yenisei, and eloped with him. That is why Angara flows away from Baikal and eventually joins 
the Yenisei river, which then continues to the Arctic Sea.  Baikal was so angry that Angara had 
run away, he threw a rock after her.  “Shaman rock” is at the mouth of the Angara, a few feet 
jutting out above the water’s surface, just visible, in the middle of the river.19  
The Angara joins the Irkut River at the city of Irkutsk.  The Soviet government built the 
first dam on the Angara at Irkutsk in 1950 to provide power to the city.  N.A. Grigorovich was 
the chief engineer of the Angara Sector of Girdroproekt, the hydrological planning commission.  
In 1958, he proposed to detonate an explosion at the mouth of the Angara river in order to 
increase the water flow to the hydroelectric dam in Irkutsk.  The proposed explosion – intended 
to be 50 percent larger than at Hiroshima (Weiner 1999: 357) – would lower the water level in 
Baikal by several meters. 
Soviet history is rife with “projects of the century,” whereby humanity would show its 
mastery over nature: diverting rivers, creating canals, building atomic energy stations, and so 
forth.  Often these would result in catastrophic destruction of human life and natural ecosystems.  
Geo-engineering Baikal proved to be the limit to Soviet attempts at “mastery over nature.”  In 
Irkutsk, with its rich regional culture and history, there was a population already primed to speak 
out against the proposal.   
Chief among the local campaigners was Grigorii Ivanovich Galazii, head of the 
Limnological Institute at the Siberian Academy of Sciences, who would, decades later, be 
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 More of the rock was visible before the construction of the hydroelectric dam in Irkutsk, which raised the water 
level of the Angara several meters, also submerging the train tracks that had connected the historic Circum-Baikal 
Railway to Irkutsk. 
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elected to the Supreme Soviet and pass the Law of Baikal, which would enshrine the Lake’s 
protection at the highest level. In these days, however, he was a young scientist who was 
passionate about Lake Baikal and the delicate balance its ecosystem maintained. Galazii joined 
two other local writers who were against the project in crafting a letter to Literaturnaya Gazeta, 
a major national newspaper. Their letter, “In Defense of Baikal,” described the potential negative 
environmental impact of the Grigorovich plan. Within a month, a thousand letters of support 
came in from across the Soviet Union (Weiner 1999).  Meetings were held, conferences were 
organized; the outpouring of public sentiment against a planned industrial project was 
unprecedented in the Soviet Union. 
In this instance, the activists succeeded.  The Grigorovich plan was scrapped.  However, 
this was only the beginning in the public fight for Baikal. 
 
The Baikalsk Pulp and Paper Mill 
In 1958, the Soviet government announced the planned construction of a cellulose plant 
on the shore of Lake Baikal.  The Baikalsk Pulp and Paper Mill (BTsBK),
20
 as it would 
eventually be called, became the lightning rod for environmental concern in the region.  BTsBK 
and the Selenginsk pulp and paper mill that would be built on Baikal’s largest tributary, the 
Selenga River, were commissioned as part of the Soviet military-industrial complex.  In the 
1950s, tires for fighter planes and bombers were made of cellulose cord.  To produce high-grade 
cellulose, plants needed large quantities of timber and water.  Other lakes in the Soviet Union 
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 Although the acronym “BPPM” would be easier on English readers, I am retaining the Russian acronym 
“BTsBK” because this is how the Russian public always refers to the mill (pronounced <beh-tseh-beh-kah>) 
following its Russian name: Baikal’skii Tsellyuznii i Bumazhnii Kombinat. In the field, this acronym was referenced 
so often that to call it by any other name would be like calling a famous historic personage by an anglicized name. 
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had already been clear cut, but the Baikal basin was still flourishing with timber.  Moreover, the 
clean, pure water of Baikal was argued to be necessary to produce the highest quality cellulose.  
The outcry against the proposed plant was enormous.  The all-union presses again picked 
up the story and helped foment widespread dissent.  Pressure was so intense that the Soviet state 
felt compelled to respond to citizen concerns. In April 1960, the USSR Council of Ministers 
adopted a law on water pollution that would require the latest pollution abatement technologies 
in all new factories.  Then on May 9
th
, the RSFSR went further and passed a law delaying the 
start-up of the Baikalsk and Selenginsk factories until waste purification systems were put in 
place.   
But even these concessions could not quell the outrage. Letter-writers reminded the 
public that Baikal is seismic; even the most advanced water purification system would be 
irrelevant if the factory faced a major earthquake.  Meanwhile, as the fight raged on, the product 
that the mill was designed to produce becomes increasingly obsolete.  Nylon and polyethylene 
cord had replaced cellulose as the industry standard.  So, too, then was the necessity of pure 
Baikal water for the creation of military-grade cellulose.  Instead, BTsBK would simply make 
paper – as it could do anywhere – only to put Baikal at greater risk. Repeated public letters, 
proclamations and conference proceedings re-iterated opposition to the mill, with long lists of 
signatories, including respected scientists and various professional associations.  
Certainly there were countervailing opinions: workers were beginning to flock to the 
small fishing village that would eventually become the city of Baikalsk.  There were jobs to be 
had in the construction of the factory and the city that would surround and support it.  Eventually 
there would be jobs in the mill itself.  Claims were made on behalf of the mill from a 
developmentalist standpoint, arguing that the economic benefit would outweigh the potential 
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harm, and that the sheer size of Baikal would quickly dissipate the pollutants from the mill. But 
these did not outweigh the increasingly aggressive stance of Soviet science and letters against the 
development.  Baikal would be their line in the sand. 
As the mill’s opening date grew closer, the flurry of activity reached a fever pitch.  The 
Moscow Society of Naturalists held a major conference, replete with militant resolutions. Once 
again, the large newspapers joined the fight.  Yet, for all this action, the battle was lost. The 
Baikalsk Pulp and Paper Mill began operation in 1966.  
 
Repression of Baikal Activism 
 The state had its mill, and environmentalists succeeded in pressuring the government to 
build it with the highest pollution abatement techniques of the time.  But critical voices 
continued to speak out against the mill and industrial encroachment on the Baikal watershed.  
The state was growing impatient with its green patriots and took measures to stifle the dissent.  
Censorship of the media was simply standard operating procedure in the Soviet Union, and it is 
widely suspected that criticism of the mill was eventually suppressed in the national media.  
After chasing the story regularly for some time, articles on the mill were difficult to find for a 
number of years, at first in the late Khruschev period, and again under Brezhnev. There was a 
brief resurgence in critical publications during the power changeover, suggesting some editorial 
flexibility during the transition, followed by a second clamp-down. While historians have not 
found a “smoking gun” that confirms an official gag order on the mill, there is reason to suspect 
that limitations on Baikal protest – at least at the national level – were in place.  
 However, local presses and scientific venues remained relatively open to local dissent, 
and those passionate about protecting Baikal still insisted they be heard.  Grigori Galazii was one 
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who would not keep quiet about the fragility of Baikal’s unique ecosystem and his deep concern 
that human damage would eventually render the ecosystem unrecoverable.  Galazii was, by this 
point, the head of the Limnological Institute, a prestigious research center affiliated with the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences.  It had a large laboratory, and Galazii used it to produce scientific 
measures of pollution in the lake and its negative consequences for the organisms therein.  It was 
pure science, but it produced inconvenient facts for the administration.  Galazii could not be fired 
from his position, but he could be “re-distributed.”  The government relegated Galazii to a single 
room, without a laboratory, that they dubbed the “Baikal Museum,” and placed him in charge.  
Without access to a significant laboratory and a team of researchers as he had previously had at 
the Limnological Institute, Galazii could not produce the studies that were implicating industry 
in Baikal’s degradation.  He continued to speak out for Baikal, but the illustrious title of the 
Academy of Sciences was no longer attached to him. 
 
Soviet Environmental Civil Society: VOOP 
 In addition to these spontaneous social outpourings, which were always in response to 
some immediate threat, Irkutsk had the same stable environmental organization as existed 
throughout the Soviet Union.  The All-Soviet Society for Nature Protection (VOOP) was an 
official organization, under the auspices of the Communist Party, and collected the common 
efforts of scientists, teachers, naturalists and nature aficionados to press for environmental 
protection.  They were able to persist, despite state suppression of other forms of activism, 
because of the apparently “apolitical” appearance of nature protection.  The Irkutsk branch of 
VOOP carried the banner locally.  A brief investigation into the organization in the 1980s can 
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give a sense of what local environmental civil society looked like around Lake Baikal during the 
Soviet Union. 
 VOOP was a Party organization and, as such, was modeled on the organizational culture 
within the Party itself. It had five-year plans with targets for the number of members, the number 
of raids conducted, the number of school activities organized, and so forth. Outcomes were not 
set by any particular improvement in environmental conditions, but simply by output of activity.  
The activities planned and conducted by VOOP were broad – ranging from placard competitions, 
to workshops on preventing forest fires.  In content, the message was similar to those of 
contemporary environmentalists. They believed nature should be preserved for future 
generations and that it enriches the human spirit.  But they were also clearly aware that the state 
placed a priority on production, and they were not to question that.  Instead, they emphasized 
“rational use” of nature’s resources and the need to preserve them for the sake of more efficient 
productivity.
21
 
VOOP members would sing the praises of the state in their official proclamations, 
conferences and reports.  Sometimes the ideology opened the door to discussions of nature 
protection.  But more often than not, the need to pander to the ruling elites bordered on absurd.  
Conference speakers would begin a speech with paeans to the ruling elite, such as: “Questions of 
environmental protection have stood at the center of attention of the Soviet government since its 
first days of existence” (VOOP Archive, 1980, Delo 510, pg. 28).  School children would take 
part in activities organized by VOOP with titles, including: “For a Lenin-like Relationship to 
Nature!” “To love nature is to love your motherland,” and “To love nature as Lenin loved her.” 
(VOOP Archive, 1980, Delo 337, pg. 24-26).  Activities were framed in accordance with the 
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 At moments, the minutes of a VOOP meeting resemble exegesis from ecological modernization theory (Buttel 
2000)  – emanating from the Soviet Union, it reminds us, perhaps, that “actually existing state socialism” is still 
modernity by other means. 
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semiotics of the power structure at the time. During one meeting, a VOOP representative 
encouraged the committee to work harder to propagandize environmental protection in the 
media. Her colleague agreed, saying, “Not just propagandize it, but give it a Marxist-Leninist 
position. That way it will garner more [visibility]” (VOOP Archive, 1988, Delo 613, pg. 40). 
Nature protection was only valid insofar as it worked in accordance with the Soviet state and its 
larger agenda. 
There were benefits, however, that accrued to a Party-sponsored environmental 
organization within the Soviet Union.  First, the organization never hurt for membership. Soviet 
citizens were expected to sign up for a number of clubs and associations, and VOOP was a box 
on a list that workers could easily tick.  Membership was in the thousands, but these were “paper 
members,” of whom nothing was required.  Second, it had a steady stream of ready income for 
its activities. Dues for memberships in official organizations were automatically deducted from 
payroll. Eventually, in the post-Soviet years, nonprofits bemoaned the payroll deduction practice 
as having lost the culture of philanthropy amongst the Russian public, forcing independent civil 
society organizations to look abroad for funding.  But during the Soviet Union, nature protection 
activities had ready money to put to use in its activities. Third, the press was a willing supporter 
in its efforts to propagandize environmental protection.  The largest regional paper, Vostochno-
Sibirskaya Pravda, regularly offered VOOP a full page of its newspaper to fill with content 
related to environmental protection in a section called “Rodnik” [Well-spring].  Within a 
censored society, VOOP had a regular megaphone.
22
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 The VOOP archives contain a letter from Vostochno-Sibirskaya Pravda to VOOP in 1991 explaining that, now 
that the newspaper must earn its revenue by advertising, it can no longer provide regular space to their organization, 
but that they were welcome to purchase a full-page ad if they would like to continue to spread their message to the 
public (VOOP Archive, 1991, Delo 735, pg 45-47). 
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However, without in-roads to power itself, VOOP was more of an outlet for activity than 
a force for social change. Members of VOOP occasionally expressed frustration at their own 
ineffectuality. “The Factory Council of VOOP, its social-technical committee, has no influence 
on the answers to questions of environmental protection. Regardless of required state 
inspections, there is no organized regulation of toxic air pollution from auto-transport.” (VOOP 
Archive, 1986, Delo 518, pg. 33). The Irkutsk All-Soviet Society of Nature Protection played by 
the rules.  They would praise the state, frame their work in accordance with ideology, mimic the 
organizational culture of the Communist Party, and still they were denied influence on the 
decision-making powers.
23
 
 
The Baikal Movement 
Environmentalism remained a prominent concern in the public mind, and deep frustration 
was simmering below the surface, ready to erupt again when the state loosened its reins during 
perestroika.  The trigger for renewed environmental activism turned out to be the nerpa: the 
totem of Baikal, its unique, endemic freshwater seal.  In 1986, nerpa began dying by the 
hundreds.  Animals would be seen heaving themselves upon the lake shore, sick and blinded.  
The diagnosis turned out to be an epidemic of canine distemper that had infected the seals and 
spread life brushfire.  But, despite the official diagnosis, all eyes looked toward the paper mill.   
For decades, the mill had dumped its toxic effluvia into the lake, trusting in the water’s 
volume and purity to absorb and disperse this waste.  But these toxins entered the food chain and 
were found to have bio-accumulated in nerpa blubber.  Environmentalists claimed that toxic 
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 However, it is worth noting the diffuse effect that the attention paid to environmental protection may have had on 
the public mind.  Baikal and the importance of Baikal were repeatedly pronounced on the pages of “Rodnik.” 
Although their ability to directly act to effect change was minimal, the eventual outpouring of environmental 
sentiment during perestroika was no doubt helped by its consistent presence.  
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exposure had weakened the seals’ immune system, rendering them susceptible to distemper in 
epidemic proportions. 
The state, meanwhile, had conceived a plan to construct a pipeline that would ferry waste 
out of the Baikalsk paper mill and into the Irkut River, where it would be carried, untreated, 
along the Angara, to the Yenisei, and eventually out to the Arctic Sea.  Environmentalists 
deemed this “solution” to be even more dangerous than the current waste disposal reservoirs.  
Baikal is a seismic region, and pipeline fractures and spill were the expected norm.  Not only 
would this endanger Baikal, but it would taint the rivers from which Irkutsk residents drank, 
fished and swam.  The proposed plan to pipe the waste for dumping in the Irkut River was met 
with scorn and indignation.  Members of the public decided to put their newly granted freedoms 
to the test. 
A collective of active citizens began planning a protest march.  They called themselves 
the “Baikal Movement” (Baikalskoye Dvizheniye).  The leaders were drawn from the 
intelligentsia and were active in the democratization movement during perestroika – forming 
new local elected councils. They announced an independent protest march to prevent the 
BTsBK-Irkut pipeline, which proved to be the first independent protest in the Soviet Union 
following perestroika. One person described it thus: 
Baikal Movement participant: There was a large group gathered, and the KGB 
was standing by watching them. People were very uncertain – ‘Are they really 
going to let us march?’ And so we took a few steps, and a few more steps, and no 
one was arrested! And so we just kept walking, all the way to [Kirov Square]! 
And so marched the first picket in the country held independently of the Communist Party.  The 
protest was against the pipeline that would dump BTsBK’s waste into the Irkut River; but it was 
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also, at its heart, a political protest. As one observer described it to me: “The problem was 
environmental – defending Baikal, but it criticized only one organization, the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.”  As perestroika progressed, questions of 
democratization overwhelmed environmental issues. But environmental activism to protect Lake 
Baikal was midwife to these. 
 Leaders of the Baikal Movement generally moved on to electoral politics.  When this 
happened they generally abandoned environmentalism; it was a green wave that they rode to 
power, but not a driving personal mission for them.  Among these, however, was Grigorii 
Galazii, whose passion for Baikal never faded.  He was elected to the Supreme Soviet, where he 
pushed and pushed for a law to protect Baikal, until he finally succeeded in passing the Law of 
Baikal.  
 
Baikal Watch 
 With perestroika, the Iron Curtain began to dissolve and the Soviet Union allowed its 
borders to become more porous for people flowing out and in.  Environmentalists in the Soviet 
Union and the West sought one another out and began to build transnational advocacy networks.  
One of the first eager participants to reach out across this long-closed border was David Brower. 
 Brower was a legendary environmental activist in the 20
th
 century United States, the 
veritable creator of modern American environmentalism.  Former president of the Sierra Club, 
Brower went on to found Friends of the Earth, the League of Conservation Voters and Earth 
Island Institute.  In 1988, at the invitation of environmentalists, Brower travelled to Moscow to 
attend a conference.  He listened to reports on the state of the environment in Russia, which were 
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typically lengthy and dry, but Brower was a man of action and would urge them to cut to the 
chase. 
Gary Cook: He would always as them, ‘Well what’s most important 
environmental problem? What is the place you want to save the most?’  And with 
one voice they would always answer: Baikal. 
In 1989 and again in 1990, Brower led teams from Earth Island Institute to Baikal.  In 1990 a 
group of 25 people came, toured the lake, and held a conference in Barguzinsky Reserve. They 
were impressed with the beauty of Baikal and all agreed that it should be targeted for 
preservation.  Earth Island Institute created an off-shoot organization, Baikal Watch, to serve this 
purpose, and Brower recruited a young activist named Gary Cook to lead it.  Cook had been 
active in the Earth Island Institute’s campaign to protect dolphins from tuna nets. He held a PhD 
in economics from UC-Berkeley and spoke some Russian, which he suspects is the reason he 
was tapped by Brower for the position. Cook knew what he had to confront. 
Gary Cook: I travelled [to Russia] for the first time in late 80s early 90s and there 
were scenes there resembling Bosco: his vision of hell. There were cities that 
were so polluted, you’d come up a hill and you couldn’t see the other side of the 
town from the top of the hill. We’re talking two miles and it was basically black. 
They said it was always like that. For our poor, pathetic Western lungs it was like, 
how am I going to survive this? That was a bit extreme, but the more places you 
went, more corners you turned, the more amazing scenes there were, 
[environmental] impacts you couldn’t imagine. We were in the forest and we 
knew we were in oil-drilling land. But we’d come over the hill and there would be 
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a lake of oil that had been there for who knows how long. It wasn’t a lake the size 
of Tahoe but it was a lake, 3 to 4 miles across. Woah! 
Baikal, by comparison, was actually quite clean. But industrial effluvia into the Selenga River 
and within the Baikal watershed were still significant concerns for environmentalists in the 
region.  Baikal Watch saw its mission, not to solve these problems, but rather to teach Russians 
how to solve them. 
Gary Cook: [In Russia at this time] public or community activity of any sort 
without the government’s permission or stamp of approval was very novel. There 
were no environmental groups. But there were environmentalists. Scientists. 
Teachers. But they were never able to get together to form even a nonprofit, non-
governmental group.… The idea was to help the movement start…. Help people 
understand what it means to be an activist, how to start activist groups, or even 
community groups, and to work with other sectors of society: the government, the 
press, lawyers, scientists, anybody and everybody; to become a valid player.  
Literally that is what we have been doing for the last 25 years, helping groups get 
on their feet. But also to help other sectors of society to interact with community 
groups, to respect them, to see them as an equally valid player. 
Without a history of independent activity, there was not even a social space to acknowledge the 
validity of community input.  The Soviet Union and its sprawling administrative apparatus also 
segregated and compartmentalized knowledge and expertise.  The public was assumed to have 
no pertinent expertise in matters such as the construction of dams, the operation of nuclear 
reactors or the placement of paper mills.  Those avenues by which the public may have impacted 
the direction of development in an environmentally positive manner were closed to them. 
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 Cook went on to play a very important role as a “broker” (Tarrow and McAdam 2004), 
mediating the relationship between Baikal environmentalists and Western activist networks.  His 
work will be discussed more in the next chapter. But his role began at this early moment, at the 
tail end of the Soviet regime, and his view of civil society as he found it at that moment reflects 
the larger problems inherent when one group achieves a near monopoly within the field of 
power. 
 
Conclusion 
 Bourdieu writes that “a field is simultaneously a space of conflict and competition…in 
which participants vie to establish monopoly over species of capital effective within it” 
(Bourdieu 1992: 17-18). The Soviet Union represents an instance in history when the state 
managed to achieve a near monopoly on the multitude of fields within its sovereign territory.  
More so even than the autocrats who preceded them, the Communists sought to bring all public 
activity under the dictates of the Party (Lewin 1994). Civil society existed in Soviet Russia, but it 
did so primarily under the auspices of the Communist Party and its sanctioned organs. Those few 
instances when the public rose up in defense of Baikal spontaneously were able to gain some 
concessions, but fundamentally they had little impact on the state agenda. 
Barricades were put in place throughout the Soviet apparatus so that different sectors of 
society would be prevented from influencing one other.  The general public especially was 
presumed to have no lay knowledge or expertise that could influence the course of development. 
As environmental problems compounded, there were no mechanisms by which the lay public 
could easily act to alter the course of events. Civil society as a power source capable of acting in 
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the world was confined to such a constrained sphere that it served mainly as a functionary of the 
commanding authority in the country: a dominating political elite.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CREATING BAIKAL AS A TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVIST SPACE 
 
Social movements scholars have lately turned their attention to organizational form as an 
empirical variable in their analyses and as a principal topic of study in itself (e.g. Clemens 1993, 
1996; Minkoff 1995, 1997, 1999), but the question of organizational form is often explored 
ahistorically. Traits of successful organizations and activist decision-making are viewed as stable 
through time.  Organizational form is seen as either instrumental or expressive, but it is usually 
considered a matter of activists’ agentic choice.  Organizational form is seldom examined in 
relation to the role of broader historical forces – exogenous pressures that still exert influence 
over and shape the form of local activist organizations.  When organizational form is examined 
through an historical lens (e.g. Skocpol 2003), the role of supra-national forces and actors is 
similarly ignored. And yet, social processes are necessarily historical – and our historical 
moment is one of ever-increasing transnational interconnection. Global forces may indeed shape 
the form of local organizing. 
 This chapter examines the process by which Baikal environmental activism moved from 
a local movement, with national sympathizers, to a space of transnational activism.  In the period 
immediately following the opening of the Soviet Union, local environmental civil society in 
Irkutsk developed permanency and strength, becoming an influential force in the community.  
However, the powers that helped to structure local civil society were not purely local in scope.  
Through key actors, working across borders, ideas and resources from other countries and from 
global environmentalism more generally were brought to Irkutsk and became interwoven into the 
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configuration of local civil society.  Importantly, as local civil society transformed over time, it 
did so in relation to the condition of other actors in the “field of power,” (Bourdieu 1989, 1993, 
1998) nationally and internationally.   
In the following section, I will examine three key environmental organizations operating 
in the region and show the dialectical relationship between the indigenous and the exogenous in 
the creation and maintenance of a permanent, organized, transnational space in Irkutsk.  I find 
that the role of exogenous support also must be examined relative to the field of power.  When 
the economic and political spheres are weak nationally, transnational activism has is most 
profound impact on the fostering of an independent and autonomous civil sphere.  When the 
economic powers recover, transnationalism can be supplanted by national actors or even 
rendered a liability in the eyes of the general public.  Moreover, transnational actors are 
themselves relatively empowered by the national configuration of the global field of power. 
Finally, the organizational form itself is impacted by the field of power, becoming more 
aggressive when civil power is high, and more accommodating when civil power is low. But 
despite the shift in the role of transnational actors over time, the long-term effect of transnational 
involvement in civil society has staying power in the region, which can be found in the many 
domestic organizational off-shoots that grow from its roots. 
 
The Social Movement Organization 
 Previous scholars generally considered organization in movements as a given; they only 
debated the question instrumentally: is permanent organization good or bad for mobilization? 
(e.g. McCarthy and Zald 1977, Piven and Cloward 1977).  A dramatic step forward occurred 
when scholars began to examine organizational form.  Clemens began the debate, explaining 
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that, just as movements have tactical repertoires (Tilly 1978), they also have  
“organizational repertoires” (Clemens 1993).   Organizational form could then be viewed as a 
matter of activists’ agency and choice. For some scholars, the question of form is essentially 
strategic: organizational permanence is desirable, but short-lived grassroots mobilizations also 
have their place depending upon activists’ stated intentions and goals. Minkoff (1993) shows the 
correlation between activists’ goals, strategies and identities and their ability to build permanent, 
self-perpetuating organizational forms.  Clemens (1996) builds upon the strategic approach to 
organizational form, showing that, not only can the choice of organizational form be strategic, it 
can also be expressive.  Organizations, she explains, are like frames: they are crafted to reflect 
collective identity and to communicate/interact with the broader public.  
Minkoff, Aisenbrey and Agnone (2008) find a variety of extant organizational forms that 
vary according to the goals the organization aims to achieve. Their focus is upon available forms 
– they do not ask about the variation in forms over time.  They also imply that, because the form 
seems linked to the agenda, that it is principally a choice made by activists themselves without 
taking recourse to the larger social structure and power structure in which these groups operate at 
any given time. Organizational forms are diverse just as human beings have different 
personalities.   
 Some scholars, however, have given careful consideration to history and the change in 
organizational form over time.  For some, the question is of the role of movements in shaping 
organizations though history.  Schneiberg, King and Smith (2008) examine social movement 
activism as the independent variable, affecting the form that other social institutions take, such as 
the formation of cooperative associations rather than corporations during the Grange movement. 
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McAdam (1998) shows how the movement for communal living found inspiration from Freedom 
Summer in 1964.   
But there is also a question of how movements themselves may be shaped by their 
presence in particular historical moments.  In the literature on civil society especially, the 
concern with historical change in organizational form reflects a concern on the part of some 
scholars that the professionalization of movements and associations has cut off the activity and 
activism of a lay public that previously formed the basis of America’s robust third sector.  Robert 
Putnam (1995) argues that “paper membership” in large advocacy organizations dampens the 
more active citizenship that builds social capital and the positive political and social benefits that 
accrue to dense network ties.  Theda Skocpol (2003) examines the historical rise and fall of 
federated membership organizations, arguing that they cut across class boundaries and, in so 
doing, not only built affective ties amongst a diverse populace, but also taught important civic 
skills to members of the working classes.  The reasons for the rise of national, professional 
advocacy organization are varied, and include such processes as the growing concentration of 
power in the federal government, legal regulations on lobbying, and competition for financial 
resources (Berry 2005, Jenkins 1998, McCarthy, Britt and Wolfson 1991, Minkoff 1994).  But 
the growth of this national-professional organizational form and its rise to dominance over 
previous forms that offered fewer barriers to entry adds a critical historical dimension to the 
study of social movements, and to civil society more generally. 
 However, while these critiques add the important element of historical change to 
questions of organizational form, they remain in dialogue with purely national forces and 
processes.
24
  Yet, increasingly, local choices are influenced, informed, and even sometimes 
constrained, by forces that extend to global levels.  The growing literature on transnational 
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 For a notable exception, see Stamatov (2010). 
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activism has also raised the question of organization, in part because the phenomenon of 
transnational activism often eschews the traditional organizational model, relying instead upon 
network ties built around issue-specific concerns (Bennett 2005, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Smith 
1997).  Making use of new technologies of communication, groups can cooperate, coordinate 
and share with one another on an unprecedented scale – altering the geographic scope of 
activists’ purview and pull.  Recent findings have shown the continued importance of structured, 
permanent organization, despite the looser requirements of network-based movements (e.g. 
Fisher, Stanley Berman and Neff 2005).  The move toward increased integration itself may be 
considered the result of larger processes of globalization (Coleman and Weyland 2006, Mercea 
2012), but otherwise organizational form is largely unexamined. In the remainder of this chapter, 
I will be examining the formation of three key environmental organizations in Irkutsk, Russia, 
showing how they were influenced by time and space, and always in relation to important 
changes in the overarching field of power. 
 
Organizational Formation in Baikal Environmentalism 
 Three key organizations developed and grew in Irkutsk during the years following the 
opening of Russia in 1989, and these three have helped to establish Irkutsk as a space of 
transnational activist attention and action. The first, Baikal Environmental Wave (the Wave), is a 
nonprofit organization geared toward environmental education and advocacy work that officially 
incorporated in 1992.  The second, Tahoe-Baikal Institute (TBI), was formed as two sister 
organizations, in the US in 1989 and in Russia in 1992, to carry out environmental educational 
summer exchanges between American and Russian youth.  Finally, the Great Baikal Trail 
(GBT), which formed in 2002, is a volunteer-based nonprofit that builds and maintains 
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wilderness hiking trails in order to promote sustainable, low-impact eco-tourism.  These three 
organizations provide insights into the role of transnational actors in the formation of local civil 
society, but also how this role alters in response to the broader field of power.  Below, I will take 
each organization in turn, describe its founding, and analyze the implications for 
transnationalism and organizational formation. 
 
Origin of Baikal Environmental Wave 
Jennie Sutton came to the Soviet Union in 1973 through an exchange program for 
language instruction that existed at the time between Great Britain and the USSR.  Britain and 
Russia each undoubtedly hoped to gain geopolitical advantage by training its citizens in the 
language of its ideological enemy; but the individuals involved in such an exchange can find 
their own lives impacted by the experience in ways that are unanticipated by the state which 
sends them.  Such was the case for Jennie Sutton, who signed up for the program and was placed 
at the Academy of Sciences in Irkutsk.  Sutton soon fell in love with her new home; she was 
fascinated by the Russian people and their culture.  Although she was originally placed in Irkutsk 
for three years, she requested an extension, so as to complete a new textbook she was co-
authoring.  Eventually, she secured a position teaching and translating English at the National 
Academy of Sciences in Irkutsk.  It was her position as a transnational actor at a major scientific 
research center that eventually led her to become a passionate and deeply committed 
environmental activist. 
When discussing social movement participation, scholars often point to the “biographical 
availability” of individual activists: they must have the time to devote to their cause and little to 
personally risk in the process (McAdam 1986, see also Beyerlein and Hipp 2006, Schussman and 
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Soule 2005). As such, the typical activist is young, unmarried, without children, and engaged in 
some form of flexible employment. In the experience of Jennie Sutton, I would add another 
dimension to her “biographical availability:” she was positioned at the intersection of two 
different societies and was, therefore, “available” to receive input from one context that could be 
applied to the other.  From a social network analysis perspective, Sutton was a node between two 
geographic networks.  While that transnational status was not a sufficient condition to produce 
her as an activist, it was, by her own accounting, a necessary one. 
Although Sutton had always appreciated nature and the outdoors aesthetically, she came 
to environmental activism in her early 40s principally by virtue of her transnational status. 
 
Jennie Sutton: I was aware that society was having an adverse impact on the 
environment, but, like most people, I had no idea to what extent this was 
happening until the end of the 1980’s. I came across the Brundtland Report, 
which was the United Nations report on the state of the planet and of natural 
resources, and it happened to come into my hands because it was in English.  I 
was teaching at the Academy of Sciences in those days, working with scientists 
on their English.  I read [the Report], and that was probably in 1988.  At that time, 
this was the height of perestroika here, which was an extremely interesting 
period. 
 
Sutton felt, aptly, that she was living through history as she watched the changes brought by 
perestroika and glasnost, and, as discussed in the previous chapter, environmental issues were 
tightly tied to emerging anti-authoritarian sentiment in the crumbling Soviet regime (c.f. Dawson 
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1996, Rihoux and Rudig 2006, Weiner 1999, Whitefield 2003)    Sutton had her ear to the 
ground during these local environmental outpourings.  She was working closely with scientists 
during the nerpa epidemic.  She knew Grigorii Galazii personally, and she eventually published 
an English language translation of his book on Baikal.  She paid close attention to the 
development of the Baikal Movement.  She even marched in their demonstrations, although she 
did so only after asking the KGB for permission to march, so as not to risk her Soviet visa.  
            Still, it was not until a trip home to Britain that Sutton was inspired to devote herself fully 
to the environmental cause and to begin organizing the group that would eventually become 
Baikal Environmental Wave. 
 
Jennie Sutton: In 1990, my mother was still alive, and I use to visit her in Britain 
every year.  I just turned up there in May.  It was after the Brundtland Report so 
the world community was becoming more and more aware of the facts, that 
[environmental problems] were on a different scale…that if we don’t take steps to 
curb our use of natural resources and pollution, we are basically destroying what 
we depend upon – the planet. 
While I was [in Britain], there was a series of television programs and 
films and discussions on these questions over a period of a whole week.  I 
followed them avidly – I don’t think I missed a thing.  With the result [being] that 
I was convinced that this was Question Number One, that it needed to be taken 
seriously and that I had to take this message back to my colleagues here in Russia. 
So that is what I did.  
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I came back here…and in those days we had an English language club. 
We used to meet once a week and discuss things in English, as much as possible, 
and I said, “You know the situation is very serious. It is not just the Baikal region, 
it is the whole planet and we’ve got to turn our English club into an Eco-English 
club” .…They accepted the information; some left, so some didn’t continue in the 
English club. Some stayed, some people came and went.  Over the next couple of 
years, some people came from outside [the Academy] – they weren’t my students, 
but people who heard about us.  Basically, the first couple of years [there] were 
weekly meetings where we were, I would describe it as, basically [doing] self-
education as to what was happening. 
 
  Among her students was Marina Petrovna Rikhvanova, a young scientist working in the 
Limnological Institute.  She was one of those who stayed in Sutton’s English Club after the shift 
to “Eco-English.” It proved to be a decision that would change the entire trajectory of her life.  
She eventually became a leader of Baikal Environmental Wave and developed her career in 
nonprofit environmental advocacy, winning the Goldman Prize and earning the ire of the Russian 
state. 
 
Marina Rikhvanova: I began studying English, and I really wanted to join Jennifer 
Sutton’s group because she is British.  And it happened that I was placed 
precisely in her group, and I was very pleased.  But Jennie also led a club of 
English aficionados where we would discuss various topics: poetry, writers, 
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artists, and such.  Then later Jennie returned from England and said, “Everyone, 
from now on we will only be discussing environmental issues. Who wants to?” 
 
 But it was not long before English fell to second place among those who decided to stay in the 
group. 
 
Marina Rikhvanova: When studying environmental problems, we immediately 
started to want to do something practical [to solve them]. Once you are doing 
practical work, you want to discuss things quickly…so we dropped speaking in 
English. 
 
 Leaving English behind, and branching out beyond the Academy, the group formed an officially 
registered independent organization called the Baikal Environmental Wave in 1992.  Baikal 
Environmental Wave was among the first environmental organizations to register as an official 
NGO in the region following the Soviet collapse in 1991. 
From its earliest years, Baikal Environmental Wave had a strong transnational 
component, and this proved to be an important draw for locals into the organization.  The first 
members were recruited from an English language club, and the ability to interact with Jennie 
Sutton and other foreigners continued to provide a strong magnet for involvement.  Shortly after 
its formation, the Wave became a host site for the European Volunteer Service (EVS), bringing 
in a steady stream of international volunteers.  Curious locals, especially students, soon followed, 
eager for the opportunity to meet people from abroad, which was a rare occurrence for Siberians 
at the time. 
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Nastya: We had a department of foreign languages where Jennie Sutton, our star, 
was. And she is the reason for our interest in the movement…So I came to Baikal 
Wave through the English language. It turns out that I came to 
[environmentalism] not through biology, but through English, and Jennie, and 
everything around that. 
*** 
Masha: I was studying at the Institute for Foreign Languages and a family friend, 
a biology schoolteacher (and so knew the Wave), told me that there is this 
interesting organization and there are foreigners there with whom I could 
socialize. 
*** 
Sasha: [I was taking an exam in English and was sent to Jennie.] She would 
approve the quality of my translations; we had to give her a minimum of 1,000 
translations. She gave me environmentalist texts, so I got into it that way…And I 
saw that there was a group that met with Jennie in her office to discuss them. 
 
 Although originally attracted to Jennie Sutton and Baikal Environmental Wave for the language 
practice, people stayed because of what the organization taught them about the environmental 
crisis, and they found themselves transformed in the process. 
 
Masha: When I only just started at the Wave, I sat, doing some translation, and 
they had a planning meeting. They were discussing an activity they were 
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planning: to make rag bags to use in place of plastic ones. I sat and thought, “My 
God, what nonsense! What they are talking about is just nonsense!”…I really did 
love nature and I wanted to protect it, but like many of our people who love 
nature, I had no understanding that in your everyday life you can live in such a 
way (or not in such a way) so as to cause less harm.  Those little things, like 
energy efficiency, where we get energy from and how it all works, how waste 
works.  How it all begins with these little, simple, most basic things.  I learned all 
this from the Wave.  And in general, about social movements, about different 
political processes occurring in this country and in the world. I learned so much, 
and now, because of that, I think differently and perceive things differently. 
 
 For many of the Wave’s early members, their attraction to cosmopolitan difference became the 
door to a shared environmental collective identity. 
As an official organization, the little band of Irkutsk environmentalists began their 
journey – learning what it meant to be an independent organization within a global 
environmentalist community.  In a nation with virtually no modern history of independent 
organizing, they emerged from behind the Iron Curtain, ready to get to work.  
 
Jennie Sutton: The Wave, right from the beginning, was a great learning 
experience. My feelings were acutely that this was all very exciting. Perestroika 
had been exciting. Then in the 1990s you have this collapse of everything around 
you, nothing in the shops, people losing their work, people going on the streets to 
sell things. One of our colleagues (who is now in Canada) was selling ice cream 
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in the street because she wasn’t being paid at her institute. She was a scientist, and 
she was selling ice creams in the street.…Society was collapsing around you, and 
yet we were building something! You felt you were doing something positive.  
You were creating something in the midst of this collapse. And I felt it was 
exciting, inspiring. 
 
 In the 1990s, Western governments and private sector foundations were eager to engage nascent 
nonprofit organizations in the former Soviet Union.  Many of my informants spoke of 
conferences, seminars and trainings during the 1990s, where Western organizations would 
provide opportunities to local activists in “capacity building.” The Soros Foundation, the Ford 
Foundation, ISAR, and USAID were only a few of the most notable bodies that were regularly 
cited by locals as operating in this endeavor.  They would sponsor workshops to instruct young 
nonprofits in Eurasia on how to fundraise, how to work with the mass media, and how a 
nonprofit organization might be organized.   
            What is important to note about this flurry of international support for organizational 
development is that Russia had virtually no history of independent organizing.  The Communist 
Party was the sole sponsor of any official activity within the Soviet Union.  When Clemens 
(1996) discusses activists as bricoleurs in the creation of an organizational form, she assumes 
they are drawing upon an extant “repertoire” (Tilly 1978) or “toolkit” (Swidler 1986) that Soviet 
citizens simply did not possess.  To that end, local Wave members were glad to learn Western 
modes of organization, to acquire new “tools” for their "toolkits."  However, they did not adopt 
organizational forms from the West wholesale.  Instead, they took advantage of their liminal 
position to fully explore the possibilities, carefully debating the implications of their choices.  
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In the 1990s, emerging from the heavy hand of the Communist Party, Irkutsk environmentalists 
were at their most free to imagine and implement organizational democracy – indeed, the 
Wave’s resulting organizational charter suggests that the shadow of the Soviet control system 
was their most operative influence – a “repertoire” that they were keen to avoid.  The Wave’s 
organizational charter instituted the deeply democratic ideals of its membership.  To prevent any 
one individual from dominating the Wave’s activities and direction, the charter dictates that there 
would always be three co-directors at any given time.  Also, for any decision requiring a vote, a 
quorum comprising two-thirds of the membership must participate to ensure that the taken 
decision would reflect the preferences of a majority.  Prior to any vote, the membership would 
debate the issue at hand, and, while not always achieved, the group strove for consensus. 
 
Lyuba: The Wave always had clear positions. They were, of course, born with 
great difficulty, since all decisions were made collectively. That is, they were all 
discussed until they came to some coherent outcome. We sometimes had seminars 
that lasted the whole week. We could discuss things from morning till night. My 
husband used to say - God, you will die from all of these conversations! 
 
While the Wave membership had many opportunities to participate in trainings and seminars, 
learning Western-style NGO professionalization, they carefully weighed what they learned 
against their local knowledge to craft an organization that reflected their needs and desires.  With 
a nearly “blank slate,” they both imported knowledge from abroad and produced new forms from 
their own imaginings. Not only was the result structurally democratic, it also enshrined education 
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and advocacy as the means to social change.  For some, this was considered naiveté: “We 
thought if the politicians just knew about these problems, they would do something about them,” 
as one member said to me.  But that naiveté is itself suggestive of the social empowerment 
former Soviet citizens felt in the wake of state and economic collapse.  The 1990s were a terrible 
time for most Russians, but for those involved in the Wave, they had never felt so free. 
During the 1990s, while political institutions were in shambles and so-called “New 
Russians” fought their internecine battles for control of the various privatized economic assets of 
the old regime, members of Russian civil society used their ability to connect to supporters 
abroad, and to mobilize local interest in “the Other,” to create a space of social alternative at the 
local level.  But as the country stabilized, the strength that had accrued to Baikal Environmental 
Wave by virtue of its cosmopolitanism
25
 came into conflict with the growing might of economic 
elites within the broader field of power.  When this happened, what had been civil society’s 
greatest asset became a threat to its public persona.   
In 2002, the privately-owned oil giant Yukos was attempting to construct a pipeline to 
bring oil from Angarsk to the east along the southern edge of Baikal.  Many people in the 
environmental community were against the pipeline, and the Wave stepped into the fray to try to 
prevent its construction.  This protest was the beginning of what has since become a hostile, 
adversarial relationship between the organization and Russia’s economic and political elites.  
Sutton was still a co-leader of the group, which now vocally opposed the pipeline.  But her 
position as a British national gave fuel to the fire of pipeline proponents. 
                                                 
25
 Sutton rejects the interpretation that Baikal Environmental Wave was strengthened by virtue of its 
“cosmopolitanism,” largely because the word “cosmopolitan” carries a negative connotation in Russia. However, 
whether the organization would call itself cosmopolitan or not, I maintain that the attraction professed by virtually 
all the early members to working with international volunteers and practicing foreign language skills indicates that 
1) the organization had a cosmopolitan character, and 2) that it was a powerful draw in fostering its local 
membership. 
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Jennie Sutton: The media in Angarsk were totally bought by Khodorkovsky.
26
  It 
was just awful.  And they managed to latch on to me, and were writing that a 
foreigner was trying to use environmentalism to prevent Angarsk from 
developing economically. I realized then that I could be a liability to the Wave, 
and I intentionally stepped out of a leadership position.
27
 
 
As national industry recovered from the collapse of the 1990s, it once again emerged in 
the field of power to counter the push by environmental civil society against economic activity 
deemed damaging to Lake Baikal.  Despite the evident allure that Baikal Environmental Wave 
garnered by its cosmopolitanism, which helped it when recruiting local support, their 
transnational character became suspect when pitted against economic recovery and growth.  The 
force that allowed the Wave to develop to the heights it achieved by the late 1990s proved less 
forceful than an oil tycoon with deep pockets and a profitable agenda.
28
 
 
                                                 
26
 Mikhail Khodorkovsky was once the richest man in Russia.  He worked in banking and finance before acquiring 
Yukos, the nation’s second largest oil producer, in the loans-for-shares program under Boris Yeltsin.  He and his 
business partner were eventually imprisoned by Vladimir Putin for fraud and tax evasion, and the Russian state 
seized Yukos and sold its assets to state-owned Rosneft at fire-sale price.  It is widely believed that Khodorkovsky 
was imprisoned because of the political threat he openly posed to Vladimir Putin (Zolotukhina 2013).  After his 
arrest, trial and conviction, Khodorkovsky was considered to be a political prisoner. His case was supported by the 
global community and Russian civil society who generally opposed the authoritarian shift in Putin’s government. 
However, before his imprisonment, he was himself considered a villain by many members of Russia’s intelligentsia. 
After 11 years in prison, Khodorkovsky was pardoned by Putin in December 2013, in advance of the winter 
Olympic Games at Sochi. He quickly relocated to Switzerland, where he is now a permanent resident. 
27
 Sutton’s activism against the Yukos pipeline and additional pipelines that were then proposed by Transneft and 
Kovytka kept her in the forefront until 2005.  On other occasions, Sutton cited different reasons for her resignation 
as co-leader of Baikal Environmental Wave, and her concern for the image problem created by her “foreignness” 
was only one among several considerations. 
28
 The Yukos pipeline out of Angarsk was finally prevented by a representative of the State Committee on 
Environmental Protection who refused to sign off on the project’s environmental impact report – a requirement for 
any new development at the time.  She was dismissed from her post within a few months, leading local 
environmentalists to suspect retaliation by the power elite. 
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Summary 
            The beginning of a permanent, organized environmentally-focused civil society in Irkutsk 
was the result of key transnational linkages.  Jennie Sutton’s position as an English-speaking 
foreigner within a scientific academy near Baikal brought a global discussion of sustainability 
into contact with local concern for the lake.  The original members of the Wave were brought 
together, not principally because of environmentalism, but because they wanted to learn English 
from a native speaker.  And later, the regular presence of Jennie Sutton and other foreign 
volunteers continued to draw local interest and involvement.  Local attraction was to the 
experience of cosmopolitanism at a time when such exposure was still rare.  Foreignness was the 
main allure; it was only through discussing environmental problems and learning about 
sustainable development that committed activists were made.  
            In the liminal space of political and economic collapse, civil society had the unique 
opportunity to invent itself, creating an organizational form that was radically democratic, 
expressing deep concern with concentrated power.  Local activists learned from transnational 
actors and borrowed from their knowledge base, but at the same time were constantly discussing 
each organizational choice.  Activists in the 1990s were constrained mostly by their own 
recollection of the Soviet past; in their ability to imagine and implement an organizational form 
as a “frame” (Clemens 1996), they were at their most free. 
At the same time, there is the potential for foreign connections to hinder the organization. 
Jennie Sutton felt she could not continue in a leadership role out of fear that her “foreignness” 
could be framed negatively in the media to discredit the organization.  However, these problems 
did not plague the organization until the Russian economy had begun its rebound in the 2000s, 
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and Russian oligarchs such as Khodorkovsky began to set their sights on new development 
projects.  When economic power was unstable, transnational connectivity was a source of 
organizational strength; when that strength was sufficient to threaten a rising economic giant, it 
became a liability. 
 
Origin of the Tahoe-Baikal Institute 
 The Tahoe-Baikal Institute began in 1989, largely thanks to the efforts of a single 
individual: Michael Killigrew.  Killigrew was a passionate and energetic peace activist and 
environmentalist who was eager, not only to dream solutions to the world’s problems, but also to 
make them into reality. He was involved in a youth conference organized by Direct Connection 
US-USSR that aimed to bring peace to the Cold-warring superpowers by building relationships 
between young people in these two countries.  The conference took place in Helsinki in 1988; 
participants were asked to come up with ideas to promote peace, and one idea was a summer 
exchange for the purpose of scientific study and environmental protection. 
Upon returning from the conference, the Soviet youth were able to win an audience with 
Mikhail Gorbachev, who supported the idea for an environmental youth exchange program.  
Ronald Reagan also stated his approval for the project, as did Perez de Cuellar, then Secretary 
General of the United Nations. 
With these powerful endorsements, Killigrew proposed the program to George 
Deukmejian, who was governor of California at the time.
29
  Deukmejian, in turn, recruited Bud 
Sheble, who headed the California Conservation Corps, and Gordon Van Vleck, who ran the 
California Resources Agency.  The team in California considered Lake Tahoe to be their own 
version of Lake Baikal: a crystal clear mountain lake that residents considered a point of regional 
                                                 
29
 According to some tellings, President Regan himself called Deukmejian and recruited him to the project. 
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pride in need of protection.  Between themselves, the three men pulled together a board of 
directors and a mission statement, and the Tahoe-Baikal Institute came into existence.  Sheble 
served as the first chairman of the board and the organization was run out of his home office in 
Belmont, California, overlooking the San Francisco Bay.   
Killigrew, Sheble and the board of directors were prepared to develop an environmental 
education program at Lake Tahoe. However, for the program to be a cross-national exchange, 
one that would foster learning and mutual understanding on both continents, there had to be 
Russians willing and able to build a similar summer program near Lake Baikal.  Killigrew used 
his contacts in the Soviet Union to seek out like-minded individuals in Irkutsk, and a delegation 
from the United States traveled to Irkutsk to draft a Memorandum of Understanding and to plan 
the first summer exchange.   
An enthusiastic group from various branches of local government and scientific institutes 
met the American delegation at the Irkutsk airport. 
 
Bud Sheble: And from that point on, the vodka started flowing. Every meal, every 
meeting we had, breakfast, lunch, dinner, they brought out the vodka. I like gin, 
but I never liked vodka. But I drank it so much over there that I started liking it! 
[laughs] We’d be meeting, and then someone would stand up and say, “My dear 
friends…” and then we’d all have to stand and drink, and then we would go on 
with whatever we were doing. 
 
The Russians quickly endeared themselves to the Americans who visited them.  The society and 
culture that the California contingent encountered in Irkutsk was truly different, and very 
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foreign, but the good nature, kindness and hospitality that their hosts displayed moved them 
deeply.  Sheble recounted one occasion when the delegation was visiting a small lake in the 
Baikal region, looking for a site for the summer work camp. 
 
Bud Sheble: They took us out to a little lake, just the tiniest thing, you could walk 
around it, where they thought they could make a camp for us…They took us 
there, the prettiest little place. There were four or five Soviet gentlemen and an 
interpreter. I asked the question, “What’s the name of this lake?” And they all 
looked at each other.  Then they gathered together and you could hear them 
mumbling. Finally they stopped, and turned to us, and one of them said, “Tahoe!” 
It was absolutely hilarious. 
 
The Russians’ hospitality remained legendary to this group of Americans, even through to their 
very last moments in Irkutsk.   
 
Bud Sheble: At the conclusion of our meeting in the Soviet Union, we said 
goodbye to everybody at a breakfast, drinking their vodka, and they loaded us into 
a van to go the airport. And we took off.  We got just outside of town and we 
turned a corner on this road – and there they were again, standing on the road, 
waving and stopping us! We pulled over and they broke out the bottles again, and 
we all had a drink again. And I was told at the time that was a tradition that they 
did that with guests. That they would run and meet them as they were going out of 
town, too!  So as you can see we were becoming very fond of these people.  
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 With the hard work of volunteers in Russia and the United States, the first 
Summer Environmental Exchange (SEE) program took place in 1991.  Fifteen young 
people, half Russian and half American,
30
 came together for a summer of environmental 
scientific study at Lake Tahoe, and then at Lake Baikal.  The logistics were difficult to 
arrange, and at times there was worry that the visas for the Russian students to come to 
the United States would not be processed in time; but in the end, all the pieces came 
together and the program was considered to be a great success.  While the object of the 
project was environmental and educational, the overarching interest in the program, 
coming out of nearly a half-century of Cold War, was the sheer novelty of bringing 
together young people who had been taught to think of each other as enemies, and to see 
how the other lived first-hand.   
 
Bud Sheble: It was an incredible experience because here were these Soviet kids, 
and we all feared the Soviet Union, but you had Soviet kids and American kids 
who find out that they are the same! They cared about each other, they cared 
about us. It turned out to be a fabulous thing. 
 
Against the backdrop of caring for the environment, young people were taught to care for other 
people living half a world away. 
It was widely acknowledged that, when TBI got started in 1990, the Russians that had 
been recruited to the organization were ignorant as to what a nonprofit was, how a board of 
                                                 
30
 TBI participants were not uniformly American across the years.  It accepted applicants from other countries as 
well, although all participants were required to speak either English or Russian.  However, the Russian participants 
(except for one) were always drawn from the Baikal region. 
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directors worked, or what it did; but they had enthusiasm for the idea and a strong desire for the 
program to succeed.  Those involved spoke with evident pride of their work in building TBI-
Russia. 
 
Nina Rzhebko: We tried to raise the level of the program every year.  To that end, 
we tried every year to do projects that were a little bit more difficult and a little bit 
more interesting…We tried to do projects that were geared toward the future not 
just the present. We did lots of types of projects. And we tried to do these various 
projects in different territories.  So there were ornithological projects, soil science 
projects, hydrological projects, all separate. So there were projects in Buryatia, 
and some in the Irkutsk region, in different counties [v raznikh raionakh].  
Sometimes we weren’t even on the shore of Lake Baikal. We took a group to the 
wild regions of the Sayan Mountains, for example…So we had a sufficiently wide 
program. 
 
 From 1995 to 2005, the Russian side of the Tahoe-Baikal Institute was run by Nina 
Rzhebko with the support of a Board of Directors that was made up of scientists, government 
officials and alumni of the program. All of them gave their support and effort voluntarily, just as 
the board in Tahoe did. 
 But the SEE program of 2005 had a number of problems that proved to be a tipping point 
in the relationship between the US and Russian branches of the Tahoe-Baikal Institute.  There 
were conflicts between the students and the Russian staff.  Rzhebko admits that she may have 
outgrown youth culture and could no longer relate to the students in her charge.  “I no longer 
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understood their jokes, their humor, their interests. And that is serious,” she said.  “When you 
have already graduated, when you hold a high position of authority, when you have your own 
children, and then to see that kind of humor, dropping one’s pants and showing one’s bottom, I 
simply…I saw that, as time went on, I started to look down on that [eto razdrazhat].”  When the 
students asked for a day off, she would scold them, telling them that they weren’t on vacation.  
When they wanted to buy and cook their own food rather than what had been prepared, she was 
offended. 
 
Nina Rzhebko: So we wrote a sufficiently harsh letter to the directorate of Tahoe-
Baikal.  I think from our perspective it was righteously harsh.  Americans don’t 
like to be treated with strictness, we came to understand. [Amerikantsy ne lyubyat 
kogda s nimi rezko obrashchayutsya, a my tak i ponyali]  
 
The Board of Directors in the United States, who raised the funds for the Russian 
coordinators, announced that, rather than simply renew their contract with Rzhebko and her 
assistant, they would re-open the job as a competitive position. Rzhebko could give an 
application, but the board would be considering others for the job.  Rzhebko declined to apply, as 
did her assistant.
31
  In the end, another program alumna in Russia was hired by the American 
board of directors, and she had a vision for the program that was more in agreement with their 
own.  This individual was presented to the Russian board as the new coordinator without their 
input or consent. 
                                                 
31
 She went on to say: “I still have very, very, very warm feelings in relation to everyone in the (U.S.) board of 
directors. For Bob Harris, and Charles Goldman, and John Gussman, and Karen Fink, whom I really love…In 
general I don’t have any hard feelings for anyone.” 
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 For the Russian board of directors, the insult was multifaceted and the injury cut too deep 
to be easily repaired.  First, Rzhebko was beloved and respected by the TBI community in 
Irkutsk.  The Russian board felt that, especially after all her years of service to the organization, 
she had been poorly treated to be dismissed so suddenly and casually.  Second, there was the 
added insult that they, as TBI-Russia, an independent nonprofit organization, had not even been 
consulted in the decision to dismiss Rzhebko, nor in the hiring of the new coordinator. 
 
Dima: You can ruin things in trying to improve them. There was a decision made 
in total that, in my opinion, was incorrectly taken. If you are talking about a 
private company, where the leader works for a paycheck, then you can take that 
person and fire them.  But if you are talking about an organization where people 
are working fundamentally from their own good will, to take those people and 
say, thanks, see ya. Then those people will say, to hell with you, too!  So, without 
any consultation, [for them] to say thank you but we don’t need you anymore, the 
whole board left.   
 
From the Russians’ perspective, TBI-Russia had been an independent organization with its own 
vision and its own ambition.  Its members were proud of what they had built.  When Rzhebko 
was let go and a new coordinator was hired, they felt that their vision had been repudiated by the 
American side of the organization, and the American vision had been unilaterally imposed upon 
them.  In response, the group chose to disband and to no longer volunteer their time and effort in 
support of TBI.  While the organization remains registered within Russia as a nonprofit, it ceased 
to exist de facto after 2005. 
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From the perspective of the American board of directors, it was not simply a matter of 
whether the students were scolded for dropping their drawers in jest.  The board had long been 
concerned about the wide dispersal of students around Baikal.  There had been some instances of 
individual safety and security far afield that worried the American directorate.  They knew that 
they would be held responsible for any problems that took place in Russia.  Having liability 
without accountability worried them.  They felt that they could no longer risk ceding control of 
the program at America’s borders.  For them, the dissolution of the Russian board of directors 
was unfortunate, but necessary.  In their minds, the original vision of having two separate but 
cooperating national organizations was inherently flawed.  From their perspective, the US was 
not dictating its terms to Russia imperialistically, but was reacting realistically to a flawed 
organizational structure.  The extent to which that outcome – which Americans might call 
pragmatic – won the day does not equate to the correctness of one program vision over another.  
Rather, it suggests the sizable power differential between the efficacy of American and Russian 
organizers within a transnational partnership.  
However, the board of directors and alumni who had been the principle organizers for 
TBI-Russia prior to 2005 did not simply vanish.  When you follow their individual paths after 
the dissolution of TBI-Russia, it becomes apparent that these disparate persons have gone on to 
further the development of environmental science and environmental protection in the Baikal 
region on their own initiative.  They have started new organizations and new research centers.  
They remain firmly committed to preserving the Baikal watershed; and now, thanks to them, 
there are many more groups in the local community striving toward this end.  They have their 
own students, their own colleagues and peer networks, and many attribute their ability in crafting 
such initiatives to the skills they learned at TBI.   
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Dima: I am very grateful for the experience that I gained there. The experience of 
organizational management and international program participation. Sure, it 
wasn’t colossal, but still significant. And the experience of organizing projects, of 
project management, all that has played a major role in my future career.  I now 
run a nongovernmental science center, which I founded. I am a professor, and I 
run a scientific laboratory. I have a ton of people there, and a ton of projects going 
on.  And obviously, the roots of all that grow precisely out of Tahoe-Baikal. 
 
Summary 
 The Tahoe-Baikal Institute was conceived jointly by Russian and American students.  It 
was founded as a cooperative program between two, separate, nonprofit organizations – one in 
California and one in Irkutsk – working on two branches of a single summer scientific and 
environmental research exchange program.  In structure, it suggested equality between members 
and participants in two national contexts.  But the inequality of these contexts subverted this 
original intent.  The U.S. and Russian versions of the Tahoe-Baikal Institute had different visions 
for the program.  But more importantly, they had differential abilities to enact that vision.  
Russian activists could create the program that they desired on the ground; but they were 
relatively powerless in their ability to counteract the vision of their international allies.   
However, despite what might be called the failure of the parallel sister-organization 
model of the Tahoe-Baikal Institute, its implementation had a profound effect in fostering the 
general field of environmental activism in Irkutsk, and for the creation of Irkutsk as a space of 
transnational activism.  Each summer for over 25 years, students from the United States and 
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other countries would travel to Baikal for five weeks, to become intimately associated with the 
lake: its geology, geography, ecology, and history, its threats, fragilities, endurances and beauty.  
Travel, tourism, and educational exchange breed place-based affective ties between dispersed 
individuals and distant points in foreign lands.  Tourism is such an effective means to build 
transnational allegiance that foreign governments may intentionally sponsor tours to encourage 
these strategic affective ties (Kelner 2012).  Through TBI, Baikal gained hundreds of 
“conscience constituents” (McCarthy and Zald 1977) – supporters worldwide who are ready, 
willing and able to evangelize in their own countries on the lake’s behalf.   
Moreover, each year for a quarter century, a handful of local students from the Baikal 
region would gain the opportunity to travel abroad, and to experience environmental science and 
protection in the United States.  They would build relationships and social networks with like-
minded individuals, both in their own region and abroad, which would serve them throughout 
their continuing careers.  My interviews with Russian participants of TBI witness repeated 
references to a colleague met who later sponsored a research visa abroad or who wrote a letter of 
recommendation for an international grant.  Participants from Irkutsk forged network ties that 
would alter the professional landscape of Baikal environmental science and advocacy.  Also, for 
those alumni who became involved in the planning and implementation of TBI, the experience 
was cited repeatedly as enormously influential in their ability to further the development of 
science, environmentalism and transnational collaborative work independently and 
autonomously, with skills that continue to serve them well into the future.  TBI alumni have 
spawned an impressive number of new organizations and environmental initiatives in Irkutsk and 
Buryatia.  Although the joint-project showed the negative repercussions of geographic power 
imbalance between partners in transnational activist collaboration, the participants in the 
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transnational exchange program itself nevertheless acquire important experience, skill sets, and 
social capital that they then use to alter their domestic environment, as they work to build a 
stronger civil sphere inside Russia. 
 
Origin of the Great Baikal Trail 
Although the Great Baikal Trail
32
 organization was founded in 2002, the idea of building 
a long-distance hiking trail around Lake Baikal is not new.  A number of Soviet writers 
discussed the possibility of a long-distance trail that would circumnavigate the lake: most 
notably Oleg Gusev and Valentin Bryansky.  Some intrepid outdoor-enthusiasts during the 
Soviet era actually did hike, skate, ski or boat around the lake without the help of a pre-existing 
trail.  What was new in the creation of GBT was the notion of hiking trails as an 
environmentalist project geared toward localist, sustainable, economic development.  The Great 
Baikal Trail was created to organize and advocate for this environmentalist work. 
This new idea owes its origin to a small handful of individuals, and chief among them is 
Andrei Suknev.  A native of Ulan-Ude, the capital of Buryatia, Suknev was an active youth in 
the late Soviet period, participating in what was then known as “do-it-yourself” tourism 
[samodeyatel’nii turizm].  The small clubs of outdoor enthusiasts would train and equip 
themselves for wilderness survival. Suknev admits that even his own first reaction, when he 
heard of building a trail around Baikal, was that the idea was idiotic. “What would you need to 
build? Geez, we’re Soviet people, after all! We can hike without trails!”  
But after the Soviet collapse, Suknev began to work as a tour guide.  It was only as he 
watched and participated in the development of tourism in the Baikal region that the Great 
                                                 
32
 The Russian name for the organization is Bol’shaya Baikalskaya Tropa – literally, the Big Baikal Trail – but I 
follow the English name by which the organization refers to itself. 
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Baikal Trail seemed to him to answer two pressing problems at once: low-impact eco-tourism 
could help to protect Baikal without sacrificing local economic development.  However, it would 
take a dramatic shift to turn what had been a marginal do-it-yourself hobby club into the kind of 
tourist industry that would bring some economic self-sufficiency to the villages around Baikal, 
while remaining environmentally sustainable. 
When he first began to proselytize the notion of building hiking trails, Suknev said, he 
encountered resistance from locals who were unclear what exactly he meant. 
 “They would say, ‘A path?’ [marshrut?]. And I would say, no, a path is a path. A trail is 
infrastructure; and it is specially done so that people won’t hurt themselves, and won’t hurt 
nature...It [represents] a better quality of life.”   
Suknev converted several of his friends to the idea, but it did not progress further until it 
found a catalyst in Gary Cook at Baikal Watch.   
 
Gary Cook: This one lunatic friend of mine came to me and said, ‘I want to build 
a trail all the way around Lake Baikal.’  And I said, ‘You’re a lunatic!’ But he 
said, ‘No, listen to me. We’d like to try this out.’  It was interesting because he 
and his colleagues theoretically understood what they wanted to do, but to get 
from the idea to actually building the trail was a quantum leap. So I felt that there 
has to be a very light velvet glove that [Baikal Watch] applies to this from the 
outside.  We were going to have to give them lots of support to understand what 
this needs. How do you build a trail? How do you design it? How do you work 
with local communities and local parks?  [How] to get that trail built, to make 
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sure it’s the trail you actually want. And most importantly, how to build a trail 
when you have very limited resources.   
 
Cook’s philosophy toward American involvement in Russian environmentalism has always been 
that of assistance and support.  Baikal Watch involves itself only upon invitation from local 
Russians, and it always asks the locals to take the lead. ‘How can we support you, so that you 
achieve what it is that you want to do?’ is the question that Cook poses to his Russian 
collaborators.  He is cognizant that he is working in a foreign country and he considers Russian 
environmental problems and, to a degree, their solutions to belong to Russians themselves.  He 
strives to avoid the potential for an imperialist approach to international aid and development, 
hoping instead to empower local activists to become leaders in their home communities. 
 Nevertheless, as his comment about the “light velvet glove” in the quote above indicates, 
Cook does have a vision for what needs to be done to see projects succeed, and his vision does 
guide the trajectory of the endeavor in his capacity as a helper and supporter of Russian 
environmentalists. When it came to the creation of the Great Baikal Trail and the shape it 
eventually took, Gary Cook played a central role.  Suknev is rightly called the “father” of GBT, 
but Gary Cook is undoubtedly its “godfather.” 
 His first action was to bring together powerful players in the Baikal region, to show them 
the vision, and to explain how it might be made a reality. The hope was to produce collective 
buy-in and to garner support for the project amongst power figures and key stakeholders in the 
region.  With a grant from the Foundation for Russian-American Economic Cooperation, Cook 
and Suknev began to build their case through two cross-national exchange programs.  First, in 
the fall of 2002, American experts working in national parks, the forest service, eco-tourism and 
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trail-building came to Irkutsk for two weeks to talk to their counterparts about potential and 
possibility for the development of eco-tourism in the Baikal region. A few months later, in 
January 2003, a similar delegation from the Baikal region came to the United States.  The grant 
covered an all-expenses-paid educational trip up and down the West Coast, where the Russian 
representatives met with groups like Earth Corps in Seattle, and the Tahoe-Baikal Institute in 
South Lake Tahoe. 
 Toward the end of the visit, the Russian delegation was taken to a classroom in an old 
school near Lake Tahoe.  Gary Cook instructed them that they were to talk amongst themselves 
and then decide whether they would try to create such a thing as the “Great Baikal Trail.”  The 
decision to proceed, and the responsibility for the project’s implementation, would be theirs 
alone.  Gary left the room, locking the door behind him.  When the group emerged a few hours 
later, it did so having planted the seed for GBT. 
 The next question was how these trails were going to be built.  Based upon American 
experience in trail construction, Cook had a ready answer. “I said, ‘You are going to have to 
introduce something very novel in Russia and that is the concept of volunteerism’ [laughs].” 
 The Russian word for a volunteer is dobrovolets, literally meaning: someone who does 
something in a spirit of good will.  However, in the Soviet Union, citizens were “volunteered” by 
the government to do work projects outside of their regularly paid hours to supplement the 
state’s need for additional labor at particular intervals, for example during harvest season.  While 
the word translates literally as people motivated by their goodwill, it took on an ironic, negative 
connotation in the Soviet Union of begrudged work, forced upon an unwilling populace.  The 
dreaded subbotniki [Saturday volunteer work] helped discredit volunteerism as a concept in 
Russia’s post-Soviet “cultural toolkit” (Swidler 1986). 
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 There were individuals in Russia who were ready and willing to give their free efforts 
toward a good cause, but they lacked an obvious outlet for their energies.  As an American long-
accustomed to the power and possibility that can be harnessed in volunteerism, Gary Cook was 
confident that such a massive infrastructure project as the Great Baikal Trail would never get off 
the ground without volunteer labor.  The question, from his perspective, was how to overcome 
the cultural mismatch between Andrei’s vision and the negative connotation associated with the 
dobrovolets in the Russian mind.  To surmount this obstacle, Cook again turned to the 
enticement of cross-cultural exchange. 
 
Gary Cook: “I said, ‘Listen, let’s try to be imaginative. What if we brought a 
bunch of international volunteers [to Baikal] and advertised it as: Come see 
Siberia!’ Even in 2000 there weren’t a lot of Westerners who had been 
there…[Westerners] not only want to see Baikal and do something positive, they 
want the real Russian experience and what better way than to hang out in a camp 
with a bunch of Siberians?  
 
 Thus, foreign volunteers could compensate for the general absence of volunteerism in 
Russian culture as a whole.  They would also serve as an incentive to recruit Russians who might 
not otherwise volunteer to help on the project.  Locals were told they would get a two-week, all 
expenses paid trip to Baikal and the opportunity to meet people from all over the world, as they 
worked side by side to build a hiking trail in the woods.  In the end, they succeeded in recruiting 
locals – primarily students – to join the project, and the first summer trail-building program took 
place in 2003.  To help overcome the negative connotation associated with the word 
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“dobrovolets” and the forced free labor it implied, GBT referred to its helpers by the English 
word – calling them “volontyory.”   
 Although the closed-door, Russians-only discussion that took place in the school outside 
Tahoe had come out in favor of creating the Great Baikal Trail project, the commitment to this 
endeavor was still hesitant.  Although convinced of the model’s efficacy within the United 
States, most still viewed the possibility of its success on Russian soil with skepticism.  But some 
participants were converted to the idea and embraced it with enthusiasm.  Among them was 
Ariadna Reida, who would eventually serve as the organization’s first executive director.  At the 
time of the Russian delegation, she was serving as the group’s translator.  She was one of the few 
who believed in its success. Most of the others simply could not comprehend volunteerism as a 
concept. 
 
Ariadna Reida: The people of power who got together [in Tahoe] said, okay, we 
want to give it a try next summer, the summer of 2003, to do international camps, 
to actually build trails.  They said, ‘We will give it a try,’ but nobody believed 
that people would actually come and volunteer for free. 
 
 With the willing, if skeptical, agreement of key stakeholders in the Baikal region, the first 
GBT work trip took place in the summer of 2003.  To the surprise of the skeptics, the program 
succeeded.  Volunteers showed up, and trails were constructed.  Certainly there were problems 
and difficulties, but the response from all involved was positive.  In fact, according to Reida, the 
volunteers’ chief complaint was that they were not able to work more.  The paid employees in 
the protected territories around Baikal were so doubtful that volunteers would actually come and 
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work, they did not provide sufficient tools for all the volunteers.  When tools were available, 
staff tended to monopolize them and would not share them with volunteers, because they were 
“tourists” and were not expected to work.  But trail-building was accomplished, and those who 
had been skeptical of the project were falling in line behind Andrei’s vision, acknowledging its 
potential. 
 At the end of the summer, the group met again to assess the summer program, and Reida 
again served as a translator and group facilitator. 
 
Ariadna Reida: There was a lot of interest and a lot of excitement about the 
project. It was really funny because locals were saying, ‘They actually came! 
These crazy foreigners, they actually paid to work!’ …So there was some 
publicity, and the excitement that people came.  And they came not only for the 
two weeks [of the work camp], they would stay and go as tourists somewhere else 
on the lake.  So [people could see that] it was building the economy. 
 
The group decided to continue the projects into the future, making improvements in planning and 
execution so that the next summer would be even better. 
 Young Russian students who participated in 2003 kept the spirit of camaraderie and 
volunteerism alive by forming a club.  They began holding weekly meetings to share stories, 
reminisce, drink tea, eat cookies, laugh, and eventually to develop new ideas and projects.  This 
pool of steady, volunteer-supporters changed the shape and spirit of GBT.  Unlike the Wave, it 
would not be primarily a professional organization, relying on paid staff and grant funding.  And 
unlike TBI, its activities would not be mostly confined to the summer months.  The club became 
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the springboard for a new collective of steady membership.  Members would work year-round, 
developing and conducting trainings for crew leaders and translators, planning summer projects, 
and getting involved in environmental education and clean-up projects wherever such 
opportunities arose.  The pool of volontyory continued to grow, largely by word of mouth.  The 
years 2005-2007 saw a huge spike in club membership.  Club meetings would see upward of 40 
people.  Friends drew one another in, and once a part of the organization, friendship kept them 
there.  Members would happily cite for me the marriages and the couplings that occurred through 
GBT.  It is a thriving community of hard-working volunteers, eager to help others, to be out in 
nature, quick to laugh and to have a good time – their eyes on the future with optimism. 
 
Summary 
The Great Baikal Trail was long a dream of local residents around Lake Baikal; and yet 
its founding was closely bound up with transnational activism.  Gary Cook was instrumental in 
the creation of the Great Baikal Trail.  He was the catalyst that brought together the various 
parties whose support and cooperation were necessary for such a project to succeed.  Key figures 
were lured by the free trip to the United States and, once in the U.S., they were shown repeatedly 
the success of an eco-tourist model of sustainable development.  Although, at the final moment, 
Cook made it abundantly clear that neither he nor any organization in the United States would be 
playing a leadership role in the Great Baikal Trail, he also made possible the conditions for 
important gate-keepers in Russia to publicly state their commitment to Suknev’s project.   
Still more importantly, it was Gary Cook who pushed for what has become a central 
aspect of GBT’s organizational character: volunteerism.  It is widely acknowledged by GBT 
members that the project could never have gotten off the ground without the presence of 
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international volunteers. There was little doubt in anyone’s mind that as of 2003, Russians would 
not have volunteered in sufficient numbers simply for the joy of building a trail, and they 
certainly would not have paid money to do so.  The money paid by foreign volunteers allowed 
Russian students to attend for free. Some of the organization’s most committed and involved 
volunteers today first attended for free and would not likely have participated without that bonus.  
Some even reported that they went on two projects their first summer: there was not sufficient 
recruitment for all the free slots available to Russians – so after completing their first project, 
they could immediately join another.  But every year, more and more Russians have been signing 
up – and there are even projects where Russians significantly outnumber the foreign volunteers, 
despite the fact that they are now required to pay their own way.  Although critical at the outset, 
once established, the dependence on foreign participation was diminished. 
 
Organizational Form and the Field of Power 
 The creation of these three organizations in Irkutsk, Russia, shows how the transnational 
shapes the formation of civil society.  We can also see another set of influences acting upon local 
organizations and acting upon their life-course.  The field of power operates in each of these 
three organizations in different ways across the post-Soviet period.  
The field of power acts indirectly in the experience of the Tahoe-Baikal Institute. In any 
transnational collaboration, individuals and organizations participating in collaborative 
endeavors cannot fully ignore the inequality in their own power relations by virtue of their 
embeddedness in a global power structure.  Members in Tahoe were not superior in commitment, 
scientific knowledge, or organizational skill to their counterparts in Irkutsk; but they possessed 
another type of power that accrued to them simply by virtue of their temporal position.  Activists 
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in Tahoe were relatively empowered to their counterparts in Irkutsk, not by any virtue of their 
own, but because the field of power has a geographic dimension that spills over onto civil 
society.  The United States, as the strongest economy in the world, provided the money needed 
to run the entire operation of TBI.  The endorsement of American donors and participants was 
necessary for the program, to such a degree that unilateral action by the Tahoe board of directors 
was seen as entirely justified, even if it dissolved the very existence of TBI-Russia.  
Transnational activist collaborators, even with the best intentions, must contend with the field of 
power and the geographic inequalities that it engenders in contemporary globalization. 
The field of power acts more directly, albeit more subtly, on the other two cases under 
study here: Baikal Environmental Wave and the Great Baikal Trail.  When the Wave was 
founded, the political and economic structures within Russia were in shambles. Yet domestic 
civil society was buoyed by support from abroad. The very newness of democracy and 
independent organizing gave individuals a sense of personal empowerment that strengthened the 
claims they would make upon businesses and political leaders.  The 1990s were a high point for 
social power within the field of power, and during this period, Baikal Environmental Wave was 
founded and flourished.   
However, the organization has suffered in the years since the early 2000s, which is also 
the period associated with the re-emergence of economic and political power within Russia.  
Some of this weakness is the result of suppression by the re-emergent political and economic 
forces.  The example with Khodorkovsky’s pipeline and the media accusations against the Wave 
are one example of suppression by economic elites.  More examples of the Wave’s 
confrontations with the state and the repressive tactics used against them will be discussed in 
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Chapter 9.  But there is also reason to suggest that the recovery of the economic and political 
forces in Russia also altered the social desirability of strong advocacy organizations. 
During this same period when Baikal Environmental Wave began its descent from its 
high-point in the late 1990s, we witness the emergence of the Great Baikal Trail, which proceeds 
to flourish.  The mission of GBT is economic development through eco-tourism, and as Suknev 
explains above, it was the direct result of his own observations of the apparent conflict between 
preserving Baikal and developing economically. As the country began to establish itself in the 
global economy, including the international tourist industry, Baikal was facing new pressures.  
The Great Baikal Trail is works synergistically with economic forces – making accommodations 
rather than demands.  This style of activism is more popular and attracts more support in Russia 
of the 2000s. 
Not only is the model of volunteerism and economic accommodation more popular with 
power elites in the political and economic spheres (and this will be addressed in later chapters as 
well), but it also resonates more with the population, particularly youth.  Most of the Wave’s 
current members are of an older generation. Their younger members often joined through their 
prior involvement in radical politics; already on the social fringe, they are willing to take on 
more confrontational advocacy work.  But young people make up the majority of GBT.  I asked 
one member of GBT why she did not volunteer regularly with the Wave.  She replied: 
 
Katya: The Wave has a position, and GBT… well, GBT has a family.  We have 
all kinds of things that we do, and we don’t necessarily have a stand on them. One 
day we are helping kids get office supplies, the next we are building trails, and 
then someone asks us to pick up litter and we do that, or to organize an event at a 
115 
 
fair. We just help each other out. And the Wave needs to have a position on 
whatever they do; they know what it is they are against. You know, that is what it 
comes down to: the Wave is “against,” and GBT is “for.”   
 
But the tables were turned only 15 years prior, when the Wave was a strong and flourishing 
organization, while still taking their advocacy with utmost seriousness.  The flexibility of GBT’s 
organizational model, which is perceived as positive and proactive, comes as the expense of 
stricter demands on the behalf of nature.  The same GBT volunteer quoted above went on to 
commend the Wave as the better environmental organization, even if it is less pleasant, in her 
view. 
Katya: They practice what they preach…They have a motion sensor to turn water 
in the sink on and off, and they are good about turning off the lights and 
unplugging computers.  At the GBT office, I feel a little hypocritical, because it is 
an environmental organization, but the office is not environmental at all. There is 
even this big crack right in the front window. Have you ever noticed it? Here we 
are supposed to be handing out brochures on saving energy, and we ourselves 
have a big crack in the window going outside.  
 
It is also worth noting the similarities between GBT and the Soviet environmental 
protection activities described in Chapter 3.  Planting trees, cleaning litter, holding events at a 
fair – these were the quintessential activities of the druzhiny and VOOP.  They are feel-good 
activities, and certainly very helpful. But they lack the critical element that the Wave has 
possessed since its early years.  The success of GBT in the 2000s attests to the changed 
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environment within Russia – where accommodation to the current powers is preferred over 
assertive alternatives. The Communist Party allowed only certain types of environmentalism in 
the Soviet Union – those which were considered non-threatening to their power and agenda.  It is 
telling that the organizational form that is ascendant today bears a strong resemblance to the 
student environmentalists of the Soviet era, while organizations emphasizing advocacy and 
confrontation seem increasingly untenable. 
Other scholars could take an inventory of different types of organizational forms in 
Irkutsk from one particular year and claim that this diversity represents a proliferation of 
organizational niches (e.g. Minkoff, Aisenbrey and Agnone 2008).  But a closer examination of 
the conditions during the time periods when each were founded, when they flourished and 
when/whether they have foundered, tells a different story.  Activists do make organizations, but, 
to paraphrase Marx’s oft-repeated aphorism, they do not make them just as they please.  
Activists are relatively empowered in relation to other power sources in society and in the world.  
When the economy and the state are weakened, civil society is at its most free for organizational 
formation and experimentation. They may be in such a position to create stronger advocacy-
based organizations that make demands upon other powers to produce change.  When economic 
powers are ascendant, organizations may be more accommodational, emphasizing non-
threatening, cooperative projects.  And activists may be relatively disempowered in what might 
otherwise be considered a bilateral relationship with other activists abroad by virtue of the 
geographic concentration and distribution of economic and geopolitical power. 
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Conclusion 
 Organizational form is strategic and expressive. But it is also something that is 
historically contingent.  Types of organization rise and fall over time, and the dominance of one 
form over another can tell us about the larger social structures in which movements are 
embedded.  In this chapter we examined three of the strongest environmental organizations in 
Irkutsk, Russia.  In their founding and in their development, these organizations were influenced 
by transnational actors and opened Irkutsk as a permanent transnational space, ferrying 
individuals between the Baikal region and the wider world.  Importantly, local activists and their 
transnational partners are helped or hindered in their efforts by the overarching field of power.   
  
  
118 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
PERCEPTIONS OF THE POSSIBLE 
 
 Among the goals of transnational activism is the sharing of “best practices,” which are 
methods or templates for action that have repeatedly proven successful (c.f. European 
Commission 2014). The hope is that, in sharing best practices, weaker, younger, or less 
experienced organizations can avoid the pitfalls of trial and error, and in so doing, more quickly 
establish themselves and achieve their ends.  The goal is benevolent; but good intentions do not 
necessarily produce good results.  Scholarly investigation into the sharing of best practices has 
yielded important criticisms.  At the extreme, the best practice paradigm has been accused of 
foisting particular structural conditions on the Global South that are conducive to Western neo-
imperialism (Goldman 2001, 2005).  But more often, best practices are faulted for ignoring local 
conditions and imposing a cookie-cutter solution to contextual problems that often require more 
subtlety in their solution (e.g. Wareham and Gerrits 1999). 
 In the present chapter, I will be examining an attempt at the sharing of best practices 
between communities around Lake Tahoe and Lake Baikal.  While these two lakes have a 
historical relationship and have been designated “sisters,” their differences far exceed their 
similarities.  Replicating Tahoe’s success at Baikal may be quixotic, given their unique and 
divergent contexts.  Such an interpretation of events supports the critical literature on 
transnational NGO collaboration.  However, I will show that the attempt to share “best practices” 
transnationally has a major, if frequently unacknowledged, unintentional effect, beyond activists’ 
stated goals.   
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In the case at hand, no particular method or skillset was diffused through the interchange 
between Tahoe and Baikal.  What did change, though, was how local residents around Baikal 
thought about their own circumstances and efficacy.  Transnational collaboration helped to 
create the “cosmopolitan vision” (Beck 2006) in the most rural of places.  Russian villagers, who 
prided themselves on skepticism, and whose social imagination ran up against the barriers of the 
tried and true, experienced a mental shift when brought into contact with activists abroad.  
Transnational collaboration became the portal to the progressive reflexivity that is commonly 
associated with modernity (Giddens 1991).  By their exposure to a different culture and to a 
milieu that respected progressive thought, Russian villagers expanded their sense of what was 
possible. In a country with weak civil society (Howard 2003) and a highly skeptical public 
(Goodwin and Allen 2006, Mishler and Rose 2005), transnational exchange created the space to 
imagine alternatives.  Civic engagement, which had previously been eschewed, was now brought 
into the realm of possibility. 
 
A Tale of Two Lakes 
 Lake Tahoe and Lake Baikal sit on opposite sides of the world.  And yet, as we have seen 
in Chapter 4, there is an invisible line that binds them, made manifest by the annual migration of 
young people from one lake to the other through the Tahoe-Baikal Institute (TBI).
33
  The 
connection between Tahoe and Baikal was originally contrived by the founders of TBI: Baikal 
was a national priority for Russian environmentalists, and, for the purposes of building a cross-
cultural cooperative environmental endeavor, their American counterparts in California thought 
                                                 
33
 As of this writing, the Tahoe-Baikal Institute has suspended its operations, after nearly a quarter-century of 
coordinating its environmental education and cultural exchange schools.  The invisible line that binds Baikal and 
Tahoe has become more tenuous with its passing. 
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of Tahoe as a lake in their home state that was also both beloved and in need of environmental 
preservation and rehabilitation.   
Once the decision was made to link Tahoe and Baikal, a number of similarities became 
apparent to justify the selection.  First, both lakes were formed through tectonic processes.  They 
are both located in mountainous terrain that hosts many similar flora and fauna, such as 
coniferous forests, bears, moose and foxes.  Indeed, many TBI participants I spoke with told me 
that the lakes are so similar in appearance that they find it difficult to tell which lake is which in 
their own photographs. Each lake is located on the border of two different governing authorities: 
Tahoe is split between California and Nevada, while Baikal lies between Irkutsk and Buryatia.  
Both lakes are prized for their clarity.  Both lakes have seen mining and logging activities in their 
watersheds, although for Tahoe this threat is now only historical. And both lakes are host to 
recreational tourism. 
 At this point the similarities end.  Most obviously, Baikal dwarfs Tahoe in size, as it does 
most lakes on Earth.  When comparing the volume of Tahoe to that of Baikal, TBI members hold 
a golf ball next to a beach ball.  Tahoe is small enough in circumference that a car can 
circumnavigate it in a day, whereas a trek around Baikal is not only impossible by car (because 
there are no roads around most of it), it would also take several days to travel the 800 miles 
mapping its circumference.  The difference in size gives rise to different environmental hazards.  
Roads and development have made erosion the chief concern at Tahoe, with silt destroying water 
clarity and upsetting ecological balance in the relatively shallow body of water; erosion of 
Baikal’s islands is a problem for its residents (human and non-human), but silt has little impact 
on the mile-deep waters and its profound clarity.  Baikal, on the other hand, has been forced to 
face the hazards of industrial and agricultural effluvia, which Tahoe has never faced. While 
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Tahoe is host to some endemic species, it is not the “Galapagos” that Baikal is, with endemics by 
the thousand.   
 In addition to these ecological distinctions, there are still more profound differences in 
the human societies that surround each body of water.  Although both lakes are dotted with cities 
and towns, the level of development one can expect to find in each location varies dramatically.  
While there are locals who make Tahoe a permanent home, the lake is better known as a rustic 
retreat for peripatetic, jet-setting, urban elites.  Only an hour from Reno on the Nevada side, and 
three hours from San Francisco, with its major international airport, Tahoe is embedded in a rich 
network of First-World recreation.  Paved and well-maintained highways connect the towns 
around Lake Tahoe to cosmopolitan capitals, and a steady stream of traffic in both directions 
render Tahoe, for all its rustic charm, a place of urbanity. As a vacation home hub for Bay Area 
residents, real estate around the lake can range from a median of $150,000 in South Lake Tahoe 
to a median near $630,000 in Incline Village in the north (Carey 2013).   The latter also has the 
notorious distinction of being a tax haven for shell companies and for wealthy Californians, who 
claim this Nevada address as a permanent residence (Liu 2008).  Even in South Lake Tahoe, 
where the working class congregates, and which has a poverty rate close to 20 percent, one can 
expect a basic level of development, which has become standard in the United States: plumbing, 
running water, stable electricity connections, Internet hook-ups, central heat and air, gas stations, 
convenience stores, and grocery stores. 
In contrast, the villages and cities surrounding Baikal lack Tahoe’s sense of 
connectedness.  There is no quick access from Moscow or St. Petersburg to the shore of Baikal.  
Most of the population centers along the lake are villages that seem to have changed little across 
the decades.  Many lack plumbing.  In the summer months, electricity is only sporadically 
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available.  Accessing villages on Baikal often involves long, bumpy rides on dusty roads, in a 
crowded minibus [marshrutka] according to a set schedule, which can run as infrequently as 
once or twice a week.  Some villages are only accessible by boat.  There are two cities on the 
shore of the lake (Baikalsk and Severobaikalsk), but travel between them takes two full days by 
train. To live on the shore of Baikal is to be, not merely rustic, but remote. 
Not only do the regions vary considerably in their levels of economic development, they 
also exist in very different political cultures.  Americans have a long history of democracy, civic 
engagement and responsive government (Tocqueville 1981).  Russians, on the other hand, hold 
onto certain legacies of Communism and Empire, which range from bureaucracy to corruption. 
Russians generally have ambivalent feelings about democracy and little faith in their government 
(e.g. Goodwin and Allen 2006, Mishler and Rose 2005).  More often, the state is something that 
is to be bypassed and avoided.  Given their profound economic and political differences, the 
human ecology of Tahoe and Baikal create two very different and distinct “life-worlds” 
(Habermas 1981).  That they could share common strategies for addressing social problems is 
perhaps surprising, yet that is just what two local NGOs at each lake aimed to achieve in a joint 
collaborative project. 
 
A Project for Mutual Assistance 
In 2012, Baikal Environmental Wave and the Tahoe-Baikal Institute received funds from 
the Eurasia Foundation for a year-long project that would link together three communities 
around Lake Baikal with organizations in South Lake Tahoe for the sharing of best practices and 
cooperative development.  The Wave and TBI planned to reinvigorate the historic relationship 
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between Tahoe and Baikal while conducting research to uncover which local resources could 
lead to environmentally sustainable development in each of these communities. 
The stated purpose of the exchange was for communities that have faced a similar 
situation – the need to develop sustainably due to their proximity to a protected lake – to share 
best practices.  The grant application states that the project’s goal is “to form mechanisms for 
international mutual assistance for local communities, facing complex socio-ecological and 
economic conditions, through a vision of sustainable development in communities based in 
preserving the eco-systemic condition of two lakes - Lake Baikal in Russia, and Lake Tahoe in 
the United States.”  The language of the grant suggests cooperation and the exchange of 
information and expertise.  
In this endeavor, TBI and the Wave were enacting a strategy for development that has 
become paradigmatic amongst the nonprofit community in the West and amongst transnational 
activist networks.  As problems have become globalized, so too have attempts to solve them 
(Smith 2008).  There is a strong desire to find what works, and to share that knowledge with 
others in the hope that they can replicate past success (Seidman 2007). The evidence of 
transnational sharing of practices can be found in the “isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983) that replicates similar norms across the globe, in policy and practice (c.f. Dobbin, 
Simmons and Garrett 2007).  Scholars have shown that NGOs are as responsible as global 
business or national governments for the growing isomorphism (Schofer 2003, Schofer and 
Hironaka 2005, Schofer and Meyer 2005).  As norms become isomorphic, they then can change 
the practical strategies of those people whom NGOs aim to serve, furthering the hegemony that 
Western organizations themselves began (Elyachar 2006).  Activists have encouraged the spread 
of certain “best practices” for labor and environmental standards amongst businesses worldwide, 
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although what works best for activists in achieving this outcome can vary greatly by country 
(Bair and Palpacuer 2012).   
However, NGOs and members of the development community who are responsible for 
pushing global change are seldom themselves under scrutiny in scholarly inquiry (Viterna 
Forthcoming).  There is a growing concern among scholars that, what is commonly deemed a 
“best practice,” may fail in ways that are culturally specific, or they may be transnationally 
coercive.  AIDS advocacy organizations in Ghana that attempted to follow the successful media 
campaigns of Western nations could not convey their message in a built urban environment that 
differed from that of the U.S. and Europe. (McDonnell 2010). Attempts to provide clean drinking 
water in the Global South effectively restructure national governments and local institutions 
toward openness to Western corporations (Goldman 2001, 2007). Whether the problem is 
Western neo-imperialism or simply contextual ignorance of local processes, there is a growing 
concern that the “sharing best practices” may not be a particularly useful practice in itself. 
This chapter will evaluate this attempt at transnational development work in accordance 
with the goal of mutual assistance – and will show the shortcomings of suggesting strategies 
irrespective of contextual differences.  However, I will also show that the attempt to unite 
communities of difference for mutual assistance has an arguably beneficial, yet unintentional, 
side effect that is potentially more profound than the sharing of best practices itself might have 
been.  
 
The Wave-TBI project for mutual assistance was primarily devised and developed by 
Marina Rikhvanova at Baikal Environmental Wave, and it was clear that her own hope in the 
cross-national component was to encourage Baikalsk and the villages of Goloustnoye (Boshoe 
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and Maloye
34
) to emulate South Lake Tahoe and its success in fostering sustainable geo-tourism.  
When I first discussed the project with her, as it was just getting started, Marina explained it this 
way:  
Marina Rikhvanova: People in Baikalsk are very concerned about the paper mill 
closing because it has been the center of their economy.  But Bolshoye and 
Maloye Goloustnoye had a similar situation.  Most people worked for the leskhoz 
(state forestry company) that operated in that region.  But when the national park 
formed, it became illegal to harvest wood in the territory of the park. The leskhoz 
had to scale back and many people were laid off.  People in these towns generally 
think that a good job is a job in a big factory, like the leskhoz or the paper mill.  
They often don’t see the resources and the potential that they have to develop 
economically in their region without some big industry.  But in Tahoe, they have 
an economy built around tourism.  They have managed protect their lake and their 
forests, and they still develop economically. 
 For Rikhvanova, Tahoe is a success story.  Her aim in connecting the towns around Lake 
Baikal to groups in Tahoe was education and emulation.  Tahoe had things to teach Baikalsk and 
the Goloustnoye village about the economics of sustainable tourism.  Over the decades, Lake 
Tahoe had recovered from environmental degradation while maintaining economic viability. 
Residents living near Baikal needed to hear that such an outcome was possible and learn how it 
could be done. 
                                                 
34
 Bolshoye and Maloe are adjectives that translate as “big” and “small.” They designate two villages: Big 
Goloustnoye and Small Goloustnoye.  Curiously, Maloe Goloustnoye is larger in population than Bolshoye 
Goloustnoye (1200 and 600 people respectively).  The name Goloustnoye roughly translates as “naked mouth” and 
it is generally presumed that the name refers to the river delta on which the two villages sit.  Bolshoye Goloustnoye 
is situated directly beside Lake Baikal where the Goloustnoye River flows into it.  Maloe Goloustnoye is located 
about 20 minutes upriver from Bolshoye Goloustnoye in the Pribaikalskiy mountain range surrounding the western 
edge of the lake.  The river delta is wider near the lake, hence the designation “big naked mouth” for the village near 
the shore, and “small naked mouth” for the village further upstream where the delta narrows and becomes smaller. 
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As the project developed, however, it was clear that much more was going on than 
merely the sharing of “best practices.”  While prior activist involvement in Baikal villages ran 
ashore on the apathy and skepticism that have become emblematic of post-Soviet society, the 
opportunity for transnational communication broke down the mental barriers that villagers had 
erected and opened them to the very possibility of a more active version of citizenship and 
engagement. 
 
Cultivated Disinterest in Bolshoye Goloustnoye 
The Irkutsk oblast [region] was in the process of setting up two Special Economic Zones 
(SEZ) on the shore of Baikal. The SEZ would be an area where developers and investors could 
receive tax breaks and other incentives for establishing tourism and recreation enterprises in the 
region.  Bolshoye Goloustnoye was one suggested site for the SEZ, and Baikal Environmental 
Wave wanted to make sure that villagers’ interests were represented in the process.  They 
generally feared that SEZ-sponsored tourism would be environmentally harmful rather than 
sustainable, and hoped that Bolshoye Goloustnoye villagers would work with them to ensure that 
outside developers would not run roughshod over Baikal and its indigenous people.  Villagers 
were aware of the planned SEZ.  They were told that it would bring running water and a sewer 
system to the village, which sounded quite nice from their point of view.  Mostly, they were 
irritated that the land that was slated for development – which, when “seeing like a state” (Scott 
1998), looked like empty space – was actually prime grazing land for the village cattle. The SEZ 
would essentially be enclosing the commons.
35
  While activists and capitalists disputed the best 
means for economic growth, the people of Bolshoye Goloustnoye simply wanted to know where 
                                                 
35
 The SEZ planned for Bolshoye Goloustnoye was relocated to Baikalsk, to ease the economic shock to the region 
when the paper mill was finally closed. The Bolshoye Goloustnoye villagers may yet elide their once seemingly 
inevitable economic development. 
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they could feed their livestock.  The Wave looked with foreboding at big business’s 
appropriation of local livelihood, and they wanted to assist the residents to find a secure path 
forward in this brave new world.   
 
In September 2012, Baikal Environmental Wave made a research expedition to Bolshoye 
Goloustnoye, and I followed to observe the process.  Bolshoye Goloustnoye is a village of about 
600 people the shore of Lake Baikal, approximately two hours from the regional capital city, 
Irkutsk, by mini-bus along a bumpy, dusty, tortuous road.  I traveled there with Artur, a thin, 
taciturn man with dark hair, a short beard, and piercing blue eyes. With us was Tanya, a 
sociologist that the Wave had contracted to perform the focus groups and interviews.  The 
country road to the village of Bolshoye Goloustnoye was beautiful, with rocky cliffs rising up on 
either side.  The road would often follow the small Goloustnoye River and the autumn leaves 
that adorned the surrounding trees were golden. 
The van lumbered along the winding road, lifting over one of the high hills and then 
descending into the river delta that opened out onto the shore of Lake Baikal.  Nestled beside the 
delta, in a wide valley of steppe, sat the village of Bolshoye Goloustnoye.  The town was made 
up of wooden, one-story houses, often with outhouses and small agricultural plots beside them, 
surrounded by wooden fences. Painted crenulations adorned some of the windows and eaves, in 
traditional Siberian fashion, but such sporadic decoration did little to mitigate the general 
dilapidated ambience of a village that mostly survives on subsistence agriculture.  Cattle and 
stray dogs roamed freely on the dirt roads and children would ride along amongst them on 
bicycles, sometimes with another child sitting on the handlebars or perched on the back. 
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 The Wave planned to conduct two focus groups and a community meeting over the 
course of several days in the village. The first focus group was to take place amongst students in 
the oldest grades at the local school (8
th
 and 9
th
 graders; those wishing to complete their high 
school diploma must travel to Irkutsk to do so).  Since many villages in Russia currently face the 
problem of depopulation, the Wave hoped to learn from the students themselves what they liked 
and disliked about village life, and whether they planned to return to Bolshoye Goloustnoye after 
completing their education. 
 The schoolhouse had several classrooms, each imbued with a homey feel.  The walls 
were wood-paneled, with floor-to-ceiling windows to allow in the natural light. Back walls were 
adorned in potted plants.  Students – boys and girls – sat in their white shirts and grey uniforms; 
most were alert, with straight backs and pleasant expressions, eager to please their out-of-town 
guests. 
 The focus group proceeded, and the students described the positive aspects of village life: 
being close to nature, on the shore of Baikal, with fresh air and homegrown food.  Most still 
planned to leave the village, saying that there was nothing to do and nowhere to work.  Among 
their chief complaints, which was also repeated frequently by adults in the interviews I had 
observed, was the lack of a pre-school in the village. When students brought up the fact that 
Bolshoye Goloustnoye had no pre-school, Tanya ask the students whether there was anything 
they themselves could do to fix the problem. 
 “No,” several answered, shaking their heads. 
 “The administration [government] should do something about it,” said a girl in a grey 
jumper, sitting in the front row. 
*** 
129 
 
When we left the school, it was obvious that Artur was in an irritable mood. The school 
housed the only computer in the village, which had a slow, dial-up Internet connection.  Artur 
told the principal he planned to keep her informed as the project developed and to invite her, the 
faculty and the students to future events that the Wave planned to hold.  He asked for an e-mail 
address where he could contact them.  Artur had also explained to the principal that the Wave 
would be building an interactive website where people living near Baikal and Tahoe could 
communicate with one another to share best practices and to mutually solve local problems.  The 
principal replied that she did not have an e-mail address and that she did not see the point of an 
interactive Internet site. 
“How can I help them develop if they themselves don’t want to develop?” Artur asked 
rhetorically, in a huff.  “How can you not want to use the Internet?” Tanya countered that she 
herself did not own a television, but Artur dismissed the comparison.  “A television is just a 
television, but the Internet…!”   
*** 
In the evening, we headed toward the village clubhouse for the adult focus group.  Artur 
and Tanya had been on the phone for the past several days recruiting participants.  Tanya wanted 
a minimum of ten people to attend.  Tanya said, while we walked down the dirt road, that she 
hoped the turn-out would be better than it had been at the neighboring village, Maloye 
Goloustnoye, the previous week, when only five people attended.  She went on to criticize the 
villagers as sovki – those Russians who are trapped in a Soviet mentality, who expected the 
government to do everything and showed no personal initiative. 
 “There was a villager in Maloye Goloustnoye who complained that the fences had not 
been painted in thirty years,” she told me.  “So no one has painted the fences – then paint them! 
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They expect everything to be done for them. And that is how it was in the Soviet Union.  There 
was the leskhoz [state logging company], and it provided people with homes, it built the school, 
it gave people vacations. So people came to depend upon the company. It was the whole life of 
the town, and then it just vanished. The leskhoz probably built that fence 30 years ago, painted it, 
and since the leskhoz shut down, no one has touched it.”36 
We arrived at the clubhouse, which was a long wooden building, painted in fading blue 
and green. Although it was almost 5 p.m., when the focus group should begin, the building was 
still locked.  Only one of the invited participants showed up to wait with us by the front door.  A 
town magistrate arrived on a motorcycle with her two year old daughter tucked into a sidecar.  
She opened the clubhouse for us and we all went inside. 
The interior of the clubhouse was old and dilapidated.  We were shown into a very small 
auditorium that doubled as the local discothèque. It has red plush theater seats lining the outside 
walls: some missing arms, others missing seats, some with torn upholstery, and all of it dusty and 
degraded. There was a proscenium and a stage that looked to be about two meters wide and deep. 
We waited past the 5pm starting time, hoping more people would come. Slowly, a few 
more people trickled in.  One woman, a recent retiree with short white hair, kept looking around 
and wiggling in her seat as though at any minute she might get up and leave.  It seemed all she 
could do to sit there and wait. “How can we just be sitting here when there are potatoes to be 
dug?” she asked aloud to no one in particular. 
Tanya was clearly dissatisfied with the low turnout, but tea and cookies could only 
occupy the guests for so long, and Artur decided to begin.  He made a brief presentation about 
the project that the Wave was undertaking.  I had heard his opening remarks shift over the course 
                                                 
36
 I then proceeded to tell her about “company towns” in the United States, but she dismissed the possibility that 
America might have had anything so similar to the Soviet system. 
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of the trip.  While he had usually begun in a respectful and upbeat tone to express the Wave’s 
desire to help and support villagers, the resistance he had encountered hardened his approach. 
Now he stood before them and explained his point of view in no uncertain terms:  
“The economy is changing,” Artur began.  “Either the village will develop or it will dry 
up.  Usually development happens when some fat cat [bogataya dyadya] comes in and pays a ton 
of money to build something. But we want to know what we can do here with what we have, so 
that you don’t have to wait for the fat cat, who may or may not put money back into the village.” 
  After Artur’s introduction, Tanya began her focus group protocol.  As the focus group 
continued, a few more stragglers came in.  All told, seven people showed up to the focus group.  
The last member came 30 minutes into the focus group discussion (and 50 minutes after the 
originally planned starting time.)  She perched on the edge of the chair closest to the door.  When 
Tanya tried to include her in the conversation, she motioned with her hand to suggest that she 
was only there to observe, not to participate. 
Like the youth focus group, there was much complaining about the state of the village, 
the prospects for development, and a general pessimism about the possibility for improving the 
situation.  These individuals were specifically invited to the focus group because they were 
considered to be the most “active” members of the community.  But even these frequently 
reverted to a refrain of fatalism.   
“The administration doesn’t listen to us,” said the woman who had been bemoaning her 
un-dug potatoes earlier.  “We can’t do anything. We are powerless.”  
*** 
The following month, Baikal Environmental Wave held another seminar, this time in the 
neighboring village of Maloye Goloustnoye.  The Wave members planned to bring 
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representatives from the Small Business Administration in Irkutsk, the regional capital, to talk 
about various programs and opportunities that the villagers could access to help develop small 
businesses.  Villagers from Bolshoye Goloustnoye were also invited to attend the seminar, but all 
declined. 
“They said it was too cold to wait for the bus,” Katya said. 
“They have a point,” I replied, as the Siberian winter was now in full-swing.  She shook 
her head dismissively. 
“So we offered to have a van pick them up in front of their houses,” she went on.  “We 
would drive around to people’s doorsteps and collect them from their homes. They wouldn’t 
have to wait outside at all. But they still said no.  Now they said it was because the cow had to be 
milked in the morning.”  
 
Until the advent of modernity, human society changed very slowly.  Practices, behaviors 
and beliefs were passed down through the generations relatively unchanged, and authority 
accrued to venerable traditions.  Whether it is driven by scientific revolution (Kuhn 1962), the 
Enlightenment’s call to critical thought (Kant 1784), or capitalism’s “creative destruction” 
(Schumpeter 2008), constant change is a defining feature of modernity (Berman 1988). 
By contrast, villagers in Bolshoye Goloustnoye seem to have stepped out of another era.  
Efforts at creating change were viewed with suspicion and doubt.  Even the schoolchildren 
believed that only the government could bring about change in the village, as in the case of the 
nonexistent pre-school. Not only were the open meetings poorly attended, but those who did 
attend put on a display of disinterest: sitting near the door and complaining that they had much 
better things to do than discuss economic development: they had to dig potatoes. 
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The activists from Irkutsk, the regional capital, brought with them their own urban 
“habitus” (Bourdieu 1977): one that views change as inevitable.  For the Wave, one needed to 
keep one’s ear to the ground, to keep an eye out, to protect nature from those who would exploit 
it for profit.  The busy bustle of modernity required constant vigilance; and networks of like-
minded supporters were an important weapon for countering the agendas of the powerful.  What 
was perhaps most incomprehensible to the modern sensibilities of Irkutsk’s activists was the 
disinterest their rural counterparts expressed at joining the global march of modernity.  There is 
probably no tool as emblematic of the cosmopolitan ethos as the Internet, and yet the school 
principle practically rebuffed it.  When discussing the tourist economy in the focus groups, most 
residents viewed tourists with distain.  They were glad of the extra income, but expressed 
displeasure with the myriad ways that tourists disrupted their village life.  They would not turn 
down the opportunity for running water, but hoped the price for such luxury would not come at 
the expense of their daily patterns and practices.  Faced with the intransigence of 
nonparticipation in this rural community, Artur essentially declared to them at the start of the 
focus group that development was inevitable: modernity was coming to Bolshoye Goloustnoye, 
whether the villagers wanted it or not.  The only question was whether they would be proprietors 
of their own guesthouses or scrubbing the floors of a large hotel owned by a Moscow oligarch.   
 
The Sister-City Webinar Project 
In January, Baikal Environmental Wave and TBI embarked on the second half of their 
project: a series of webinar sessions to take place between groups in South Lake Tahoe, 
Baikalsk, and Bolshoye and Maloye Goloustnoye.   Because there is only one computer in 
Bolshoye Goloustnoye, and the dial-up connection is too slow for video, interested participants 
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from the two Goloustnoye villages were picked up in a minivan and driven to the Baikal 
Environmental Wave office in Irkutsk for the webinar event. 
 
February 5, 2013 
It was still dark when I arrived at the Wave office at a quarter to nine for the very first of 
the webinar series.  Marina and I greeted each other as I shed my layers and hung them on the 
coat stand.   
 “We have only two people from Bolshoye Goloustnoye and no one from Maloye 
Goloustnoye,” Marina told me, with a grin. I was perplexed as to how I should react, as I often 
was when Marina would deliver bad news with a cheerful smile.  She then directed me to the 
classroom in the back of the office.  I saw a number of chairs set up in a semi-circle facing a 
computer monitor, with a microphone and speakers attached.  There was an embarrassment of 
staff in the Wave office: three times the number of employees as there were program 
participants.  In addition to the regular Wave staff, two scholars from the Center for Independent 
Social Research (CISR) were on hand to assist, and a journalist had been recruited to document 
the event.  Marina encouraged everyone to help themselves to the coffee, tea, muffins and 
cookies brought for the occasion. 
 The two guests from Bolshoye Goloustnoye sat in the chairs, facing the computer 
uncertainly.  One was a woman – Zina – in her late 60s probably, with short, spiked, white hair. 
Beside her sat a man named Pyotr who looked to be in his 50s. His long black hair was streaked 
with grey and was pulled back in a ponytail.  He had dark rimmed glasses and a goatee.   
Olga, a sociologist with CISR, was serving as moderator and translator. She thanked the 
two from Goloustnoye for coming and explained to them what the webinar would be about.  She 
135 
 
told them of the similarities between Baikal and Tahoe. “Thousands of people live in Tahoe, and 
they get millions of tourists. Two million people live on Baikal, and we get thousands of tourists. 
But tourism is something that we have in common. So we can talk about tourism here and 
tourism there.” 
“It will be interesting to listen to it,” Zina told Olga, although she looked very far from 
interested, her face buried in a gardening tabloid she had brought with her.   
“Before we begin, let’s talk about the questions that will be raised during the webinar,” 
Olga continued.  “What are the key assets or tourist attractions in your region that you can 
discuss during the webinar?” 
The two guests sat mute for a moment. Then Zina shrugged and said, “The Dry Lake.” 
“What is the Dry Lake?” Olga asked. 
“It’s a lake in the forest that appears every four years,” she answered, and then was silent. 
“So, every four years there is a lake.  What happens the other three years?” Olga 
prompted. 
“It’s just a field.” 
“So it’s pretty?” 
“Well, yes, it’s pretty.” 
“Ok.  There is the Dry Lake. What else? What other things would attract tourists to 
Bolshoye Goloustnoye?” Olga asked. 
“Lake Baikal,” Pyotr said. “In the winter, you can ice skate on the lake.”  Given his 
prosaic answer, one might have countered that Baikal is not unique to Bolshoye Goloustnoye. 
Nor did the village have any particular corner on the market for ice skating.  Olga’s expression 
and tone suggested disappointment and mild frustration with their disinterest, but she proceeded 
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with the project program and prepared to begin her role as moderator and translator for the 
Irkutsk site of the webinar. 
The Wave had selected Google Plus as the hosting software for the webinar.  All three 
locations could be seen at once as small, inset panels at the bottom of the screen, and users could 
take turns enlarging them to the full screen size.  Olga opened the screen from Tahoe, and the 
two guests from Goloustnoye inhaled sharply. 
“So many people!” Zina murmured, and indeed, with about eight attendees, there were 
noticeably more Americans seated around the table in Tahoe’s conference room than in either 
Irkutsk or Baikalsk, which had two and four people respectively.  There was also a small squeal 
of delight when one of the Russians noticed a large map of Lake Baikal on the wall of the 
conference room in Tahoe. 
The conversation got started. We began with introductions, going around to each 
individual at each site.  Dialogue was understandably slow, since everything needed to be 
translated into either English or Russian by the translator that each site had on hand for that 
purpose.  But despite the continuous need for translation, the conversation soon became more 
involved. 
The Tahoe residents came in with an agenda.  They had a model of development that they 
clearly wished to convey.  The head of a local nonprofit, a woman with long, silver hair, 
described Tahoe’s program for sustainable tourism. 
“Our region is embracing geo-tourism as a way of life,” she explained, without defining 
what geo-tourism is.
37
 “First, you have to identify those assets that are unique to your area.”  
Here she produced a map of Tahoe with several points indicated upon it.  “Then we develop 
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 Geo-tourism is defined by the National Geographic Society as tourism that sustains or enhances the geographical 
character of a place – its environment, culture, aesthetics, heritage, and the well-being of its residents. 
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these places on the ground, so we can show tourists these particular places.”  Here, she showed 
information about a number of “adventure tracks” that had been developed for tourists to follow.  
“We use a trinomic model in developing these tracks that includes social organizations, private 
businesses and the government. Nonprofit organizations host the adventure and provide the 
guides, the state provides access to these special places, and then the local businesses benefit by 
providing the food, equipment, and transportation.  And everything we use in an ‘adventure 
track’ showcases the local – it’s all local. Local food, local transportation, local kayaks, local 
businesses, local biologists. Everything is here. Nothing is imported. There are no cars 
[involved].”   
While she listened to the accented Russian proceeding from the translator in Tahoe, Zina 
nodded her head vigorously. 
 “Visitors have incredible experiences,” the woman in Tahoe went on. “It’s fun, it’s 
educational, and it’s low-carbon... It’s sustainable.” 
 Next, the conversation turned toward tourism potential in Baikalsk. There was a doctor in 
attendance, employed by the local ski resort, who harbored dreams of developing medical 
tourism in Baikalsk through alternative spa therapies.  The Baikal watershed is seismic, with hot 
springs throughout the region.  This doctor planned to develop thermal springs therapy, and blue 
clay spa treatments with local muds in Baikalsk.  He presented this as a means to sustain tourism 
outside of the regular ski season, but noted that it would be a major economic undertaking and 
would require a great deal of collaboration and capital to succeed. 
 After hearing about the well-developed program of adventure tracks in Tahoe, and a 
thermal spa in Baikalsk, it was time for the two villagers from Bolshoye Goloustnoye to speak of 
their own tourist attractions.  They spoke of the Dry Lake and the skating trails, as they had with 
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Olga before the webinar; however, this time they did so with more enthusiasm.  Zina described 
the Lake as a magical, mysterious place that everyone should come and see.  She talked about its 
healing properties and the legends surrounding it.  She seemed to think the site more worthy now 
than before the webinar.  Pyotr talked positively about the idea of creating an ice skating trail, 
and continued to speak about the potential of ice skating tracks even after the conversation had 
turned to the difficulties of tourism and the problems it can bring.  Their pessimism had morphed 
into interest, positivity, and participation. 
The conversation proceeded nicely until this point, and it seemed that the three sites were 
glad to listen to one another’s issues and ideas.  But discussion then took a sudden turn for the 
worse.  One of the pre-designated questions asked of each community was to discuss various 
environmentally-friendly technologies that they used in tourism, and the drawback to cross-
nation collaboration became immediately apparent. 
“Embassy Suites is a 400 room hotel in South Lake Tahoe,” explained one of the 
community leaders there. “They managed to cut costs by $500,000 per year based upon 
environmental upgrades.” She explained that the hotel now composts all its food waste, and how 
it instituted a recycle-reuse program that helped save to money.   
“But one of their biggest expenses was laundry,” the woman went on.  “So they bought 
new, efficient, ion cleaners, which are modern washing machines that use little energy, little 
water, and no soap.  They use no soap and no dryers!” 
The participants in Russia looked back at the screen blankly.  The “best practice” offered 
by Tahoe in this instance was so divorced from their own experience that the conversation 
seemed to shrivel and die.  The villages of Goloustnoye have no plumbing –the schools and 
hospitals have outhouses.  Washing machines themselves were fanciful, let alone ion cleaners. 
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Even in Baikalsk, which is an industrial city, one can see clothes hanging out to dry in sub-zero 
temperatures. 
Someone in Baikalsk muttered something about a solar panel somewhere in the city.     
“Our technology is simpler,” Zina answered when it was her turn to talk about 
“alternative technologies” in Bolshoye Goloustnoye.  “Our leftover food is given to the cattle.  
And we use only fallen trees for heating the house, rather than cutting trees down.”   
 No one in the webinar was directly helping anyone else at this moment in any way.  
Bolshoye Goloustnoye had no use for Embassy Suites and its ion cleaners.  People in Tahoe only 
heat their homes with fire for the aesthetic, and they certainly would not be giving food waste to 
non-existent livestock.  Baikalsk hovered somewhere in the middle.  As a factory town, they had 
central heating, so felling trees was not a chief concern of theirs.  But neither would their solitary 
solar panel do much to impress the Americans. 
 To bring the conversation back onto mutual footing, one of the Russians in Baikalsk 
asked the Tahoe residents to tell him about snow-shoeing, which is a sport seldom seen in 
Russia.  The Americans obliged, talking about their adventure tracks, and how local businesses 
will rent out snow-shoes. 
 “What about ice skating in Tahoe?” asked Pyotr, seeking to include Bolshoye 
Goloustnoye in the conversation.
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 “Tahoe never freezes,” the Americans answered in once voice, resulting in raised 
eyebrows from the Russians who live by Baikal, where winter ice is more than a meter thick.   
                                                 
38
 The ecosystems surrounding Lake Baikal vary substantially.  Baikalsk has a great deal of snowfall. In the winter, 
it mounds up for several feet.  Baikalsk is home to a mountain ski resort because of the quantity and quality of its 
snowfall. Bolshoye Goloustnoye, on the other hand, receives the greatest number of sunny days for any place in all 
of Russia. When snow does fall, it is often powdery and quickly blows away, off the dry steppe, on the strength of 
Baikal’s wind.  Ice skating is a common sport Bolshoye Goloustnoye, but skiing and snow-shoeing are impossible 
there. 
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“We have ice skating in Truckee,” said one woman referring to a city not far from Tahoe. 
“But it’s indoor.” 
 “Come to Bolshoye Goloustnoye!” the two residents invited their foreign correspondents 
with enthusiasm. “We have the biggest ice skating rink in the world!” 
 And with this friendly invitation extended, the first international webinar between Baikal 
and Tahoe drew to a close. 
*** 
 Bolshoye Goloustnoye had a reputation amongst the Irkutsk activists involved in the 
project for its passivity and intransigence.  Invitations to participate in events were inevitably 
met with reluctance and questions like: “Why are we having a meeting when the potatoes need to 
be dug?”  or, “How can we travel to Irkutsk when the cows must be milked in the morning?”  
There were a few active members of the community, but the general public in this village of 600 
souls tended to enact an almost ritualized avoidance of involvement.  It was that performance of 
disinterest that brought Zina to press her nose to her magazine and to tell Olga that the 
conversation would be interesting “to listen to,” as though to emphasize that she was there to 
hear and not to participate.  She would attend, but still keep herself at a distance.  Such 
insouciance is also the likely reason that there were so very few people from Goloustnoye in 
attendance for the first webinar. 
 But during the webinar, there was a marked change in the participants from Bolshoye 
Goloustnoye. Their cultivated disinterest failed them when faced with the active interest of 
Baikalsk and South Lake Tahoe.  In the village, one garners a degree of respectability from 
suspicion and stubbornness, but during the webinar, respect was conferred on those who were 
progressive: to those who were attempting to improve their communities – and especially to 
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those who had succeeded in some small way to make change.  Suddenly, members from 
Bolshoye Goloustnoye felt the need to tout their potential skating trail, to talk about their Dry 
Lake with more gusto.  It was the only thing that saved them from the mortification of having 
nothing to say when, in a new social milieu, the standard for respectability had shifted 
dramatically toward involvement. 
 However, the transformation that occurred amongst the participants in Bolshoye 
Golousnoe was not merely one of lip service, nor was it solely geared toward saving face.  
Simply being exposed to another context, one where progressive thought was validated, seemed 
to alter the legitimacy of activism and community involvement for the villagers.  Both 
participants listened attentively, and Zina would nod her head on occasion, signaling that she 
heard what the other participants were saying, and that she liked what she heard.  By the end of 
the conversation, both participants from Bolshoye Goloustnoye were fully engaged, offering an 
enthusiastic farewell.   
 After the webinar, Zina behaved differently.  She had long since tucked her newspaper 
away, and now she wanted to talk, to work through the ideas and the experience.  The two guests 
from Bolshoye Goloustnoye showed a reluctance to leave the Wave’s office after the seminar. 
They wanted the conversation to keep going, telling the staff what they thought of all they had 
just heard.  Indeed, the desire to de-brief was so evident that the Wave decided in future 
webinars to formalize it and hold a post-webinar discussion as part of the webinar process. 
Importantly, the effect of this cognitive transformation extended beyond the webinar 
itself.  The sense of interest and efficacy did not stop at the door of the Wave’s office.  Reports 
of the webinar spread, and at each subsequent meeting in the series, more and more people were 
in attendance on the Russian side of the screen.  There were six webinars altogether between 
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Irkutsk, Baikalsk and Tahoe, and the general trend was toward increasing attendance in Russia.  
Essentially, transnational contact altered the thought-processes of those participating, shifting 
mind-sets away from fatalism and apathy and toward possibility and involvement.    
In addition to raising interest in participation, the project also influenced people’s sense 
of efficacy in the face of social problems.  The webinars became spaces where stumbling blocks 
that had seemed insurmountable became collectively conquerable. Once in a mindset of efficacy 
and agency, problems got solved.  During the webinar that discussed poverty, a woman with a 
guesthouse in Bolshoye Goloustnoye, Galina, talked about putting in a new pit toilet and then 
being fined 130,000 rubles (US$4,334) because she did not have proper documentation for it.  
She described her difficulties with the state bureaucracy that regulates business and concluded, 
saying, “I’ll have to work on the black market, because I just can’t deal with what it takes to 
work officially.” 
 This type of comment is common in Russia.  Anthropologist Nancy Reis (1997) refers to 
this discursive category as a “lament.”  In her ethnography of discourse in the late Soviet period, 
she documented the cultural tendency to describe at length the problems and difficulties people 
face, particularly at the hands of an incompetent and unresponsive state.  An important quality of 
the “lament” was its divorce from any discussion of problem-solving. This litany of suffering 
was not geared toward finding an avenue to relieve the suffering – it was simply a discursive 
ritual: to proclaim a lamentation.  The lament has continued to persist in Russian culture well 
past the perestroika period wherein Reis documented it, and normally, Galina’s complaint would 
have fallen squarely in this tradition. 
 What was different was what happened after her lament.  The Russians in the room began 
to try to help her overcome the obstacles she described.  They asked her questions about how her 
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business was classified and made recommendations for what she could do.  Among those present 
was a woman from the Irkutsk Small Business Administration, and she passed her card to 
Galina, saying she would be glad to help her work out her documentation problems and point her 
in the direction of grants and resources geared toward small entrepreneurs to make the toilet and 
other improvements more affordable. The two met up and continued talking after the webinar. 
 In another occurrence, during a post-webinar de-briefing, participants from Bolshoye and 
Maloye Goloustnoye began to discuss about the growing litter problem that has accompanied the 
rise of Baikal tourism. 
 “I’m ashamed of the mentality in our country,” another woman piped in. “We have 
volunteers come to pick up litter. And not just volunteers: international tourists will pick up litter 
and bring it to me. But our Russian people just drink and toss the bottle.” 
 Again, despite the tone of the comment, which suggested a lament (and to which the 
appropriate response is a sad shake of the head, a click of the tongue or another lament), those at 
the webinar began to think of ways that the problem might be fixed.  
 “My souvenir shop could start a program: bring a bag of trash and get a free souvenir!” 
 The webinars provided a space apart from the everyday where possibilities could be 
envisioned and expanded.  In the third webinar on poverty, a woman attended in Baikalsk who 
owns her own restaurant.  
 “We started with four people, and we now employ between 70 and 100 people, 
depending on the season.  It is hard to do business because of high taxes and expenses, but we 
pay good salaries.  We also do charity work. We built a church with our contributions. We also 
regularly provide free meals to children in a local school.  We are Russian, we are a strong 
people, and we just have to work to believe in our work.” 
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 At the end of this speech, the participants in Irkutsk from Bolshoye and Maloye 
Goloustnoye burst into applause.  They had been listening with rapt attention throughout, 
exchanging nods or approving glances with every point the speaker raised.  They were 
impressed, not only with the success of the restaurant, but especially with the apparent civic 
virtue displayed by the local entrepreneur – providing wide employment, with a “good salary,” 
feeding local school children for free, and building a community church.   
 During the group discussion following the webinar on poverty, the very first comments 
were about the restaurant.  
 “Let’s organize an exchange so we can meet in person,” someone from Bolshoye 
Goloustnoye said. “At least between us and Baikalsk.  We can send delegates there, and they can 
come here. Especially the woman with the restaurant.” The others nodded energetically and 
added that they also would like the opportunity to see the restaurant and learn more about it.  For 
a population that in previous circumstances would find a multitude of excuses to avoid attending 
seminars or meetings, it was a radical departure for the same group to suggest such an exchange 
of their own initiative.  For a group that would often complain of the difficulties in traveling to 
Irkutsk, or even the next village over, the excitement about a field trip to distant Baikalsk was 
out of the ordinary, and was only made possible by the inspiration provoked by the transnational 
webinars. 
 
Consuming the Other 
The promise of transnational collaboration is in the creative thought that such interchange 
can bring.  However, not all parties come to the table with the same expectation for benefitting 
from the experience.  Indeed, in this respect, the most developed country can be at a 
145 
 
disadvantage.  Inequality in expectation was most evident at the fourth webinar, which covered 
the topic of food.   
When the Tahoe participants discuss food, they are chiefly concerned with issues of 
environmental protection, and it derives from the American intelligentsia’s growing distaste for 
agribusiness.  The combination of chemical pesticides and herbicides, the mechanization of farm 
work, advances in trucking and shipping, the volatility of land and food prices, and vertical 
integration of the food sector allowed for the rise of massive industries in food production.  A 
century ago, the United States was mostly agricultural, and many Americans worked the family 
farm.  Today, only 2 percent of Americans claim to be farmers.  Books like Michael Pollan’s The 
Omnivore’s Dilemma have become best-sellers, driven by the growing insecurity that Americans 
feel, being divorced from the production of their sustenance.  
For environmentalists especially, agribusiness has worrying side effects.  Agricultural 
chemicals have repeatedly raised alarm due to their negative ecosystemic consequences, from 
DDT for the bald eagle in the 1960s (Carson 1962), to Gaucho for bee colony collapse in the 
present (Suryanarayanan and Kleinman 2014), not to mention their potential impact on human 
health (e.g. Horrigan, Lawrence and Walker 2002).  Moreover, many U.S. environmentalists are 
concerned about the carbon footprint of their diet.  “Food miles” is a term used to encompass the 
distance travelled by the beef or broccoli or rice that ends up on a person’s plate (e.g. Weber and 
Matthews 2008). To counter the negative effects of agribusiness and food mileage, a movement 
has grown up in cities in the Global North to bring food production closer to home.  Urban 
agriculture and community gardens are growing in popularity as the educated elite strive to eat 
organically grown, local produce.  Farmer’s markets have seen a renaissance in recent years.  
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Community-supported agricultural cooperatives are on the rise. Such were the food concerns that 
motivated the webinar participants at Lake Tahoe. 
Russia has followed a similar trajectory as the United States, moving from an agricultural 
nation at the turn of the last century to an industrial/post-industrial economy at the beginning of 
the present; however, there is a major difference between the two countries when it comes to the 
production of food.  Although the Soviet industrial project required the creation of a proletariat 
from the peasantry, the practice of domestic agriculture was not lost in the Soviet Union as it was 
in the United States.  Collectivization and food production po planu [according to plan (as 
opposed to the market)] resulted in problems that ranged in severity from famine to waste, from 
scarcity to spoilage.  To address food problems, and to serve as an incentive to the state’s citizen-
employees, companies began to distribute a parcel of land to workers of certain tenure: a dacha.  
Usually an hour or two from the city by commuter rail, these rural plots would host a primitive 
cabin and garden that would grow flowers, vegetables, berries and sometimes even fruits.  Soviet 
Russians would spend their summer evenings and weekends working the land, and the yield 
would produce enough both to feed themselves for the summer and to preserve food for the 
winter.  
About 40 percent of urban households possess a dacha (Clarke 2002). Thus, even urban 
residents maintain the art of subsistence agriculture.  Dachas served to maintain fresh food 
supply regardless of the vagaries of planned production or periods of economic crisis in the 
market economy.  The extent to which Russians make use of subsistence agriculture generally 
follows the rise and fall of economic well-being in the country as a whole (Southworth 2006).  
Residents in Baikalsk and Bolshoye Goloustnoye are no different in this regard.  When the paper 
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mill suspended its operations in 2008, many people began selling dacha-grown strawberries
39
 on 
the side of the road to bring in extra money.  While villagers of Bolshoye Goloustnoye had 
always maintained their own agricultural plots, these were not their main subsistence in the 
Soviet Union, when most residents worked for the leskhoz. When Bolshoye Goloutnoe was 
incorporated into the Pribaikalskii National Park, the logging industry shut down, and what had 
been the villager’ supplementary agriculture changed to their chief occupation. 
 When the Russians and the Americans came together to discuss food, their unique 
histories limited the kind of assistance that could be offered.  The Tahoe interest in food was 
philanthropic and philosophical, but it was not existential.  Their approach to food was that of a 
conscientious consumer.  For the Russians, self-sufficient food production was considered both 
necessary and good.  Given the short growing season, Russians are also accustomed to buying 
food that has travelled many miles. Any fresh produce purchased in winter has been shipped in 
from China or Central Asia – and with winters that can reach forty degrees below zero, there is 
no easy way to shorten those food miles.  Instead, Russians emphasize that, while it is necessary 
to ship food in winter, one’s own produce is always preferable.   
  Given their preoccupation with food miles, the participants in Tahoe began the webinar 
by stating their desire to grow food in Tahoe, but the impossibility of such an endeavor. 
“Almost no one up here grows any food,” one Tahoe resident explained. “Quite a few 
people have tried to grow veggie gardens, but they don’t succeed.”  The residents of Tahoe were 
convinced that the heavy environmental regulation protecting the lake from erosion and run-off 
                                                 
39
 The climate in Baikalsk is uniquely beneficial for strawberries in that region. In one of its many attempts to help 
Baikalsk find alternate revenue to operating the paper mill, Baikal Environmental Wave helped Baikalsk start an 
annual Strawberry Festival, that is now a proud tradition, attracting visitors from Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude and neighboring 
towns.  
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would render domestic agriculture impossible.  But they went on to say that Tahoe makes up for 
this lack with farmer’s markets and CSAs, where food only travels 50-200 miles.   
Russian participants were pleased to learn about CSAs and ways to organize the sale of 
rural produce to nearby urban dwellers.  However, they also wanted to share their own 
knowledge of domestic agriculture with the Americans in Tahoe.  Russians in both locations 
talked with enthusiasm about their fresh eggs, chickens, berries, and vegetables. Residents of 
Baikalsk even brought examples of fish, nuts and homemade jams to show proudly to the 
Americans in Tahoe.  They explained how to start seeds indoors in late winter to circumvent the 
short growing season and how to preserve freshly grown produce to eat in the winter.   
One man from Baikalsk discussed his permaculture garden, which he framed as useful to 
the residents of Tahoe and their environmental difficulties. 
 “We have the same problems as Tahoe, with little top soil and a cold climate,” he said.  
“But I read an American magazine a few years ago about gardening, and there was all this 
information on permaculture. Now I have an organic garden, making use of an organic landscape 
design. Fruit trees are not common in Siberia, but I have managed to grow apples and pears, 
apricots and cherries.  They produce fruit for us, and more left over, so we can feed our friends. I 
also use the garden to educate people about organic gardening and permaculture. I invite people 
from the local campgrounds and hotels.  Every year, the students at Tahoe-Baikal Institute come 
as guests to my house and tour my garden. We also grow saplings and flowers that are used for 
landscaping in the city. We do all this organically, and we only have 1/3 of a hectare [less than 
an acre].” 
This man combined the Russian tradition of domestic agriculture with ideas on 
permaculture that he imported from an American magazine.  His experimentation had proven 
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successful, and he was eager to share his knowledge and experience with the representatives in 
Tahoe.  However, they did not seem interested in learning from Russia’s experience.  Despite 
their rare access to expert domestic gardeners and subsistence farmers in a similar ecosystem, 
they continued to write off the very possibility of homegrown produce.  The usefulness of this 
best practice was as lost on their sensibilities as ion cleaners had been for those in Russia. 
Instead, the food webinar served to reinforce the axiomatic expression of multicultural 
appreciation: an exchange of recipes.  In multicultural America, the Other is domesticated and 
incorporated via gastronomy (e.g. Appadurai 1988).  Urban dwellers can display their 
worldliness and tolerance through adventurous cuisine.  They can imagine themselves partaking 
of a culturally authentic experience when ordering Vindaloo or Pad Thai, from the safety of a 
restaurant that is expressly created for the purpose of Western consumption (Long 2004).  Food 
offers a “banal cosmopolitanism” (Beck 2006:10). So too did the Tahoe residents seek display 
their appreciation of Russian culture by reducing it to food.  The one question that Tahoe 
residents asked of Russians with the intention to learn a “best practice” from them was: how do 
you cook cabbage? 
“We would like to know how to cook cabbage,” a woman in Tahoe asked. “I think 
cabbage would grow well here, but Americans don’t eat cabbage, mainly because we don’t know 
how to prepare it.”  Were she ever in Russia as a guest or tourist, she said, she would like to eat 
Russian cabbage. 
 
The grant project that supported the webinars was based upon the principles of exchange 
and cooperation.  But as the project progressed, it became increasingly evident that the concept 
of mutual benefit was itself not mutual. American participants were glad to talk about their own 
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work, and they were always glad to hear what their colleagues in Russia were doing.  But there 
seemed an implicit expectation that one party was there to provide the best practice, and the 
other was to receive it.  Whether it was the trinomic model of geotourism or the establishment of 
CSAs, Americans came prepared with programs to impart.  There was less evidence that they 
brought any expectation of receiving help from Russia.  While that may be an accurate 
assessment, given the different levels of development between the two regions, the expectation 
itself may have forestalled learning; it may have prevented a similar expansion of mental 
horizons in Tahoe, such as happened in Bolshoye Goloustnoye.  While transnational activist 
collaboration was able to bring to rural villages the experience of cosmopolitanism, the 
routinization of cosmopolitanism in the developed world prevented them from experiencing the 
opportunity for wonder that comes with encountering difference. 
  
What Is In It for Them? 
 While webinar participation in Baikalsk and Irkutsk continued to grow, it was waning in 
Tahoe. It became clear that the participants on the Tahoe end of the conversation were almost 
exclusively composed of individuals who spearhead local nonprofit organizations and who were 
invited to participate for one particular subject of discussion. Certainly the same was true for 
individuals in the Russian sites as well – the man with the permaculture garden did not come to 
the food webinar by chance – but there were also those people who kept coming back to the 
webinars regardless of the subject matter.  These were people eager to learn what was going on 
in other locations and excited or inspired by the ideas that were shared. In Tahoe, it seemed the 
only repeat attendees were the organizers from the Tahoe-Baikal Institute, and this gave the 
impression that while these participants were glad to talk about their own programs, they were 
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otherwise uninterested in their sister lake across the ocean.  The lack of comparable “repeat 
attendees” on the American side was noted by Russian participants with concern. Were the 
Americans engaging in exchange, or was it merely a paternalistic charity they offered, sharing 
their assumed greater wisdom with their imagined inferiors? 
The penultimate webinar discussed the problem of retaining young people in the towns, 
of developing activities and employment opportunities for youth so they would not move away 
to larger cities.  This session was the most populated of all the sessions in Baikalsk, and was 
attended by a number of young people themselves who had learned about the webinar from their 
teachers or parents.  One attendee was a pretty, blonde girl in her late teens.  In the post-webinar 
discussion, she said that she wished students in Tahoe had attended the call on the American side 
so that they could have talked. Everyone else nodded and agreed. 
“We had young people here, why didn’t they have young people there?” asked one of the 
adults with a critical tone, who had been a repeat participant in the webinars.  “They just brought 
their NGOs and teachers.  If you want to talk about problems of young people, then you have to 
talk to young people.”   
Again, in the spirit of the webinar and its active, problem-solving and initiative-seizing 
ethos, participants began brainstorming ideas to connect young people in Tahoe and Baikalsk. 
Someone said that a youth exchange should be part of the sister-city relationship.  Others thought 
it would be cheaper to have a display in each of their schools where they could post photos and 
stories about one other.  One popular idea was to have groups of students in each village plant a 
tree on the same day in honor of each other, then send images and information about the trees 
back and forth as they grew: that way, students would be caring for nature locally while 
imagining their brethren globally. 
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 While the post-webinar discussion carried forth the optimism and initiative that the 
webinar space tended to foster, doubts lingered over whether the wealthy, progressive, 
democratic Americans were actually interested in in their Siberian counterparts, other than as a 
fleeting curiosity.  
 
February 25-26, 2013 
Our hotel in Baikalsk resembled a warehouse from the outside. The inside did little to 
mitigate the resemblance.  The lobby was white and open, only sparsely furnished with a sofa 
and concierge desk.  The lights were kept off in any part of the hotel that was not in use, and the 
corridor that sank back from the lobby was black and forbidding. After checking in, it was down 
this corridor we went, stopping at the one door that radiated light from the inside. The room 
contained four twin beds with mismatched sheets in flamboyant designs.  
“Ooo, I was the zebra bed!” Katya announced with enthusiasm, claiming the animal print 
sheets as her own.  The rest of us lumbered in and dropped our belongings.  We pulled two 
chairs together and improvised a table to quickly eat dinner.  We had homemade blini [Russian 
pancakes] with ground beef and rice stuffing, a spicy carrot salad which we ate out of the jar, 
sesame seed bars, and bread with jam. For dessert, Katya bought cookies that were molded into 
the form of cats.  
“I thought you were a vegetarian,” Artur teased her, as she gleefully bit the head off one 
of them. 
It was in this hotel that the Wave was holding a closed meeting in preparation for the last 
videoconference in the sister-city project.  The last webinar was supposed to discuss the “sister-
city” relationship between Tahoe and Baikalsk, and how that relationship could be reinvigorated.  
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The Wave invited select individuals who had been active in the formative years of the 
relationship between South Lake Tahoe and Baikalsk as “sister cities”40 to talk about their 
experiences.  When visits to Russia were cheap and grant money flowed plentifully to help 
integrate societies long separated by an Iron Curtain, there were repeated delegations sent in 
exchange between Tahoe and Baikalsk.  The alumni of these various exchanges gathered on the 
second floor of our small, warehouse-style hotel in Baikalsk to discuss that period. 
  The second floor lobby where the meeting took place was cold and dimly lit, but very 
large with a high ceiling.  We set up chairs to form a circle with the couches and armchairs 
already in the pink pastel room, and guests started trickling in.  There were 12 individuals from 
Baikalsk, joining Marina Rikhvanova, Katya and Artur from the Wave.  At first there was simply 
pleasant discussion and reminiscences about past exchanges.  Then Marina Rikhvanova brought 
the group to order.  She organized the conversation around four questions: what they did in the 
past, how they had benefitted, why the relationship ended, and what they might like to see 
happen in the future?  For each question, she posted a sheet of flip-chart paper and stood ready 
with a magic market to list the group’s responses. 
The members described four exchanges that took place. One was geared toward school 
children, one was for city administrators, and two were professional exchanges, including for 
local artists, two of whom were among the 12 people present. 
“It was the 1990s, so people had never seen anything like it,” said one of the men. “No 
one went abroad back then.” 
                                                 
40
 In Russian, the term is “brother-cities,” and the conversation began with the group musing on the culturally 
distinct gendering of inanimate objects, such as cities. 
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“I remember how shocked those Americans were when they saw Siberia for the first 
time,” said one woman who had hosted exchange guests. “They learned three new words: salo, 
vodka and moroz! [lard, vodka and frost!]” 
 “I also remember the shock we had when returning to Russia after our trip to the United 
States,” a soft-spoken man added. 
 “Ugh! Yes,” another woman chimed in. “The airport! As soon as we arrived in the airport 
in Russia, there was this smell, and everyone was dressed in black, and no one smiled.” 
  “I remember when the school kids came back, they came to me because I worked in the 
city administration, and they asked me, ‘Why is it not like that for us here?’” The small woman 
with short hair and glasses seemed overcome with emotion remembering those young people 
who wanted answers to questions about their country’s unequal development.  Marina turned to 
the posted paper and wrote: “Kids see the world,” on it under the list of benefits resulting from 
sister-city exchanges. 
“What were the other benefits of the exchange?” she asked the collective.  
“Learning a foreign language,” one participant said.  
“It improves the image of the city,” said another.  “Baikalsk could be known 
internationally.” 
“And not just as a place with the smelly paper mill!” the black-haired woman added. 
After a pause, one of the artists spoke up. “It created a new level of discussion,” he said. 
“It fostered a more intellectual level of discourse.” 
The other artist, a thin man with a bristly brown moustache, then spoke up. “And there 
were even financial benefits.  Several of my colleagues and I showed our work at a gallery in 
America and we even made some money on the event.” 
155 
 
 The question was asked what happened to the partnership, and the consensus opinion was 
that the economic crisis in 1998 and the election of Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush in 2000 
altered the priorities of both countries and made financing such trips and exchanges more 
difficult. 
Then Marina asked what they would like to see out of a renewed sister-city relationship, 
and people made many suggestions on various activities would enjoy. But when Marina asked 
for more concrete steps that individuals might take to bring such activities to the next level, the 
conversation became stilted.  The hesitancy did not result from laziness, lack of faith in efficacy, 
or an unwillingness to take responsibility for implementing the projects.  Instead, it seemed 
directly tied to a concern amongst those present that the Americans in Tahoe were actually 
uninterested in a long-term relationship with the people of Baikalsk. 
“What I want to know is: do they, in Tahoe, really want brotherhood, or do they just want 
to look at each other on the computer screen?” asked the small woman who used to work for the 
city administration. 
“Is this conversation happening over there, too?” another man wanted to know. 
The people of Baikalsk were unwilling to get their hopes up or to put effort into 
continuing the project if the Americans did not also take it seriously, and the Russians were 
skeptical that the people in Tahoe had the interest or ambition to do so.  
For the residents of Tahoe, the sister-city relationship to Baikalsk in Eastern Siberia is 
one of the many ways their community is linked in to the global imaginary.  There is a group in 
Tahoe that is firmly committed to Lake Baikal and their brethren in Eastern Siberia – the Tahoe-
Baikal Institute – but for others in the community, the link is barely noticed.  Tahoe does not 
need recourse to a sister-city relationship to affirm its cosmopolitan identity.  For Baikalsk, on 
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the other hand, it matters that they are known abroad, and that they have a tenuous lien on South 
Lake Tahoe in the symbolic relationship of sister-city.  This connection provides hope for a 
wider horizon for themselves, their children, and their community.  But from the late 1990s until 
the webinar project, this symbolic capital had not been tested to see what returns it might bring.  
Connecting to Tahoe via the webinars enabled the local residents to dream big; but the reality of 
their unequal status, given Tahoe’s routinized cosmopolitanism, threatened a rude awakening.  
They were loath to learn how little their sisterhood was worth. 
 
So What Is the Point? 
After the final webinar, members of Baikal Environmental Wave gathered for lunch in 
the cozy upstairs kitchen in the Irkutsk office.  Seated behind the heavy hardwood table, the 
Wave members talked about a concern that was repeatedly raised by the residents of Baikalsk: 
were the Americans in Tahoe really interested in collaboration?  It was a question of collective 
self-esteem for them: people in Baikalsk did not want to put their hearts and minds into a 
cooperative project only to have the Americans reject or neglect them. 
 “They are worried that they will work toward creating a partnership, only to find that the 
other side doesn’t want a partnership with them and isn’t going to work for it,” Artur explained 
to the group at the table. 
 The Wave members sat in silence, each lost in thought. 
“So what is the point of including America?” I asked.   
The members exchanged glances, waiting to see who would speak first. 
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“It seems to me that the most important thing is to unite Baikalsk and Goloustnoye,” 
Artur said. “America is the catalyst to bring them into dialogue.  They come because they are 
interested in talking to America, but they end up talking to each other.” 
Elena Alexandrovna spoke up next.   
“The point is to see that there are problems everywhere and to see how local people solve 
their problems [differently].  To paraphrase the great Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoi, we think all 
happy families are the same, but our unhappy family is totally unique.  We say, ‘Oh, in America 
everything is perfect, everything is fine, but we have all the problems.’ Once you interact with 
people in other places, no matter if those places are thousands of kilometers away, you see they 
have their own problems.  But you also see what they are doing to fix those problems. And it 
gets people thinking of other ways they can be fixed. In a lot of these villages, you see people 
stuck in problem-thinking. They just see: we have problems, they are awful, these people are to 
blame, and so forth. If you are sitting, stuck in a problem-mindset, it becomes a vicious cycle and 
you get nowhere. The key is to move people away from problem-thinking and toward 
constructive-thinking. So they say, ‘Ah! We could try this. Let’s start a small business that fixes 
this problem. Or let’s start a group working to defend our rights,’ or whatever.  But the important 
thing is that they are thinking constructively, not just waiting for manna from heaven.  When you 
look at other people’s problems and see what they are doing [about them], it can be inspiration. 
You might think, ‘I wouldn’t do it that way, I’d have done this.’ But you are already thinking 
now in a different way, that you would not have done otherwise.” 
 In answering my question above, Elena Alexandrovna cogently described what might be 
considered the most fundamental benefit of transnational activist collaboration. While activists 
may indeed benefit from foreign financial resources, organizational support, or an opportunity 
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structure that is translocal, these are all, fundamentally, strategic means to an end – geared 
toward achieving some predetermined collective goal.  The webinars suggest, however, that 
there is a deeper contribution that transnational activism can make, one that is more than a means 
to an end, but rather is an end in itself.  To wit: transnational connectivity can change how we 
think.  It can spur creative thought, altering our approach to social problems and the means for 
solving them.  It overcomes limits to imagination and expands perceptions of the possible.   
 As the experience of the American webinar participants in Tahoe shows, this creative 
thinking does not happen automatically by exposure to cross-national communication.  Groups 
who consider themselves to be occupying a more privileged position relative to their 
collaborators may assume they have nothing to learn from exchange and thus close off the 
opportunity to alter their thoughts a priori.  However, this predisposition to closed-mindedness 
could be mediated by the duration of the cross-national contact.  American participants in Tahoe-
Baikal Institute’s exchanges were much more likely to think of some contribution Russia could 
make to American environmentalism than Russians were themselves.  Foreign GBT participants 
also described positive attributes of Russian culture they were ready to adopt and ways their 
minds were changed by their experiences in Siberia.   
But for those occupying positions in in the periphery of the globalized world, 
transnational activist collaboration can be one of the rare opportunities to experience that which 
is taken for granted in more cosmopolitan centers.  For them, exposure to transnational activist 
networks can have a profound cognitive effect.  In the case of the Wave’s webinars, the effect 
may, in fact, be a short one. It would likely take prolonged involvement to truly change ingrained 
habits of thought and culture.  But the experience of the webinars shows how impressive that 
change might be, were it carried forward.   
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Conclusion 
There are many paths into modernity.  Not all of them lead to reflexivity, 
cosmopolitanism and personal empowerment. As Baikal enters into its next phase of 
development, with all trends indicating a post-industrial tourist economy, there is no guarantee 
that the dispositions that foster civic engagement and a robust civil society will automatically 
come with it.  Indeed, previous attempts to bring modern progress to the rural population in 
Russia through education and outreach have failed throughout history.  
The Russian Empire was heavily involved in what popular writer Thomas Friedman 
refers to as “Globalization 1.0” (Friedman 2005).  The aristocracy was transnationally networked 
in terms of political alliance and trade,
41
 and yet the bulk of Russia’s people remained peasants.  
Peasants were the tools of Empire, but they were not its beneficiaries (Lewin 1985).  Russian 
intellectuals in the 19
th
 century formed the Populist movement (Narodnichestvo) to rally the 
agrarian masses to fight for their rights against autocracy; however, their “going to the people” 
movement ran ashore on the general disinterest and conservatism of the Russian peasantry 
(Belfer 1987, Pipes 1964).  For all their attempts to mobilize the peasantry to fight for their own 
interests, very few minds were opened by this mission of Enlightenment.  After the fall of the 
Russian Empire, the Soviet Union began its own efforts at modern state-building, which to their 
mind rested upon ideological evangelism and disciplinary state authority.  The Soviet state 
brought industrialization to Russia en masse, and oversaw revolutionary gains in literacy, health, 
science and technology.  But this move toward modernity did not produce a subsequent leap 
forward in progressive thought or a sense of personal efficacy in the general population, 
                                                 
41
 Indeed, much of the Russian aristocracy spoke French as a primary language. 
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particularly among the rural population.  Indeed, the Soviet path to modernity rested upon even 
more thorough state control of peasants’ lives than the Empire had ever achieved (Lewin 1985).  
The question that remains to be seen is whether and how the introduction of large-scale 
investment projects with absentee ownership in the modern capitalist era differs significantly 
from those of the Russian Empire and the Soviet State in the extent to which they promote the 
progressive thought that is so commonly associated with modernity (Beck 2006, Giddens 1991).  
For neoliberal theorists, the answer would be a resounding yes. It is the institution of the market 
economy that fosters political freedom (Hayek 2007, Friedman 2002).  But political freedom is 
more than a set of institutions.  Democracy relies upon citizenship.  A subjective sense of 
powerlessness can nullify citizenship regardless of institutional democratic freedoms (Gaventa 
1980).  There is reason to suspect that the move from subsistence agriculture to “(formally) free 
labor” (Weber 2002:xxxiv), cleaning bed sheets in a large hotel, in a Special Economic Zone, 
owned by an investor from Moscow, would not necessarily cause a cognitive leap toward agency 
in Bolshoye Goloustnoye. 
The data I have presented here show that transnational activism can be a conduit to 
cosmopolitanism for people occupying peripheral positions in the modern world-system 
(Wallerstein 2004).  Exposure to the Other, renders Otherness in one’s own circumstances 
plausible.  When activists from the Wave would reach out to villagers in their own region, the 
endeavor was reminiscent of the Populists two centuries prior: idealistic intellectuals foundering 
upon entrenched conservatism and rural resistance to progress.  Baikal Environmental Wave was 
not succeeding alone in its effort to spur engagement in Bolshoye Goloustnoye.  Transnational 
webinars were.   
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The Russian literary critic Victor Shklovsky (2009) coined the term “defamiliarization” 
to describe how an author can make the familiar seem strange in order to alter the reader’s 
perception of everyday events.  We can think of transnational activist collaboration as a process 
of defamiliarization.  Familiar social problems seen through the eyes of a foreigner, who is 
facing those same problems in a different context, can alter the apparent permanency of one’s 
own environment.  Defamiliarization can then spur inspiration and creative thought, in such a 
manner that individual efficacy becomes plausible, and, eventually, possible. 
Despite the difficulty that domestic NGOs may face in trying to produce change in their 
home environments, the importance of their continued presence cannot be understated.  Their 
influence cannot be judged solely by the success of their particular campaigns or actions, but also 
from the opportunity they provide to others to immerse themselves in transnational discourse, if 
only briefly.  GBT offers this opportunity to its volunteers; TBI to its students; and the Wave to 
the villagers and town residents outside of Irkutsk.  The organizations are nodes in a social 
network existing at the nexus of two planes – the local and the global.  Their persistent presence 
in a locality offers a continuous portal to the wider world.  Individuals may drift into and out of 
contact with this portal by means of the organization; people may have a life-changing, thought-
altering experience as a result of that contact, and then carry the experience forward into their 
future lives, whether or not they continue to associate with the NGO itself.  To this extent we can 
think of civil society organizations, and the service they provide to the social body, separately 
from their stated causes and goals. 
In conclusion, cross-cultural activist collaboration may provide new political 
opportunities, new financial resources, or broader bases of support.  It may be a means to tackle 
those problems that extend beyond borders, such as global climate change or economic 
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globalization.  But there is an unintentional effect that transcends more instrumentalist 
accountings of movement activity, and that is the cognitive effect that can be found in 
populations exposed to new ideas, experiences and dispositions.  Amongst those participating in 
the webinars that were the subject of this study, this alteration in thought patterns shifted the 
mental landscape towards activism itself.  Such an effect of transnational activism cannot be 
constrained to the outcome of any particular movement campaign.  Neither was it merely 
representative of tactical diffusion, since the webinars did not directly equate with the adoption 
of any particular practices from abroad.  Instead, simply by opening the space for sharing diverse 
perspectives, transnational activism in and of itself helped lay the foundation for social change, 
even in the smallest villages of Eastern Siberia.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
PUTIN’S FAVORITE OLIGARCH 
 
Deripaska: The Russian consumer market is growing and we can sell as much as we can 
produce. 
Saragosa: Do you ever worry about being too big? 
Deripaska: We’re investors. 
Saragosa: At what point do you say that’s enough? 
Deripaska: Not at the moment. 
 -- Interview between Oleg Deripaska and Manuela Saragosa of the BBC World Service, 
May 9, 2013 
42
 
 
“This summer I re-read again Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand.  Atlas Shrugged is a legendary 
series … In the US the series is regarded as the second most important after the Bible. This 
masterpiece made Ayn Rand a global literary star.”43 
 -- Oleg Deripaska, on his website regarding books he recommends 
 
 
 This chapter discusses the economic transition in post-Soviet Russia and the rise of the 
oligarchs as embodied by the biography of Oleg Deripaska.  Called “Putin’s favorite oligarch,” 
(e.g. Reguly 2011), Deripaska began his career as a poor student in theoretical physics in the 
Soviet Union.  Throughout the 1990s, he used his financial acumen to accumulate a diverse 
portfolio of Russian industrial enterprises, while warring openly with other oligarchs during the 
well-documented days of fraud, corruption, and mortal danger that followed “shock therapy” and 
privatization (e.g. Appel 2004, Frye 2002, Shelley 1995, Shevtsova 2007, Varese 1997).  
However, although Russia touts the greatest income inequality in the world
44
 (Credit Suisse 
2013), the role of the oligarchs in contemporary Russia may also be considered as beneficial; 
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 http://www.deripaska.com/in_focus/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=691#.UikuSj_fIug 
43
 http://www.deripaska.com/in_focus/lets_discuss/knigi-kotorie-ya-chitayu/#.UikN2T_fIug Accessed on September 
5, 2013. 
44
 With the exception of a few, small Caribbean islands. 
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they are credited with helping return Russia from the chaos of economic collapse in the 1990s to 
stability and profitability in the 2000s (e.g. Gorodnichenko and Grygorenko 2008, Guryev and 
Rachinsky 2005, Treisman 2010).  Oleg Deripaska was a chief architect in the transition from 
mafia-style capitalism to the re-emergence of Russia as a global economic powerhouse.  Yet, as 
Deripaska and his peers seek out global markets, they must adapt to global business norms that 
include efforts at “corporate social responsibility” (c.f. Carroll and Shabana 2009; Margolis and 
Walsh 2003; Wartick and Cochran 1985). In conforming to this global norm, Deripaska and his 
enterprises, collected in a holding company called the En+ Group, must enter into the sphere of 
local environmental civil society. 
 Local environmental activists in Irkutsk are suddenly confronted with the meaning of this 
new corporate partnership in environmental preservation.  Motives are suspect, autonomy is 
questioned, and one organization even chooses to reject corporate funding.  But local activists, 
despite their ambivalence, overwhelmingly decide to accept En+ money and don its corporate 
logo.  The involvement of En+ in environmental projects around Lake Baikal displays the central 
role of branding in the siphoning of symbolic power from the civil sphere and into the realm of 
economic power. 
The growth of “cause marketing” is more than greenwashing and less than environmental 
stewardship.  It is a play within the field of power (Bourdieu 1989, 1993, 1998).  Civil society 
holds power in its own right; the creation of Corporate Social Responsibility norms at the global 
level are a testament to successful struggle by civil society to push back on the ideology of 
economic self-interest.  But when Russian businesses accept the global mandate to begin social 
responsibility programs, they soon find that the benefit of such branding can be an end in its own 
right – and environmentalists are the means.  Cause marketing is an attempt to adopt the glamour 
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of civil society for the further accumulation of power, or, to use the language of business, 
competitive advantage, in the economic realm.  The cultural power of society’s shared allegiance 
to the norms of the “civil sphere” (Alexander 2006) can be borrowed or bought by economic 
elites, and then exchanged for economic power in their own struggles for dominance. 
 
August 14, 2012 
The 23 members of our eclectic volunteer work crew hiked for an hour from the platform 
where the train had stopped, through the taiga, and finally we arrived at our work site.  For the 
next two weeks, we would be living in this spot in the woods, building a switchback trail from 
the river valley to the ridgeline several hundred feet above.  But before getting to work on our 
main project, we first had to build the base camp.  We split up into teams: two volunteers dug a 
pit to bury organic food waste, several worked constructing a large table that twenty people 
could sit around for meals; some people were gathering fire wood, while others built the rack 
that would suspend our cooking pots over the camp fire.  When all these tasks were finished, we 
got to work setting up tents. 
GBT provided tents for the volunteers, and we slept two people to a tent.  These were 
nice, big, new tents, and we pitched them close together in the small clearing.  The forest was 
soon home to a clump of green and yellow domes, like mutant mushrooms growing from the 
pine straw floor.  Each tent had a small “foyer” made by the outstretched rain fly, and the door to 
the foyer bore the GBT logo in white.  Beneath the logo, in extremely large script, I read the 
word Ent.   
After the chores were done, we gathered in a circle. Katya passed out favors to thank us 
for participating.  We all got matching blue bandanas that quickly became a collective badge of 
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honor amongst the members, who donned them daily as we set out for the trail.  The triangular 
bandanas were made of synthetic material and covered with small GBT logos printed in white.  
And alongside each GBT logo, written in large lettering, was that funny word Ent again.  Clearly 
it was some kind of brand, but nothing I had encountered before.  
In the evening, I was sitting around the campfire with a number of Russian volunteers 
and I ventured to ask: “What is Ent?” My question was met with confused faces and some 
shrugs. 
“What is what?” one of them asked me, and I repeated the word and then pointed at the 
logo on the tents. 
 “Oh, I know this!” one of them suddenly announced. “I know these people.” She made a 
sour face.  It was Polya, an environmental scientist from Moscow.  She corrected my 
pronunciation error – what I had seen as the letter t was, in fact, a plus sign.  The logo was that of 
a large corporation called the En+ Group. “En+ is an energy company and they build 
hydroelectric dams,” she explained to me.  “China wants to develop in its northern region and 
they need a lot of power.  So En+ is talking about damming rivers in Russia in the Far East and 
sending the power to China.  But who will profit from this?  En+ will get all the money and 
China gets all the power.  But what does Russia get? Nothing.  And what does nature get?”   
She ended there, as though the answer to this question were obvious. 
“So, they are not good stewards of nature?” I asked.   
“Not at all,” she shot back.  “They are only interested in money and profit. But they give 
money to organizations like GBT so they will look environmental even though they are not. 
They only care about money...They give a few tents and then drown rivers and build dams.”  
Such was my introduction to the En+ Group. 
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Oleg Deripaska and the En+ Group 
 En+ Group Ltd. is a holding company that operates mining, metals, energy, and logistics 
businesses throughout Russia and abroad.  Headquartered in Moscow, although registered for tax 
purposes in Jersey, En+ was founded in 2002 by Oleg Deripaska as a privately traded collection 
of assets in a wide range of natural resource extraction and energy production enterprises.  The 
centerpiece of its assets is a controlling share of United Company RUSAL, the result of an 
aluminum industry consolidation that Deripaska began in the early years of privatization.  
Through acquisitions and mergers, Deripaska and his partners have developed RUSAL into the 
largest aluminum producer in the world.  Additionally, En+ owns the coal company 
VostSibUgol, which mined 16.8 million tons of coal in 2011, most of which En+ consumes in its 
own factories and plants, and EuroSibEnergo, which builds and runs numerous hydroelectric 
dams and nuclear power plants. EuroSibEnergo is the largest independent power producer in all 
of Russia.  Employing more than 100,000 people worldwide, En+ Group reported revenues in 
2011 of US$15.3 billion. 
 To better represent the vast energy and material empire that exists under the auspices of 
En+, the following portrait comes from BusinessWeek’s investment summary of the privately 
traded company: 
“En+ Group Ltd… produces alumina, aluminum, and bauxite; and smelts 
aluminum for consumers in defense, aviation, transportation, ship-building, 
packaging, and construction industries. The company also generates hydro and 
thermal power; provides engineering services to projects in the fields of power 
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generation, grid infrastructure, housing facilities, metallurgy, and oil industry; 
distributes energy raw materials, including coal, gas, and oil to consumers of the 
wholesale electricity market; produces energy coal; and supplies solid fuels for 
thermal plants. In addition, En+ Group Ltd. produces ferromolybdenum, which is 
used in the manufacture of stainless and certain other steels, and heat-resistant 
nonferrous superalloys; and steel, oil, industrial machinery, chemical, defense, 
electrical, and electronic industries. Further, the company engages in the 
integrated process of ore mining; ore processing to produce molybdenum and 
copper concentrates; and molybdenum concentrate roasting for ferromolybdenum 
production through smelting.”45  
The majority of En+’s plants and facilities are located in Eastern Siberia, which, although 
remote, is touted loudly as the company’s greatest asset.  “Close to fast-growing Asian markets,” 
is the oft-repeated refrain in En+ promotional materials.  The company has ambitious plans to 
develop and exploit the natural resources of Siberia, viewing the region as the linchpin of 
Russia’s continuing economic growth.  En+ points to the geographic proximity of Siberia to 
China as a vital comparative advantage over mineral producers in Africa and South America.  
“Asian nations already consume more than 30% of the global energy output, more 
than 50% of steel, aluminium, copper and other metals, and about 2/3 of global 
iron ore. Asian consumption will only grow [in order] to fuel rapid 
industrialization and urbanization. New Chinese cities alone have seen an inflow 
of 100 [million] people from rural areas over the past ten years, which has created 
a huge demand for housing, roads, infrastructure, and transportation system 
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 http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=34947186 
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construction – which in turn requires more and more resources. A further 250 
[million] people are expected to move to new Chinese cities by 2020 – and a 
similar transition will be witnessed in India, [w]hich has a population of over 1 
[billion], Indonesia, Vietnam and other emerging regions of the world. The Asian 
economies are going to develop most rapidly in the next few decades – and the 
demand for resources needed to maintain the economic growth rates will 
constantly grow.”46 
En+ aims to meet this exponentially growing demand with the buried wealth of Eastern Siberia. 
As the company explains: “Eastern Siberia is blessed with some of the world’s most abundant 
stocks of natural resources, where 90% of the Russian platinum group metals (PGM), about 70% 
of nickel, copper and other metals, 80% of coal reserves, substantial hydrocarbon reserves are 
stored… All these riches have been left almost intact, with the region being socially and 
economically underdeveloped.”47  En+ intends to unleash the potential of Siberia’s latent 
resources, piggy-backing off Asia’s emergence as a major player in the global economy.  Siberia 
can be tapped to meet the growing consumer demand fostered by urbanization and capital 
penetration into China’s interior.  Such is the strategic development plan laid out by the President 
and founder of En+, Oleg Deripaska. 
 
Oleg Deripaska is among the richest men in Russia,
48
 with a net worth of nearly US$9 
billion. His life is a rags to riches story that could only have been possible at a particular juncture 
in Russian history – he was one of the few individuals to seize the moment in an era of mass 
privatization and a burgeoning capitalist economy.  
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 http://eng.enplus.ru/about/strategy/ Accessed on September 5, 2013 
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th
 richest as of 2012. 
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In the late 1980s, Oleg Deripaska was a student, studying quantum statistics at Moscow 
State University in hopes of entering the field of theoretical physics.  At the time, in the late 
Soviet period, there was still no financial market, but change was in the air.  Perestroika had 
opened the Pandora’s Box of Western ideas and practices long forbidden by the Communist 
Party.  As censorship loosened its hold, debates about democracy and liberal economics found 
their way into the newspapers and magazines on shelves throughout the country (c.f. Yurchak 
2006). Deripaska says that he became interested in investing after reading an article about 
securities exchanges in the late 1980s.  After the formation of the Moscow commodities 
exchange, Deripaska bought a seat, where, according to his telling of it, he began applying the 
principles of physics to calculate the buying, selling, and trading of commodities in association 
with his partners.
49
   
Russia in the 1990s was a country buffeted by crisis and chaos.  The transition from the 
state planned economy to the market was not the slow, controlled, phase-in that reformers in the 
vein of Gorbachev might have imagined.  Instead, the country faced “shock therapy” and the 
immediate privatization of state-owned enterprises.
50
  Without the Soviet state to strong-arm 
production or police the population, companies ground to a stand-still (Kotkin 2008).  With a 
mounting debt crisis and hyperinflation, the bankrupt state left millions of workers’ wages in 
arrears (Desai 2001).  The entire Russian economy was privatized virtually overnight through a 
process that has been widely disparaged as corrupt and without sufficient regulatory oversight 
(Hoff and Stiglitz 2004).  Most Russians gained nothing from privatization, while a few who 
were well-connected or nefarious walked away rich (Appel 2004). Managers and owners of the 
newly privatized firms began an epidemic of asset stripping.  Pyramid schemes erupted, and 
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gangs of mobsters were terrorizing the streets for “protection money” (Varese 2004)  Corrupt 
dealings, fraud, insider trading, rigged auctions: all of these and more characterized the decade 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
The young investor Deripaska was not immune to this history; his meteoric rise in the 
1990s could not have been accomplished without shaking dirty hands.  He was only 26 when he 
took control of his first aluminum smelter in 1994. He continued to consolidate his hold on the 
aluminum sector throughout the 1990s, during a period that is known as the “aluminum wars.”  
Throughout the decade, there were multiple contenders who fought for control of Russia’s 
aluminum industry, its fourth largest export, and the fighting was not in the variety of clean 
competition.  Indeed, the battles were often brutal, crime-ridden, characterized by financial fraud 
and physical violence, which cost many individuals their lives.  As oligarch Roman Abramovich 
describes it, “someone was murdered every three days” (Peck 2011).  By the end of the 
“aluminum wars,” more than 100 people were dead, including industry managers, bankers, 
traders, politicians and mafia men (Ahmed 2012). 
Deripaska’s individual role in the dirtier side of Russian business appears ambivalent 
from the outside.  He has been the subject of multiple lawsuits in Russia and abroad connected 
with allegations against him for bribery, extortion, and nefarious business dealings. He was 
investigated by several countries for money laundering and links to organized crime. In 2001, 
associated with these allegations, he was uninvited from the World Economic Forum conference 
in Davos (which he otherwise attends regularly), and in 2006 he was embarrassingly denied 
entry to the United States.  While Deripaska has never been charged with a crime and 
strenuously denies any wrongdoing, as one journalist wrote, “it will probably take years to 
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dissipate the stench of criminality surrounding the industry he now controls.”51   Deripaska 
admits to paying organized crime for protection in the lawless decade of total institutional 
collapse after the fall of communism.  In this, he claims he was not unique; it was the only option 
for those doing business within Russia in the 1990s.  Times have changed, business in Russia is 
much cleaner, and Deripaska played a leading role in that transition. 
In 2000, the same year that Vladimir Putin ascended to the Presidency, Oleg Deripaska 
sat down at a table with rival oligarchs Lev Chernoi, Iskander Makhmudov and Roman 
Abramovich.  At the invitation of Abramovich, the group hammered out a merger of their 
aluminum companies, signaling an end to the violence and a new regime for the commanding 
heights of the Russian economy.  Their various competing regional interests were joined into 
RUSAL (Russian Aluminum), a single company, under the management of Deripaska, that 
would collectively control 70 percent of all Russian aluminum production.  No longer would the 
captains of industry battle each other in internecine struggle; instead they would unite for the 
creation of a national industry that would springboard them to a wider, global marketplace. The 
meeting has since come to symbolize the end of dikii [wild] capitalism in Russia with its mafia-
style business dealings, and a shift toward an established, stable, national corporate monopoly. 
The accomplishment of these oligarchs, coupled with Vladimir Putin’s efforts to stabilize 
the political sphere, offers a new perspective on the meaning of Russian privatization.  The 
1990s were socially catastrophic, but Russia’s economic profile a quarter century later can be 
viewed as a legitimation of “shock therapy” and “loans for shares.” A number of scholars have 
recently conducted empirical studies show the high productivity and efficiency in those 
industries owned by the oligarchs compared to those retained or managed by the state. Treisman 
(2012) has shown that the companies that were auctioned in the “loans for shares” deal have 
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since significantly outperformed those that remained in state control. Gorodnichenko and 
Grygorenko (2008) found in Ukraine that oligarchs were more likely to invest in productivity-
enhancing up-grades to their facilities and to vertically integrate their production, resulting in 
greater profit and efficiency.  Rather than greedy gangsters, the new outlook on the oligarchs 
suggests that of the reform-minded “citizen employers” (Haydu 2008), responsible for bringing 
Russia into its present era of stabilization and progress. 
Oleg Deripaska personifies this new conception of Russia’s “responsible oligarch.”  
Deripaska states that he is interested in building business rather than simply making money.
52
  
Under his control, the Sayanskogorsk aluminum smelter increased its output even beyond Soviet 
levels.  However, when aluminum faced a global crisis in overproduction and a significant drop 
in its commodity price, Deripaska became the darling of global investors by agreeing to keep his 
factories operating below capacity.  Deripaska is active in the World Economic Forum at Davos, 
and has been a longtime crusader for a more transparent, rationally organized, Western-style 
business community in the Russian Federation.  Among his adopted practices is the phenomenon 
of management stock-options, as an incentive to align company leadership with investment 
outcomes as in American-style “shareholder capitalism” (Dore, Lazonick and O'Sullivan 1999, 
Fox and Lorsch 2012, Gordon 1998).  In 2013, Deripaska received much positive press by 
forgoing his $3 million bonus and using the money to purchase $25,000 in company stock for 
120 of his 72,000 employees (BBC 2013).   
Moreover, he has been involved in extensive charity work and public service.  Deripaska, 
along with several of his peers, has come to regard the question of his legacy as one of great 
importance.  He sits on several Boards of Trustees, including the Bolshoi Theatre, the School of 
Economics at Moscow State University, and the School of Business Administration at St. 
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Petersburg State University. He has also donated more than $8.5 billion to charities and social 
causes through his private foundation, Volnoe Delo.  Deripaska, along with several other major 
Russian oligarchs, has been aggressively seeking a more positive image for himself and his 
companies abroad.  In the end, they say, it is not how their fortunes were created, but how they 
shaped the country, that is the metric by which posterity shall judge them. 
   
En+ as Corporate Philanthropist 
August 21, 2012 
Back in the taiga, half way through our work trip, my GBT crew had again gathered in a 
circle before heading off for the trail. 
“Before we get back to work,” Katya began with a mischievous smile, “I have a little 
surprise gift for you!” She opened up the potato sack she was holding and pulled out a blue tee-
shirt. 
 “Clean clothes!” exclaimed one of the Americans in the group, and people laughed, since 
clean clothing was truly a novelty after a week in the woods. Katya showed off the new shirt.  It 
had the En+ logo on the left breast.  The back of the shirt bore the GBT emblem. We each came 
and claimed a shirt in our size.   
 “What’s this?” Yegor asked, pointing to the En+ logo.  He looked at the back and the 
front, flipping it over twice. “It’s like advertising,” he announced and then laughed loudly.   
*** 
 En+ became a major player in the environmental scene in Irkutsk in the fall of 2011.  
Representatives for the corporation’s new Sustainable Development division showed up in 
Irkutsk and sought out all the local environmental nonprofit organizations with a single message: 
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we want to be your corporate sponsor.  By the next year, Irkutsk was awash in En+ sponsored 
environmental activities.  Some of these were projects initiated by the company itself; others 
were conducted in partnership with local nonprofits.  In the case of GBT, En+ simply offered 
money for material supplies to support the projects they were already conducting. 
 In late January, I travelled to Moscow and visited the corporate headquarters for En+ 
Group.  I was there to interview the head of their Sustainable Development division, which 
manages all their corporate social responsibility work.  The building was tucked away on a 
small, winding street, close to several national consulates.  From the outside, the headquarters 
was fairly nondescript.  Even the interior, at first pass, seemed uninviting.  There was only a tiny 
foyer with tightly packed and uncomfortable seating, fluorescent lighting, and a dirty white 
ambience that reminded me more of a clinic than a corporate office.  The desk personnel, a 
young man and a young woman, struggled mightily to speak to me in English, even though I had 
greeted them in Russian.  They were expecting me, they said, and haltingly tried to explain that I 
had to wait.  When I assured them they could speak Russian, a look of gratitude swept over their 
faces.   I was given a visitor’s pass that I could swipe at the turnstile to allow entry, but only after 
my host came to greet me. 
 Soon another woman, a secretary, came to collect me and usher me upstairs.  Again, I 
was unimpressed by my surroundings until we left the stairwell and entered through a main door.  
Suddenly the ambience shifted, I was in what has become the standard décor for a corporate 
office.  Gone were the uncomfortable clinic chairs and dirty white walls.  I was directed to a 
small conference room and seated at an oblong table.  I came to think of this as the “Green 
Room:” the walls were key lime, the chairs Kermit green, on a forest green industrial carpet. A 
large potted tree was growing in the back.  My escort gave me a set of En+ promotional 
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materials and told me that my interviewee was running behind schedule.  She then ordered me 
tea, which was brought to me on a silver tray with two chocolates in En+ wrapping. 
 After about ten minutes, a representative of En+’s Sustainable Development department 
arrived.  She had a bright smile and sunny, blonde hair that fell in waves around her face and 
shoulders.  Her green eyes were bright and engaging.  I asked her to tell me about her programs 
and, evincing great pride, she launched into a detailed description of the many activities that take 
place under the auspices of En+’s Sustainable Development division. 
 
 The entry of En+ into Irkutsk environmentalism was as sudden as its money was 
abundant.  The general motivation for the company’s philanthropy is two-pronged: first, social 
responsibility has become the established norm for multinational corporations; second, 
environmental philanthropy helps to counteract the stewardship balance-sheet for a company 
with a less-than-stellar environmental track-record. 
 When I asked the representative about the creation of the En+ Sustainable Development 
division, she immediately pointed to Deripaska’s study of business, particularly international 
business, and his longtime participation in the World Economic Forum at Davos. 
En+ Representative: Deripaska…is a person who learns things for himself and 
participates in a variety of foreign programs – he has studied in America and in 
Switzerland, he has various degrees – he is always learning. [His studies on] 
international management systems gave him the idea that he should split his 
businesses into two groups.  One group would be those businesses that must 
steadily develop, grow, and provide growth to the country.  The other would be 
investment businesses that he would buy, develop and sell, in order to make 
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money. The first business group is…En+, and it includes those companies that he 
will always own, that will continue to develop for a long time and will develop 
Russia as a country.  It is heavy industry... The company was eventually ready to 
start developing on social issues and sustainable development, because it should 
eventually do this.  Business can’t start on day one, or maybe they can but not in 
Russia...Therefore, it is just in this moment, a couple years ago, we came to such 
a level of development ourselves that we were ready to begin implementing such 
a complex and encompassing social project.  So we created this separate division. 
The global influence on corporations such as En+ was confirmed by another informant I spoke 
with in Irkutsk who is close to both local nonprofits and the business community. 
“It’s quite a change for big business. Russian big business is still very young; it’s 
literally only about 20-25 years old.  In such a short space of time it’s hard to 
become a civilized business. And so Russian business usually does its own thing.  
[But] when a business enters the international market, it discovers that [the 
international sphere] has its own rules of the game and certain standard 
requirements to ensure that you and I can negotiate on equal terms.  Simply put, 
you have to meet certain criteria, including how socially responsible you are, how 
you act in those areas where you do business, how much assistance is provided to 
charity, and so on and so forth.  And our business understands that it must be 
done. Not because you want to, or don’t want to, but because that is what is 
expected.  And since it is expected, now we'll do it.” 
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Essentially, En+ did not invent the model it has adopted for its corporate giving, nor was it 
instigated by conscientious members of the company.  Instead, it was a new division, with orders 
from the top, that was created in the image of Davos. 
 En+ Group’s interest in environmental partnership also comes admittedly out of the 
company’s past and present sins against nature.  The corporation and its CEO Deripaska have 
been at the embarrassing center of a number of environmental fiascos.  Most notably, in the early 
2000s, Deripaska’s other holding company, Basic Element, acquired the Baikalsk Pulp and Paper 
Mill, which has been a source of popular ire since it was first constructed in the 1960s.  In the 
2000s, local environmentalists again built a major campaign to close the factory.  In 2008 a court 
determined that the plant was breaking the federal Law of Baikal and had to cease production 
until it could operate with a closed wastewater system.  The plant stopped operation. Initially, the 
company refused to pay wages to its furloughed employees, resulting in massive labor unrest 
with workers also pointing the finger at Deripaska.  After Putin intervened, Deripaska offered a 
personal loan of 150 million rubles to cover worker compensation.   Meanwhile, Deripaska 
pleaded to Putin that the legally required environmental upgrades would render the mill 
unprofitable.  In 2010, Putin overturned the court via presidential decree, granting an exception 
to the Baikalsk mill and allowing it to continue production at status quo ante, as long as it 
instituted the closed wastewater system by 2012.  The decision to reopen the mill without 
environmental upgrades created a new wave of environmental protest, and Deripaska once again 
became “public enemy #1.”  He sold the mill in 2010. 
 The head of corporate giving for En+ repeatedly strove to disassociate Deripaska from 
the infamous paper mill.  During our discussion, the En+ representative described their work on 
“mono-cities,” the Russian term for a company town, and she brought up Baikalsk as an 
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example. Then she added that it was a bad example, since En+ does not own the mill. Somewhat 
disingenuously, she went on: “A long time ago, like ten years ago, Deripaska bought it, and then 
sold it.  I mean, he didn’t build it. But people continue to have the sense and the belief that it is 
his business.  And because of this, Deripaska’s negative image here has remained.  Although he 
only controlled it personally for 2 to 3 years – not very long.  It hasn’t been his for ten years.  But 
because the city is in our region of influence we decided to include it also.” 
 At the same time that Deripaska was dealing with the fallout of the paper mill, En+ was 
the target of another environmentalist campaign, this time on the detrimental effects of the 
massive Boguchansky dam on the Angara river. This massive hydro-electric dam was originally 
planned and designed under the Soviet government, but was not constructed due to lack of 
funding.  In 2005, En+ joined with state-owned RusHydro to complete the dam.  One of the 
largest dams in the world, Boguchansky would power a massive aluminum smelter that En+ 
planned to construct nearby.  Environmentalists were adamantly opposed to resuming work on 
the dam.  They claimed it was poorly designed, with few of the modern safeguards normally 
required for maintaining a healthy river system.  They also claimed that its construction was 
nonsensical, since the dam was located far from any population center with no infrastructure for 
transmitting the power it generated.  While En+ plans to construct a large aluminum smelter, the 
plant does not yet exist, and neither is there a working population to support it.  Finally, whole 
villages of indigenous Siberians were displaced by the flooded reservoir with hectares of 
uncleared forest submerged.  The Boguchansky dam is now complete and running, but only after 
years of vocal opposition from local and national environmentalists. 
 These are the two most notorious examples of environmental harm resulting from 
industries under Deripaska’s control, but the very act of mining, metal processing and 
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conventional energy production may also harm the environment to greater and lesser degrees.  
To this extent, En+ will always have a conflict of interest with environmentalist organizations.  
True to the model of corporate social responsibility, the company is attempting to bring 
environmentalists in as community stakeholders while simultaneously giving to environmental 
causes to bolster their public persona as environmental stewards.  
The director of corporate giving for En+ was straightforward in her explanation of this 
fact in response to my question as to why they were giving to environmental causes in Irkutsk. 
En+ Representative: Large industrial enterprises always affect the environment. 
Always . [Whether they are] good, bad, American, Russian, European, from a 
certain point of view, any industrial undertaking is harmful to the environment, 
despite the fact that there are economic advantages. Therefore, in order to develop 
more appropriately, we have to make sure these industries take into account 
environmental factors, risks and dangers. So, in environmentalism, we can say 
that there is a technical side, like, say, the environmentalism in the business, 
factory modernization, installing various filters. That is the technical part of the 
enterprise, which is done there [in the factory]. And there is a second part, which 
is global, and has to do with the issue of environmental development of the 
region. This is what is included in our social program… To say it rudely, industry 
inflicts the most damage on the environment in any situation, whether it is good 
or bad.  That means that, in making money, [industry] absolutely should try to fix 
those problems that are bringing harm.  And a conscientious company 
understands that. A non-conscientious company will try to fight with 
environmentalists using various means. We try not to fight, but to find some 
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common ground and partnerships to address these environmental challenges, 
whether our production is guilty or not. 
Unable to avoid the tarnish of environmental culpability, En+ has developed a proactive 
approach that seeks out relationships with environmentalist organizations.  They offer support 
and engage in partnerships, meeting the needs of environmentalist organizations and seeking 
input on their own industrial development.  This new approach to relations between industry and 
environmentalism could be said to be cooperative or co-optive, and whether it is one, the other, 
or possibly both, can be in the eye of the beholder.  How it was perceived by the 
environmentalists themselves is the subject of the next section.   
 
Environmentalists React to En+ 
It was my day to cook for the GBT work crew.  Our worksite was at a camp ground 
[turbaza], which had a cook shack with a gas oven and range.  While most of our cooking was 
done in pans over the campfire, I slipped into the cook shack to chop vegetables.  When I came 
in, I realized that I was not alone. Polya and Katya were already in the shack, seated on the 
wooden benches behind the table drinking tea.  Polya was questioning Katya about GBT’s 
relationship with En+, something that seemed to bother her deeply.   
“We talked about it for a long time,” Katya explained. “The club discussed it, because we 
know they are a big corporation and we didn’t want them to control us.  But in the end, we 
decided that taking the money wasn’t giving them control. We are still independent. We still 
decide what projects we are going to do.  No one is telling us what to do.” 
“But it isn’t about whether En+ will control you,” Polya objected.  “It’s that it is so little 
money for them and they get so much for it.”   
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Katya did not register Polya’s comment that En+ is actually gaining something from its 
donation to GBT, and instead fixed on the size of the donation compared to the corporate budget 
as a whole.  
“Yes, it is only a little money to them, but for GBT it is enormous!” Katya said 
“But they make that money hurting the environment,” Polya countered.  
“And we talked about that,” Katya insisted.  “But we decided that we could use this 
money for good. Why not take money that came from bad and turn it toward doing good?  And 
we are not the only ones. Defend Baikal Together – which is another nonprofit that does 
environmental education in schools – they get money from En+ and now they have a new 
monthly bus tour that brings children to Baikal who might not otherwise go.  They could live 
their whole lives two hours from Baikal and not know about it.  And it isn’t just En+! Lots of 
nonprofits take money from corporations. When I worked for Earth Corps in Seattle, they took 
money from big corporations, like Boeing and Microsoft.  And they also discussed whether they 
would lose their independence, whether the corporations were using them, but they decided that 
taking the money didn’t mean the corporations were using them, because they were going to do 
the work anyway, only now they had better equipment.” She started to list the things that we had 
on our trip that was paid for by En+: pick-axes, tents, shovels, t-shirts. Polya still seemed 
unsatisfied. 
 “Baikal Wave might have a different perspective,” Polya ventured to suggest.  
“Yes,” Katya agreed.  “They likely would have a different perspective. They probably 
wouldn’t take money from En+.” 
 “And En+ would not give it to the Wave!” Polya retorted. 
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 Polya’s assessment proved to be incorrect: En+ did seek out Baikal Environmental Wave 
for a partnership, but they were met with a cold shoulder.  Jennie Sutton mentioned the encounter 
briefly on my first day as a volunteer with Baikal Environmental Wave.  The organization had 
recently become involved with One Percent for the Planet, a movement to connect nonprofits 
with companies committed to donating one percent of their profits to environmental causes. 
Sutton stressed that the Wave would not take money from just any company that wants to give. 
“We are very selective with whom we work,” she told me. “Very particular. We require 
that there be some environmental component to the business.  For example, there was one 
company that really wanted to work with us and support us. They have their sights set on some 
big damming projects on some rivers in Siberia and selling the energy to China. They would like 
to get us, an environmental organization, under their thumb, but that is not going to happen!” 
Later, in another context, Jennie and Marina were discussing Oleg Deripaska.  While I 
was familiar with En+ from the logo that was plastered on so many environmental projects in the 
region, I was still unfamiliar with the man behind the curtain. 
“Who is Deripaska?” I asked. 
“He’s an oligarch who owns lots of various energy and mining companies,” Jennie said. 
“His company tried to come here and sponsor us. What were they called? Something-plus? It 
doesn’t matter, it’s all Deripaska.”  
Baikal Environmental Wave was the only organization in Irkutsk to reject En+’s offer of 
partnership.  They were also the only nonprofit that virtually never referred to the corporation by 
name.  In the Wave’s office, the companies under the control of En+ or Basic Element were 
called by their metonym: Deripaska.  He became the personification – the active and culpable 
agent – for environmental harm committed by the companies he owned.  The Wave’s apparent 
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refusal to adopt the corporate moniker seemed intentional, as though the brand were a 
smokescreen to hide the puppeteer.  While the En+ name and logo found its way onto many 
environmental projects throughout the region, in the Wave’s office, it was a non-entity; they only 
discussed the oligarch Deripaska, naked without his brand. 
 
The Wave was unique among environmentalists in the region in their firm stance not to 
associate with En+.  Most others, while not conceding their right to criticize the company, were 
nonetheless glad for the money and the partnership.  Elena Alexandrovna Tvorogova from the 
organization Reviving Siberian Land hoped that the interaction would not only help her 
organization, but might even spur new ways of thinking in the minds of Russia’s elites. 
Tvorogova:  En+ appeared at the end of the year before last, toured around, met 
with practically all of our environmental organizations. And to each organization 
they proposed that they were ready to support any of our projects, so what 
projects do you have?  Obviously, every organization then had to make a 
decision: do we wish to enter into such a relationship with such a business?  For 
example, Baikal Wave decided no, we are not going to play these games.  [But 
Revising Siberian Land] has been working with business for a long time, already 
for many years.  We have done projects with money from Yukos and money from 
Polyus Gold, and now with money from En+. Because I think it's better to do a 
little bit of good work with money from business, than not to do any work. 
Because business will spend the money somewhere anyway.  They will find 
somewhere to spend it. But they could spend it on something stupid.  So I think it 
is much better to use this opportunity for good... I don’t want to overstate our 
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influence on the minds of our oligarchs. Still, some of these business 
representatives, experts working in this field, coming into contact with these 
themes and  problems, you will see them, just a bit, a little bit, maybe two to three 
percent, turn Green. 
 
 At GBT, members were ambivalent about the relationship, but finally came down on the 
side that it was better to accept the money than to not.  There was only one member – Lusiya – 
who was adamantly opposed.  The sponsorship proceeded over her objections and she has made 
her peace with it.  But in an interview, she explained her concern. 
Lusiya:  When Lena asked us about this last year, it was in the fall I think, she just 
said that it is possible to get such a grant, and she asked ‘What do we think of 
this?’ I was the only person who was strongly opposed. Very much against it. And 
I'll explain why.  I said that an organization, especially if it is a social 
organization, it must be consistent in its actions. And I thought  that it is 
inconsistent when we, say, go to a protest for preserving Lake Baikal and demand 
that something is not built, that they do not re-open the paper mill owned by [the 
CEO of] En+, and, I mean, I think it is just unethical.  You need to differentiate 
whose money to accept. But since the question was asked to all, and most people 
agreed, the decision was taken.  And ... I still think it's such a double standard.  
Because, on the one hand, we are an environmental organization, and to take 
money from an organization that pollutes the environment – that’s bad. On the 
other hand, I think it's better if the money goes to something good, than if they 
spend it on something else. Because at least I'm sure that the money that is given 
to GBT will be well spent. I know that it will be for educational projects, I know 
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that it will be for the trails ... I know it will be helpful to a variety of 
environmental initiatives.  So, let En+ at least do something good. I mean, this is 
their chance to do something good.  And ... well, I cannot say that I am 
completely ‘for’ it, but at least I think that it’s, you know, as a lesser evil (laughs). 
But in any case, I think that GBT is compromising its conscience. 
However, Lusiya was singular in her unilateral opposition to En+.  More often, comments from 
GBT members resembled those offered by Pavel.  He described the debate over whether to 
accept their sponsorship as a “hot topic,” but fundamentally decided that he was in favor of the 
relationship. 
Pavel: I know all about [En+] and what they do. And I don’t hold deep, positive 
feelings for them, like, “Ah, how good! What a great company!”  I understand 
that for them it is just PR, I guess. Because they are trying to be like a Western 
company, right? But I think it's good, and you shouldn’t reject these companies 
simply because it's PR for them. Let all these companies do it for the purpose of 
public relations, but they are giving money for good activities... I think it’s also 
payment for how they harm nature, and pretty strongly at that...But! Here's 
another additional point. That said, I believe that if they give money, then that 
does not mean that they can affect our activities. Or tell us what to do or not to do. 
Or that we can no longer talk about them using unfriendly words. So that am I 
supposed to say, "En+ Group is a wonderful company.” No. That is, I believe that 
it is not. There are certain concrete decisions that I have not liked.  For example, 
t-shirts. I believe that this t-shirt is for GBT, not for En+. But for some reason I 
see En+ and I don’t see GBT [on the front]. That is, if I had the chance, I would 
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not myself accept this shirt because that’s not what I need. I think this is the 
wrong approach, precisely in this concrete issue. And the same thing with the 
signage, when they made badges, emblems where you can’t see GBT, but there is 
En+, I wouldn’t have agreed to that. I mean, I think it's just a little bit too much. 
The ubiquity of the En+ logo made it an easy target for environmentalists to suggest that the 
company was only interested in its image.  But logo battles reflected a greater concern amongst 
participants that En+ would threaten the autonomy of GBT.  The fear of corporate domination 
would creep up in GBT as random shows of autonomy that were arguably overblown. 
 One such example was GBT’s ten year anniversary that was held in December of 2012.  
GBT had incorporated as a nonprofit in 2002, and the anniversary was seen as a real triumph and 
reason to celebrate.  Few nonprofits in Russia reach ten years, I was repeatedly told, and the 
collective wanted to plan a self-congratulatory bash.  However, big celebrations take 
discretionary funds that volunteer organizations seldom possess.  Lena Chubakova, the executive 
director, went to En+ to ask for money for the party.  En+ immediately agreed and told her not to 
worry, that they would take care of everything: the Emcee, the program, the venue and so forth. 
 “I told them, no, we are a nonprofit organization and we are completely capable of 
throwing our own anniversary party,” she told the club meeting one night.  “Because what if they 
invited all their own people and not ours? What if we ended up with the En+ logo all over 
everything and nothing about GBT?”  
 The same refrain was repeated for the next two weeks as Lena worked on the details of 
the event.  When discussing the program, she told the group, “We have two options: 1) we have 
En+’s designers put together the program, which I’m not too keen on, because who knows if they 
will put a giant En+ logo over everything; or 2) we do it ourselves.”  Lena was certainly thrilled 
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to receive En+’s financial support, both for the party and for the many other aspects of GBT’s 
work.  But her fixation on the omnipresent En+ logo expressed her underlying fear that En+’s 
self-promotion comes at least in part at the expense of GBT’s autonomy.  Her fierce stance on 
the anniversary party, in itself not a dire issue, displays a territoriality on the part of an 
organization that fears being subsumed by its wealthy benefactor. 
 
*** 
As can be seen above, environmentalists were mostly concerned with three issues in their 
interactions with En+: 1) they were concerned that their autonomy would be undermined, that 
En+ might imperialistically control their activities; 2) they were worried that En+ was only doing 
it for the sake of self-promotion; and 3) they were worried about their own reputations, or 
perhaps at a deeper level their organizational souls, being sullied by association with a large, 
profitable corporation that has been known to harm the environment. 
 All of the local organizations except for Baikal Environmental Wave were able to 
reconcile themselves to these three concerns.  First, while the blatant self-promotion of corporate 
giving was met with rolled eyes, there was general agreement that it is better for corporations to 
make an effort toward a having a social conscience than to do nothing at all.  Second, they were 
generally satisfied that they retained their autonomy; indeed, many claimed that the added 
resources only enhanced their ability to achieve what they planned to do anyway.  Third, and 
finally, environmentalists in Irkutsk came to the conclusion that rather than tainting themselves 
by association, they were instead doing greater service by helping to turn ill-gotten gains toward 
a socially and environmentally beneficial end. 
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Cause Marketing: The Cost and the Benefit 
Corporate social responsibility is a business ontology.  The “presentation of self” 
(Goffman 1959) that an enterprise adopts in relation to this ontology is known in the trade as 
“cause-marketing” (c.f. Earle 2002, Smith and Alcorn 1991, Varadarajan and Menon 1988). The 
principle behind cause-marketing is that a for-profit and non-profit organization can enter into a 
partnership for mutual benefit: the non-profit receives aid and the company garners positive 
attention to its brand.  Cause-marketing is more than corporate philanthropy.  Philanthropy is 
described in the literature as a donation whose benefit to the company lies in the tax-deduction.  
The goal in cause-marketing is broader: cause-marketing aims to create an associative link in the 
public mind between the company and the good cause.  The return to the company is in image, 
reputation, and public goodwill, as well as increased sales.  Studies have shown that cause-
marketing is both cheaper and more lucrative than traditional marketing campaigns (e.g. Bloom, 
Hoeffler, Keller and Meza 2006, Krishna and Rajan 2009, Smith and Alcorn 1991).  A cursory 
glance through journals of marketing and business will show the great effort that has been put 
toward research that aims to maximize returns to a company in cause-marketing: assessing the 
relative impact in choosing one’s cause, or the type of support (e.g. Ellen, Mohr and Webb 2000, 
Nan and Heo 2007). Essentially, cause-marketing is an investment, upon which corporations 
expect to see a profitable return. 
Despite the general recognition that En+ was motivated to fund Irkutsk’s environmental 
scene as a public relations coup, there was little acknowledgement, or perhaps even 
understanding, by my informants that sponsorship can be viewed as just another market 
transaction.  For the activists, the money is still viewed as a donation; the activists and En+ are 
operating on different planes and from widely divergent perspectives.  For the environmental 
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activists, the money donated is contrasted to their income before the sponsorship.  From their 
perspective, the question is one of money vs. no money.  This “either-or” approach to sponsorship 
helps explain why the environmental activists focus principally on whether or not to associate 
with En+ as a partner, and do not discuss the amount they receive.  When they do discuss the 
size of the corporate sponsorship, it is considered in relation to the organization’s regular 
income; from this perspective, Katya could say that GBT is receiving an “enormous” sum from 
En+. 
Yet, for En+ the transaction is different and amounts matter.  By its association with 
myriad environmental causes, En+ is investing in its image.  The company is essentially 
purchasing the right to associate itself with various environmental groups.  When associating 
with a nonprofit like GBT, the question for En+ is not money vs. no money, but rather what is the 
price of GBT’s reputation?  En+ receives increased name recognition, and has its brand 
associated with a positive, feel-good cause, both directly, through volunteers, and indirectly 
through the mass media.  The affiliation raises the positive profile of En+ locally in Irkutsk, 
nationally – given the importance of Baikal, and even internationally through GBT’s global 
volunteer base.  From this perspective, affiliation with GBT is an enormous bargain.  For the 
price of a tent, they reach countless people sleeping in those tents, trip after trip, year after year.  
For the cost of a silk-screen logo imprinted on a blue T-shirt, En+ imprints its brand on the 
minds of multitudes, from pedestrians passing volunteers on the street to those viewing GBT trip 
pictures on the organizational website.  Environmentalists in Irkutsk see their work as a cause; 
En+ sees it as a commodity: one which they managed to purchase at a terrific bargain. 
Moreover, when the image of environmental stewardship becomes the primary point of 
an activity, the cause itself is liable to suffer.  The quest for a positive headline or an eye-
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catching photo opportunity can result in activities whose cost may not equal the benefit 
environmentally. To this extent, environmentalists in Irkutsk may be correct in suggesting that it 
is better for them to accept corporate funds for their own projects rather than to allow En+ to 
spend its money on “something stupid,” as Tvorogova stated above.  And indeed, En+ does 
conduct its own environmentalist projects in addition to those it sponsors with local 
organizations. As the next section shows, the emphasis on publicity can lead to ambivalent 
environmental outcomes. 
 
360 Minutes for Baikal 
Litter has become a major concern around Lake Baikal.  As the region has developed into 
a major domestic outdoor tourist destination, the traffic to Baikal has increased, while the 
infrastructure around much of the lake remains primitive.  Much of the territory around the lake 
is protected – including some territories with the highly restricted zapovednik status.   
Where villages and outposts dot the lake, there is no trash collection. Residents are 
supposed to haul their trash to a landfill, but since many lack transport, they also frequently burn 
it or bury it in the woods.  Such a transgression by villagers would not amount to vast 
environmental damage except for the advent of two phenomena: tourism and globalized mass 
consumer production.  The amount of packaging waste arriving into the villages has grown 
exponentially since the Soviet era; and now, with the influx of tourists, this trash has only 
increased.   
“Packing out what you brought in” has not yet become standard outdoors etiquette for 
Russian tourists. Vacationers will boat up to the lake shore, picnic or camp, and leave their beer 
bottles, tin cans and plastic bags behind them.  Some people will even dump their broken lawn 
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chairs or tents. The more conscientious will dig a hole for their rubbish in an improvised, and 
unregulated, mini-landfill, but these accumulate and expand with remarkable rapidity, leaving 
many of Baikal’s beaches sullied.  Litter will also wash up on the shore, dropped or tossed into 
the water by boaters.  In the Soviet era, the forests may have been able to absorb what little was 
left behind. Today, with the plastic packaging of mass consumer production, and with the greater 
number of visitors, the sheer amount of waste renders these practices unsustainable. 
Since litter has become a visible blight on Baikal’s shores, it is also an easy target for 
environmentalist concern.  Many list it just behind the paper mill as the chief threat to Baikal.  
Even those who are not active environmentalists generally recognize the problem of 
accumulating litter.  Lately, a number of initiatives have arisen to collect rubbish.  Schools in the 
region regularly organize clean-up projects.  In the city of Irkutsk, a coalition of nonprofits, state 
agencies and businesses called “We Will Make Irkutsk Eco-Logical” [Sdelaem Irkutsk Eko-
logichnii] coordinated a massive work day to rid the city of illegal dumps and litter. 
En+ joined the litter collection effort with its event “360 Minutes for Baikal,” an annual 
clean-up project that takes place in association with Baikal Day.  At its inaugural event in 2011, 
100 volunteers traveled to the shore of Baikal to gather trash.  I attended the 2012 event as a 
participant observer. I had been recruited by members of GBT.  En+ had enlisted the help of 
GBT members as crew leaders, who would each direct small teams of volunteers.  Although it 
was not a GBT project, they were glad to lend their enthusiasm and expertise. 
I had only been in Irkutsk for a month when I was recruited to 360 Minutes for Baikal.  
The summer was nearly over, and many people were glad for an excuse for one last trip to Baikal 
while the weather was still warm.  I was encouraged to go at least in part as an opportunity for a 
free trip to Olkhon Island, where the litter clean-up was to take place.  Olkhon is the largest 
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island in Baikal and is also a major tourist destination.  The island, with its unique topography of 
rock formations, ice caves, forest, and steppe, as well as its endemic flora and fauna, has long 
been sacred to the indigenous Buryat shamans.  Dina, one member of GBT, said she had signed 
up to participate specifically so she could visit Olkhon, a place she had never been.  I had also 
heard of Olkhon and was eager to make its acquaintance; helping keep it clean and observing 
local environmentalists in action would be an added bonus. 
 
September 9, 2012 
I awoke before sunrise to go, as I then thought, to Olkhon to pick up litter.  There were a 
surprising number of people congregating on the corner of Kirov Square, and lots of taxi-vans 
and buses to take the volunteers to their destinations.  In all, En+ had recruited 400 people to 
volunteer for the day – a four-fold increase over their number from the previous year.  I quickly 
found the GBT folks amongst the crowd, and there were happy hugs all around.  
 “Where are you going?” Vasya asked me. 
 “To Olkhon,” I answered. 
 “Ah, nice,” he replied.  “We are going to a campground on the mainland, but across from 
Olkhon, just about 15 kilometers away.” 
 Anatoly from GBT was one of the crew leaders. He came up to me and said, “You are in 
a group with Yanna and Pavel. Stay with them, and you will be in the right place.  Your group is 
standing over there.” He indicated a small cluster of people nearby. 
 “That’s my group,” said Vasya. 
 “But if I am in your group, then I’m not going to Olkhon either!” I realized out loud.  
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I was not the only one disappointed. Dina from GBT came up to me later and said, 
“Remember how I told you that I had signed up for this because I had never been to Olkhon in 
all my life? Well, it turns out I’m still not going to have been to Olkhon.  They have me in a 
group that is on the mainland.” 
Our crew leader was a young man named Vova. He had to check us in before loading us 
on the bus.  We were the last group on the bus, but there were still plenty of seats. We sat and 
waited.  Then a young woman named Tamara, who was the leader of another crew on our bus, 
announced: “If anyone needs to use the bathroom, you need to go now because you won’t get 
another chance for two hours.”  I asked where we could go to use the toilet, but Tamara didn’t 
know.  Pretty soon people were pulling out their cell phones, calling around to see if local 
businesses were open yet so we could use the restroom.  Pavel turned to me and said, “That 
building there is Irkutsk Energy.” He indicated the formidable cement structure, whose door was 
flanked by two security guards, next to which the buses were parked. “It is owned by En+, the 
company that is organizing this action, and yet they won’t let us inside to use the toilets.”  I was 
confused and mildly irritated that someone would say that “you should use the toilet now,” when 
there wasn’t a viable toilet available.  Eventually Irkutsk Energy relented and opened its doors to 
volunteers who needed the restroom.  
Finally the bus and began its long, arduous journey.  At first, it was a pleasant morning 
drive through the country, watching the world turn from city to forest, and forest to steppe. Little 
grey marmots kept popping up and watching us drive past in our caravan of buses.   
On the way, the crew leaders addressed their teams and gave out the schedule.  The trip 
from Irkutsk to the work site should take four hours. We would eat breakfast at a campground at 
11 a.m., spend four hours (360 minutes) collecting rubbish, return to the campground for supper, 
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and then leave on the buses again, arriving back at Kirov Square around 10 p.m.  However, 
according to the schedule, we were already 40 minutes late in departing from Kirov Square. 
The crew leaders also passed out baseball caps and windbreakers to the volunteers, each 
bearing the En+ logo and an emblem for the project: “360 Minut Radi Baikal” [360 Minutes for 
Baikal]. 
“There will be news media and television cameras filming, so you must wear the 
windbreakers and hats at all times,” Tamara told us. “Do not take them off.” 
“What if I get hot?” someone asked. 
“You cannot take them off,” Tamara repeated. “Maybe take off what you are wearing 
underneath.”   
Now for a word about the bus we were on:  it was a Korean bus, decorated with drapes 
and tassels in the windows.  Ornaments hung from every other window that either had the image 
of the playboy bunny or that made some other allusion to sex.  We were part of a caravan of six 
buses, with a police car in the lead and in the rear.  I was unsure of the purpose served by the 
police car because it certainly was not helping us reach our destination more rapidly.  The trip 
seemed interminable.  First, the paved road turned to dirt. Then the dirt road turned to bumpy 
rock.  And eventually, the road disappeared entirely when forced our caravan to take an off-road 
detour.  The bus had virtually no shocks, so in addition to a bumpy ride, we also were traveling 
at a snail’s pace.  According to the schedule it should take no more than four hours to reach the 
work site, but four hours came and went, and still we were driving.   
At 5.5 hours into the trip, I learned forward to Yanna and Pavel, who were sitting ahead 
of me. 
“What do you think, are we going to stop sometime?” I asked them. 
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“Yes, sometime,” they both responded.  
“The bus will run out of gas eventually,” Yanna added. 
She was right, though. After more than 6 hours of travel, we did eventually stop at a 
campground called Danko. We disembarked and were ushered to the cafeteria.  According to the 
schedule, we were supposed to have “breakfast” at 11am.  Now, it was 1 p.m., and we were 
sitting down to rice kasha with salami and bread.  One of the GBT volunteers complained later 
about the bad food: “Those tiny slices of bread that were, as my grandmother would say, cut like 
in a restaurant!” 
Outside the cafeteria, there was a porch set up like a stage. Large, banners of bright 
orange bearing the En+ logo waved in the breeze.  All the volunteers were asked to gather on the 
stone steps as makeshift risers above the improvised stage.  The media were instructed to set up 
around this stage in a semi-circle.  There were multiple television cameras and several reporters 
from print media. I found myself standing beside a woman in her thirties from Krasnoyarsk, 
another city in Eastern Siberia.  She introduced herself as a journalist.  She was wearing the 
obligatory hat and windbreaker, and I learned I was not the only person volunteering and 
working at the same time. 
“En+ did a similar project in our city,” she said, “so I am here as a follow-up story.” I 
asked what she thought of the project.  “It is fine and all to pick up the trash. But it would be 
better if people didn’t litter in the first place.” 
After a staged event where representatives from En+ thanked participants and partners, 
talked about safety, and made short speeches for the cameras, we were sent off for the day’s 
mission.  We were all given orange drawstring bags with logos on the outside and lunch on the 
inside: bottled water, three pirozhki, an apple, and two granola bars.  Each work crew also 
197 
 
received gloves, trash bags, shovels, rakes, and a wooden sign that read, “Please don’t litter.”  
Then, we piled into yet another vehicle to be driven still further away to our respective work 
sites. Fortunately, our team’s work site was only about five minutes from camp. 
Despite the stress of the day, it was impossible to miss the beauty of the Olkhonskii raion 
[county].  The campground where we gathered was one of several tourist bases on the Western 
shore of Baikal, in an area named Maloye More, or “Small Sea,” after the shallow channel 
between Olkhon Island and the mainland.  Baikal water is warmer here, and it has become a 
popular spot for tourism. The landscape was full of fascinating shapes; the treeless steppe 
accentuated the contours of its undulating topography.  There were strangely shaped rock islands 
sprouting up from the water amidst the many peninsulas and bays.  There were horses grazing by 
the bank where the van dropped us off.   
We uncovered several trash pits, mostly filled with glass bottles and burnt cans.  One 
volunteer spent a great deal of time fishing disintegrating plastic out of the water, joking 
sardonically that it was a bag from the previous year’s litter clean-up.  He also pulled up what 
looked to be motor oil. Someone left an old raft and a broken lawn chair by one camp site.  The 
trash truck came by early and we were able to get some of the bigger stuff hauled away. 
Undoubtedly, the foulest thing we uncovered was several used baby diapers.  From then on, no 
matter what we were pulling out of a trash pile, we would say, “At least there are no diapers!” 
While we worked, picking up glass, plastic bottles and metal cans, I asked about 
recycling and why there was no recycling in Irkutsk.  I said that I heard someone say that there 
used to be recycling, and I wondered why it stopped.   
“They had recycling in the Soviet Union,” Pavel explained. “But the thing was that, back 
then, there just were not that many products.  Not like now. You maybe had three kinds of 
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drinks, and they were all made locally, or at least regionally.  So back then, the companies would 
take the bottles back and you would get a deposit. Not a lot of money, but something.  Now, 
bottles are coming from far away, from all over, and it is just cheaper and easier for companies to 
make new bottles than to collect and reuse the old ones. But we’ve never had the kind of 
recycling where you could just bring any glass or plastic or metal. It was just those specific 
bottles going back to that particular company.” 
We kept collecting trash until we ran out of plastic bags. At the end, we planted the 
wooden sign on which En+ kindly asked visitors not to litter.  The work was over and the 
silliness ensued.  Two boys started swinging bags of trash at each other.  Yanna came up behind 
me and pretended to brush my hair with a rake.  We took some group photos and then all 
clambered back in the van to return to the campground.  We left the bags of trash piled up and 
were told a truck would come collect them. There were some looks of skepticism exchanged, but 
there was nothing for us to do but hope that they would, in fact, be collected.  
When we arrived back at the campground, volunteers were being stopped by a 
videographer from En+ wanting to take footage for an in-house promotional video.  Each 
volunteer was asked to say his name, where he was from and why he was there. Some of the 
television stations were also continuing to collect interviews with volunteers.  We returned to the 
cafeteria for supper: soup, salad and pirog.  After supper, we piled back in the bus for our long 
journey home. 
On the road back to Irkutsk, I talked briefly to Pavel, a geographer working on his PhD.  
His dissertation studies the effect of large businesses like En+ working in remote regions, like 
Bolshoye Goloustnoye or Olkhon.  I asked what his results were and he made a face.    
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“It’s mixed. More negative than positive, though.  The thing is, they may do some little 
things that are good, but usually all of the local wealth will be sent out of the region.  Big 
businesses do not actually create good jobs for local people, just bad, service kinds of jobs.”  
Despite the many problems, though, he was pleased that large businesses are now making 
an effort at doing something positive.  “Like this event,” he said. “It’s all about PR, but still, five 
years ago this kind of thing would never have happened.  There were no kinds of volunteer 
opportunities and no one picking up trash five years ago.” 
*** 
 Trash on Baikal is a real concern.  But “360 Minutes for Baikal” did far more to benefit 
the company that created it than it did the lake it was ostensibly supposed to serve.  Even the 
name was something of a misnomer; because of the many delays, volunteers were only actively 
gathering trash for about two hours.  The effect on the lake was minimal; there was less litter, but 
only by a very small percentage.  And yet the positive publicity that this event generated for En+ 
was clearly substantial.  The story reached local, national and international (English language) 
media outlets. Footage and photographs clearly displayed the En+ brand on banners, backpacks, 
and especially on the windbreakers and hats that volunteers were forbidden to remove.  The story 
was a positive one of a company making an effort to clean up a beloved national treasure. 
 En+ was clearly willing to pay a great deal of money for the publicity stunt.  They hired 
buses, vans and drivers to haul hundreds of people from Irkutsk to the Olkhonskii raion, and then 
paid for hundreds of volunteers, staff and media guests to eat two hot meals at a campground and 
a picnic lunch.  They provided apparel and souvenirs to all participants, not to mention the 
necessary tools and equipment, the police escort, and the vehicles to haul away the collected 
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rubbish.  Had the principle concern of En+ been the state of Baikal, one might imagine many 
more cost-effective means to achieve comparable, or even superior, results.   
Given the amount of auto transport involved – 12 hours of driving, with multiple vehicles 
that were not always full to capacity – it is arguable that the environmental footprint of the event 
exceeded the benefit of the litter collection, a fact not lost on the environmentalists involved.  In 
particular, the members of Great Baikal Trail bemoaned the cost-benefit of a one day trip.  Their 
organization, with its “volunteer vacations,” also has a practice of carting volunteers to distant 
locales for environmentally beneficial projects.  But the environmental cost is weighed against 
two full weeks of labor. In the case of 360 Minutes for Baikal, participants spent 6 times as much 
time in transit as they did volunteering.  When I asked later what he thought of the event, one 
GBT member said, “For all the money they spent on it, you would think they would have let us 
spend the night and actually get some work done!”   
But En+ was not paying for the work; they were paying for the publicity, and that could 
be accomplished just as easily with two hours of work as it would two days, and the former 
would not involve overnight accommodations of hundreds of volunteers.  In a publicity stunt, the 
size of the event is more important than the quality of the experience.  Had trash collection been 
their major motivation, En+ could revamp the annual event to that end.  However, when I 
discussed the project with the Director for Sustainable Development, she said that her plan was 
to expand the project so that volunteers were cleaning trash all around the circumference of Lake 
Baikal.  And, indeed, the next year, the number of volunteers more than doubled to 1,000 and the 
trash collection took place at sites all around the lake – an increase in quantity, but not 
necessarily in quality.   
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The En+ Representative admitted in our discussion that trash collection was not really the 
goal, but rather it was one of education.  “If kids, especially teens, spend one day picking up 
trash and see how hard it is, then they will no longer litter.  And they will tell their friends and 
family not to litter…The goal is that eventually [the event] won’t be necessary.”  She also hoped 
that participants would be introduced to volunteering and would continue to do so.
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These two goals are in accordance with the environmental movement that the company 
aims to serve.  Jennie Sutton would dismiss local litter clean-ups as “feel-good” measures that 
produce no real structural change.  But most of the local environmentalists were glad that litter 
clean-ups were taking place.  As one pointed out, in order for structural change to take place: 
“First, people have to see the litter.”  En+ aims to help the public to see the litter – as long as 
they, and the mass media, see the En+ brand prominently alongside it. 
 
Conclusion 
 Revolutions offer ruptures in time, and the resulting quake may upset the maintenance of 
systems of social stratification. As Fitzpatrick (2008) has shown, the 1917 Russian Revolution 
opened a space for social mobility, but the stratification structure again solidified, as those 
individuals newly occupying higher rungs of the social ladder sought to secure their position.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 represented another social quake, jostling individuals 
who then had to vigorously maneuver for social gains, and, in the process, several reached 
heights of economic prosperity that had previously been unimaginable. 
 As long as the fight for position took place amongst contenders within the economic 
sphere, the civil sphere retained relative autonomy.  While few in Russia would return to the 
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 Although, I did not see great enthusiasm amongst the recruited participants nor did I hear expressions of how 
excited they would be to participate again. 
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three-headed terror of violence, instability and insecurity that characterized life in the 1990s, as 
we have seen in previous chapters, there was, at the same time, a blossoming of possibility.  
While Oleg Deripaska fought the “aluminum wars,” he was not concerned with what 
environmentalists were doing.  It was only with the emergence of the Russian oligarchs in 2000 
as a unified class with shared goals and objectives that their relationship with civil society 
became more complex. 
 The entry of Russian business into the global economy is at once an economic necessity 
and a power play.  Becoming global economic players expands the economic power and 
dominance of the oligarchs, both at home and abroad.  As Sun-Woo (2010) has noted, Russian 
business may also have chosen to integrate more fully into the Western economy so as to gain 
alliances abroad to counter the ever-increasing power of the Kremlin. But the logic of global 
capitalism also compels growth and expansion, and Russian oligarchs operate according to the 
same logic as governs any other multinational corporation. But these power plays operate within 
the same semi-autonomous field: that of business and economy.   
Access to the field of global business came with new rewards, but also new obligations. 
As Russian industrial magnates moved into a more prominent position within the global 
economic sphere, they found themselves beholden to previously established norms of global 
business.  Amongst these was an insistence upon corporate social responsibility.  While late in 
coming to the social responsibility mandate, companies such as En+ have since moved full 
throttle forward, seizing the opportunity to align with nonprofit partners.  Amongst 
environmental activists in Irkutsk, the affiliation with a corporate partner amounts to a windfall, 
opening new opportunities that would have been otherwise beyond their reach. But to 
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corporations such as En+, the relationship is expected to have long term economic payoffs.  The 
expense is minimal and the rewards are potentially vast.   
The rewards come through cause-marketing.  Cause-marketing is not greenwashing, 
whereby a company engaged in environmental harm seeks to advertise better stewardship than it 
actually conducts.  Neither is it pure philanthropy, as a one-time tax deductible donation.  
Instead, cause-marketing is how corporations purchase access to civil power.  Most often, that 
power is used to better the image of the company for the sake of higher profits.  Civil power is 
used for purely economic struggles between various companies and their brands.  The emphasis 
on branding may be so great that the “cause” itself becomes window-dressing, as in the case of 
360 Minutes for Baikal.  The environmental impact of this environmental clean-up project is 
arguably less than positive.   
But purchased civil power need not be constrained to use in the economic sphere, 
building the brand of a particular company.  Civil power operates in the field of power at large; 
when corporations acquire civil power through their social responsibility programs, this power 
can be employed for the benefits of economic elites in the field of power as a whole, a subject 
that we will turn to next. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
DISEMPOWERING EMPOWERMENT IN THE CIVIL SPHERE 
 
The previous chapter emphasized corporate environmentalism as a vehicle for publicity.  
Through cause-marketing, corporations can adopt the aura of civil society to more successfully 
compete within their own field of business.  However, large corporations who have had success 
as players in the field of business can then become players in the field of power.  From a field of 
power perspective, civil society is a threatening opponent. Thus, the “worthiness” (Tilly 2004) 
that gives civil society its symbolic force becomes a double-edged sword for business elites.  To 
perpetuate the efficacy of cause-marketing, civil society must be independent and honorable.  
But an independent civil society, buoyed by the strength of conviction, holds social power; and 
that can be used against business in the field of power at large.   
However, the relationship between the civil sphere and the economic sphere within the 
field of power can be managed using the same means by which each is strengthened in its 
respective field though cause-marketing.  When businesses expand the capacity of partner 
organizations in civil society through giving, they also gain entry into the activities of the civil 
sphere. Not only can business borrow the glamour of the civil sphere for power in their own 
economic field of struggle, they can also bend civil power toward ends that benefit business in 
the larger field of power. 
Drawing upon Gramsci’s (1971) work on hegemony within civil society, this chapter 
discusses how corporate sponsorship employs civil actors to propagate a pro-business style of 
environmentalism.  As it embarks upon its program of Sustainable Development, En+ chooses 
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particular programs to fund, and eschews others, such that civil society becomes the purveyor of 
ideological programs that reinforce contemporary power relations and the dominance of the 
contemporary capitalist model of production.   
 
Economic Hegemony in Environmental Activism 
 Writing from an Italian prison, the Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1971) puzzled through the 
complicity of the working class in its own economic exploitation and political domination.  He 
accepted the basis of historical materialism, with its base-superstructure model of society. 
However, he decided that the superstructure could be further sub-divided between the state and 
the mass of other human institutions that can be called “private life” or “civil society.”  
Economic relations were enforced by a state, so the power of economic elites could be clearly 
identified.  But how does one enforce domination without the force of law?  Gramsci’s answer 
was: hegemony.  A range of soft-power tactics operated within the civil sphere to support the 
dominance of the economic elites – the hegemon – without the threat of force.  Ideological 
justifications and economic incentives encourage individuals to choose domination. Hegemony 
can then be seen as domination by attracting the willing participation of the dominated.  
*** 
In the 1970s, the environmental movement in the West was at an apogee.  Strict 
regulations were put into place.  That these were initiated in the United States by a Republican 
president underscores the power of environmentalism as a movement. But by the 1980s business 
was pushing back against the tide, now under the ideological banner of neoliberalism.  The 
collapse of the Soviet Union helped further the ideological dominance of market capitalism to 
near uniformity.   
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Consequently, the market logic has become more than one tool in the modern toolkit – a 
means to an end.  It has become a social good in its own right.  “Market fundamentalism” 
(Polanyi 2001) has gained new traction, with cut-backs on regulation becoming increasingly 
popular worldwide.  In this ideological environment, traditional regulatory means for protecting 
nature have foundered.  The result is “fourth wave” environmentalism: the greening of capitalism 
(Dowie 1996). 
The first wave of the environmental movement focused upon preserving wild spaces and 
it had broad social appeal. With the rise of the “second wave,” though, which emphasized 
industrial pollution, business and the environment began a more confrontational relationship. 
With business chafing at state-imposed end-of-pipe pollution regulation, business began fighting 
back against the green movement by enlisting the working class.  Protecting the environment 
would hurt business, which would slow the economy and cost working people their jobs. In the 
United States, the conflict between the economy and environmental protection was symbolized 
by the spotted owl – an endangered species whose protection was used to justify an end to 
logging of old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest (Foster 2002: 104-136).  The spotted owl 
fight proved a turning point in public opinion; no longer would the environmental movement see 
the widespread support that characterized the creation of Earth Day in 1970.  With waning public 
support, this latest wave in the green movement has changed its call away from state regulation 
and toward a reimagining of the capitalist economy itself.  Industry has been the problem – but 
could it also be the solution?  Proponents of the “ecological modernization” school emphasize 
the mutual benefit of environmentalism and capitalism (e.g. Huber 2000, Nordhaus and 
Shellenberger 2007, Young 2001).  “Greening” business helps the bottom line; courting business 
achieves environmental gains without a fight. 
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 “Fourth wave” environmentalism54 and the theory of ecological modernization can be 
seen as an attempt to harness the power of markets for environmental purposes.  However, 
“command-and-control” regulation may, in fact, be a more effective means to pollution 
abatement than market-based measures or voluntary actions.
55
 In light of this fact, the strategic 
switch of the modern environmental movement toward green business reflects the ideological 
domination of capitalism in the public sphere and the present weakness of regulation-based 
environmentalism. It is a relationship of hegemony. 
 In the entry of En+ into environmental civil society in Irkutsk similarly bears the 
hallmark of domination by consent. Activists receive tangible benefits by their association with 
En+.  As Katya proclaimed in the previous chapter, the sum provided to GBT is “enormous” and 
goes a long way toward increasing their capacity. They feel their own power in the 
environmental sphere is increased and their horizon of efficacy is expanded.  As we also saw in 
the previous chapter, there was considerable concern within GBT that the relationship would not 
infringe upon the organization’s autonomy.  Aside from small, territorial skirmishes, GBT was 
satisfied that it only gained from its relationship to En+: they wear the corporate logo, but 
otherwise continue doing the work they always have. 
 However, as discussed in Chapter 4, GBT’s principle activity and organizational form is 
already accommodationist towards business.  Its spirit is non-threatening to elites in the sphere of 
power.  Its projects need no interference to ensure positivity and mitigate threat.  The same 
cannot be said for all organizations within the sphere of environmental civil society.  In their 
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 “Third wave” environmentalism focused upon environmental justice issues and, although important in its own 
right, is not pertinent to the discussion here. 
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 A classic comparison is the alternate responses to the ozone hole and acid rain.  Regulation, albeit with strong 
industry buy-in, effectively ended trade in CFCs and has largely solved the problem of the ozone hole.  The market-
based cap-and-trade approach to acid rain slashed the rate of acidification in forests, but it has not prevented its 
continuation. 
208 
 
wielding of civil power, social organizations have the capacity to exert threat against economic 
elites within the sphere of power.  Hegemony, by means of corporate social responsibility 
programs, allows business to steer the activities of civil society with their consent because of the 
expanded power they are granted through this cooperative relationship.  How businesses might 
use this influence is the subject of the next section. 
 
Disempowerment by Design 
The process by which these symbolic systems are acquired and accepted has long been 
studied as the phenomenon of “socialization” (e.g. McFarland and Thomas 2006, Hyman 1959, 
Merelman 1969).  Educational programs are often primary mechanisms of socialization. Public 
school systems assimilated immigrants, socializing them into a common American culture 
(Graham 2005).  Youth culture socializes schoolchildren into appropriate class-based 
dispositions (Willis 1981). Even programs aimed to counteract these socializing mechanisms 
through “empowerment” projects face a dilemma because there is a contradiction embedded in 
youth empowerment projects: teaching young people to navigate and command the society 
around them necessarily involves socialization into the terms of that society.   
 Civil society organizations are frequently engaged in socializing projects. When business 
gains access to the operations of civil society through sponsorship, it acquires the ability to put 
civil power to work for economic ends within the field of power.  Socialization projects then 
instantiate the episteme of business; they become the means to governmentality, disciplining the 
populace into the perpetuation of particular power relationships. Civil power is diverted from 
civil projects and used to strengthen the position of economic elites in the field of power as a 
whole. 
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 In the next section, I will give a lengthy description of one of the educational programs 
sponsored by En+ in cooperation with a local environmental organization, and then I will discuss 
its role as an agent of socialization into the values of business at the expense of a more robust 
environmentalist agenda. 
 
The School for Environmental Entrepreneurship 
The School for Environmental Entrepreneurship, or SHEPR, as it is called according to 
its Russian acronym, is a recent initiative launched as a partnership between En+ and a local 
nonprofit organization called Reviving Siberian Land.
56
  SHEPR is an entrepreneurial boot-camp 
for budding entrepreneurs.  Admission is via application, and, while the majority of participants 
are in high school or university, there were also some working adults in the program, mostly in 
their 20s or 30s.   Over the course of five days, participants are involved in nearly non-stop 
activity, all geared toward developing and refining the business plan for an environmental 
enterprise.  The school takes its participants and their business proposals through a series of 
intensive learning and evaluating mechanisms, culminating in the presentation of a final business 
plan before a jury of potential investors.  What begins as a very loose, undeveloped idea grows 
into a defensible, implementable, entrepreneurial venture. 
The school also functions as a competition.  Each team seeks to garner the most points by 
means of participating in and successfully fulfilling a variety of events and benchmarks.  At the 
end of the school, points are tallied and a grand winner is announced.  Winning the competition 
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 The actual organization name in Russian is Vozrozhdenie Zemli Sibirskoi, which literally translates as the 
Renaissance of the Siberian Land.  I thought this translation cumbersome, and that Reviving Siberian Land was 
more apt for their intentions, catchier as an organization name, and easier on the tongue for English speakers – just 
as the name Vozrozhdenie Zemli Sibirskoi is for Russian speakers. Still, I have seen the organization’s name written 
in English elsewhere according to the more literal translation. In case one is looking for the organization in other 
sources or venues, I wanted to be clear that Reviving Siberian Land and the Renaissance of the Siberian Land are, in 
fact, the same organization. 
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also has very real, as well as symbolic, rewards; the winning team leader is awarded 4,000 rubles 
with the hopes that the funding will be used to further the project and move it toward 
implementation.  
The inaugural session of SHEPR was held in August 2012. I attended the second session 
in February 2013 as a participant observer.  I will recount below several occurrences from my 
experience there to illustrate how the values of business repeatedly trumped environmental 
stewardship, despite the intention of environmentalists involved in the project.  
 
Day 0 
Despite its name, SHEPR largely presumed knowledge of environmental issues and green 
business.  No aspect of the program actually taught environmental practices or mindsets.  The 
only such instruction occurred the night before the School actually began.  Not all students were 
yet present, and no points were offered for attending the presentation.  It also took place at the 
end of a busy day, filled with travel and orientation. But, despite these drawbacks, the activity 
clearly had an impact on those who attended and participated.  The presentation involved a 
lecture and educational game by Zinaida, a volunteer from the environmental advocacy 
nonprofit, Baikal Environmental Wave.  Zinaida, a professor of pedagogy in her 60s, had 
designed and developed the game, which she called: “Eco-Footprint of Commodities” [Eko-sled 
Tovary
57
].   
Zinaida began by laying a hand-drawn map of the world on the floor.  “There are about 7 
billion people in the world” she told us. “So let’s have seven volunteers get up and stand on this 
map. You can each represent a billion people.” Several students obliged. “But of course you 
can’t stand everywhere on the map. You don’t have a billion people in the ocean.”  The students 
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 Literally, “Eco-Footprint of a Commodity,” but I changed it to the plural form for the sake of stylistics. 
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bunched up on the land masses.  “So everything that comes from the earth, all the land, the trees, 
the farms, the forests – this is all we have for all these seven billion people.  There is nowhere 
else they can go.  Nowhere else we can get resources from.  How do you feel?” She asked. 
“Pretty crowded,” someone replied, and there was mild laughter. 
“Look at your feet on the map.  Think of this as your environmental footprint. You are 
taking up a certain amount of the Earth’s resources.  So this is how it would be if we all shared 
the Earth’s resources evenly amongst the seven billion people.  But that isn’t the case, is it?  
Some of us take up more than others. Some of us have bigger footprints.”  Here she retrieved a 
pair of giant “shoes” made out of cardboard that were covered with magazine clippings of 
advertisements and products.  She handed them to one of the students.  
“Here put these on,” she instructed, and the young man did so.  “Now what happens?” 
The young man with the shoes took up most of Eurasia and Oceania, and some of the others 
started to tip over and fall off the map. 
 “We have less,” said one of the girls astride North America.  
 “There are fewer resources for everyone else,” Zinaida confirmed.  “But what if it were 
equal? What if all of you had shoes like that?”   
“It would be impossible,” several people said. 
This led to a lecture and slide show about resource use and waste that was pointedly 
critical of consumption.  It was after 9 p.m., and it was clear that not all students were equally 
present and alert, but a cluster of them were engaged, and occasionally, I heard a comment or a 
reply to a question that showed that critical connections were being made. 
Zinaida then held aloft a Kinder Egg.  This is a common children’s treat in Russia: a 
hollow chocolate egg, wrapped in foil, with a plastic toy inside.  The chocolate is enriched with 
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extra milk and vitamins, so it is considered healthier than other candies, but to kids it is still 
chocolate.   
“You all know what this is,” Zinaida began. “It is likely a part of everyone’s childhood. 
Maybe you once collected the prizes inside.  Now we will take this one product and look at its 
environmental footprint.  What are the resources that it takes to make this one little egg?” 
Here she pulled out a box and set it on the table. The box was filled with cards showing 
pictures of either raw materials, such as water, wood, sun, animals, or processing centers such as 
mines and factories.  Some cards had forms of transportation, like trucks, trains, planes, boats. 
Students clustered around the table. They were instructed to take every component of the egg – 
the chocolate, the foil wrapping, the plastic toy, and the paper instructions – and create four 
threads that traced the piece from raw materials to finished product.  They needed to think of 
where the rubber came from, how it got to Russia, what went into chocolate, how many stages to 
make the foil, how many times products had to travel, how much electricity was needed at each 
stage.  At the end, students could see the long chains they have created, and how much is 
necessary for that piece of candy, sitting as an impulse buy beside the cash register of most 
grocery stores.  There was only one table and one set of cards, so only about eight of the 40 
people in the room were actively interacting in building the eco-footprint.  The attention of those 
in the back waned early.  But the exercise seemed to impact a few of the more participatory 
students who looked at their work and said, “Wow!” or “I had no idea!” 
After the game wrapped up, we returned to our seats and Sasha, SHEPR’s second-in-
command, stood up to tell us what to expect tomorrow.  But before discussing logistics, Sasha 
encouraged students to think about the “amazing egg.”   
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“Isn’t it incredible how many things go in to making this one tiny egg?  Businesses all 
over the world contribute to it.  Lots of enterprises play a role. There are famers, truckers, factory 
workers, and your business can be just one part of that whole.”  What had been a lesson in 
unsustainable consumption was shifted into praise of supply chain economics. Zinaida, who had 
spent the last hour conducting students through the game, stood nearby, tight-lipped.   
 
Day 1 
Elena Alexandrovna Tvorogova, the director of Reviving Siberian Lands, gave the 
opening remarks to a seated crowd of students before her. 
“Welcome to the winter session of the School for Environmental Entrepreneurship!” she 
cried, and we all applauded.  She went on to describe the school and what we could expect to 
gain form it. 
“Only those projects that receive a certain number of points and can attract enough 
people to the team will get to move forward in the competition.  If your idea turns out not to be 
successful, that isn’t failure – that is experience.  Your job, then, is to think up an even better 
idea based upon what you’ve learned.  This is what you have to do in the real world as an 
entrepreneur.  So your business idea doesn’t work? Think of another idea.” 
 Elena Alexandrovna continually emphasized that the school would mimic the “real 
world” as much as possible, particularly in the final activity.  “At the end of the school,” she 
said, “you will stand and present your idea before a panel of investors. These are real investors 
from Sberbank and the Small Business Administration.  They are not used to gushy, emotional 
language. They think: quick, precise, and serious.  This is not a game.  This is a real conversation 
with serious people.  They will determine who wins the competition.” 
214 
 
 There were several talks scheduled before we could begin working on our own business 
proposals.  One of these was given by a representative from En+ named Ksenia.  Her fair skin 
was adorned in pastel cosmetics.  Ksyusha began her talk with a smile. 
“What is sustainable development?” she asked us, pushing her long blonde hair behind 
her shoulder. “What do you think when I say ‘sustainable development?’” 
Students began to call out possible definitions: “When you don’t lose any money,” one 
said. “Working within the law,” answered another.  “Monopoly,” another added. “It’s about 
stability,” guessed another. “The quality of your products, and your workforce,” was the last 
guess. 
Maria smiled again. “I am going to tell you now about what En+ is doing for sustainable 
development and hopefully when I am done explaining, you can have a better answer for the 
question: what is sustainable development? 
 “Whether small or large, a business’s image is what guarantees its success long-term,” 
she told us.  “One’s image or reputation is extremely important. You can spend years building it 
up, and in a single moment it can be destroyed.  When we talk about image we are talking about 
it with a wide lens. We are talking, not just about your product, but how you show yourself in the 
territory where you work, whether that is in a small village or worldwide. 
 “Many companies, especially new ones, think only about profits.  But 30-40 percent of 
the success of a business is due to its reputation,” she continued. “Twenty to 25 percent of the 
stock market price of a company is due to its reputation.  Sometimes that number can even be as 
high as 80 percent. Think of reputation as the price of the materials that go into a product relative 
to the price of the brand.  For Coca-Cola, the ratio is 4:96 – four percent materials, and 96 
percent brand.   
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 “So let us apply this to the sphere of social responsibility. Your business is spending 
money when it works on social responsibility, but you should spend money on it.  This is an 
investment in your image.” Ksenia then went into detail about the various programs and projects 
that En+ supports in Siberia, including SHEPR.  “Anyone can earn a profit,” she concluded, “but 
you have to work hard to have a positive image and a good reputation.”  
  
 After this talk, we moved on to the main event of the day: the project fair.  Students spent 
the two hours before lunch preparing posters about their projects that they would display at the 
fair.  Students and staff were given stickers to affix to posters of projects they liked. Stickers 
represented “points” and only those projects garnering a certain number of points could advance 
into the competition.  Any team with fewer than five members also would not make it to the next 
round, and soon my roommate Veronika and her brother Pyotr recruited me to their team and I 
agreed.  We were then joined by two more individuals who did not have projects.  So now we 
were a team of five, and had collected sufficient stickers. Eco-Field passed into the competition. 
“Clarify for me what this project is all about,” I asked Veronika and Pyotr, as we sat 
down at the table that we claimed as our work-space.   
 “So the idea is that we would employ about 150 people to go into an area of the taiga to 
live in tents and gather raw materials,” Pyotr explained.  “There is an herb that people use to 
make tea that grows wild in the taiga. People would live in the woods for four months, cutting 
and drying this herb. Right now each person can gather up to 5 kilograms for personal use, but 
we could get a lease or agreement to take more.  And then we would sell these herbs to a 
wholesaler in Angarsk.  Right now there is a deficit of raw materials in forest products and the 
price is really high. These are natural forest products, and brands, like Taiga Products, Evalar 
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and Shalfei, sell natural teas and pine nuts.  So there is a market for it.  In the summer, we gather 
this herb, and in the winter we can gather pine nuts and sera [a sap that can make natural 
chewing gum]. Maybe we can also gather mushrooms and berries – all kinds of forest products.  
My dad runs a business like this near Olkhon.  So I’ve done this before. My plan is to start my 
own operation near Baikalsk, only bigger.  I already have the contacts at the wholesaler in 
Angarsk. I know the raw materials that they want and how much they pay per kilogram.”  
 We were soon joined at our workspace by Marina Petrovna Rikhvanova from Baikal 
Environmental Wave.  She instructed us on the next activity, which was called: “Dreamer, Critic, 
Realist.” 
 “So, when it comes to your business plan, what are your dreams?” Marina Rikhvanova 
asked. 
 “To be a famous Russian brand,” Veronika said with confidence. “So that when people 
think of getting a Russian souvenir, they want to buy our product.” 
 “Now for the Critic,” Marina asked. “What are the critiques?” 
 There was silence. Veronika shrugged lightly and said, “I don’t have any,” then flashed a 
proud smile. 
 “I do,” I said, and the group’s attention turned toward me. “So you go into the taiga and 
collect your herbs. And you sell them and your brand becomes famous.” Veronika smiled at this 
acknowledgement of her dream. “Now more people want your products, so you collect more of 
this stuff. And people love it, they go wild, they want more, so what do you do?” 
 “So we get more, and then more!” Pyotr said, egging me on this line of thought. 
 “Yes! That is what we want!” said Veronika excitedly. 
 “This isn’t a critique, this is a dream,” Pyotr said, smiling.  
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 “What I want to know is whether you have a mechanism to make sure you don’t take too 
much.” 
 A confused silence met my query. 
 “When you gather everything from one area, you go somewhere else,” Pyotr answered. 
 “But when do you stop? How can you guarantee you won’t harm the environment?” I 
asked. 
 “Because you don’t kill the bush,” Pyotr said. “This herb grows really fast.  If you cut it 
all the way to the base, in four years it will be big and bushy again like before. So you clear 
everything in an area, but if you come back four years later, you can’t even tell that you cut 
anything!” 
 “Okay,” I said. “That’s great that it grows back, but how can you guarantee you aren’t 
harming nature? How do you know you aren’t taking too much?” 
 “You can never take too much,” Pyotr replied. “Siberia is endless! You can’t even 
imagine it, it’s so big.” 
 This word must have gotten Marina Petrovna’s attention.  She entered the debate, saying, 
“Nothing is endless. People always think that natural resources are endless, but everything has an 
end.” 
 “And even if you aren’t using up all the tea in all of Siberia,” I went on, “you might 
decimate it in a particular region.” 
 “But we don’t kill the bush,” Veronika explained to me with a patient smile. 
 “Okay, the bush will come back, but what if there were an insect that lives on that 
particular bush and now it has nowhere to live in that whole region?  What if there is a type of 
bird that lives off that insect that is no longer there, and the bird can’t eat?  I’m not saying that 
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this will happen, I’m just asking how you are going to make sure that it doesn’t.” Veronika’s 
smile faded. 
 “Good brands for environmental products usually have some way of showing that they do 
not negatively impact the Earth,” Marina Petrovna said, cleverly steering the conversation back 
to branding and their concern to have a “good” business plan. 
 Veronika looked at me with awe. “I never thought about it like that.  I never would have 
thought about birds.”  She looked as though a little LED light bulb were flickering over her head.  
Its illumination never reached her brother, however. Over the course of the school, Pyotr 
continued to insist to me that it was impossible to deplete the taiga. 
  
Day 3 
The chief event of the third day was the “expert conveyor.”  Each team had to go before a series 
of experts and defend its project according to a particular measure.  The expert would then award 
the team up to three points for that measure.  There were 12 expert stations with the following 
themes: 1) Attracting new people to your team; 2) Media-kits; 3) Website design; 4) Attracting 
resources to your project; 5) The case; 6) The break-even point; 7) Competence profile and plan 
of development; 8) Risks and their minimization; 9) Marketing; 10) Location; 11) Eco-
certification; and 12) Preparing your presentation. Teams were required to defend their project 
before at least 6 of the 12 stations to successfully complete the conveyor, although the more 
stations completed, the more points the team receives; consequently, most teams strove to 
complete the entire conveyor. 
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I was invited to observe our team’s Eco-certification, although I was not defending it 
myself.  Pyotr sat across from Marina Rikhvanova and explained that the resources they gather 
replenish themselves in four years.   
 “What will you do to ensure that this project won’t damage the ecosystem?” 
 “We will get an ecologist to certify our project,” he told her. “We will pay an expert to 
assess the territory, tell us how much we can collect, and give us their certification.” 
 “What does that mean, a certification?” Marina asked, smiling. “How will that protect the 
ecosystem?” 
Pyotr looked confused. “The specialist will know that the ecosystem is being protected. 
We will consult with experts who know and can provide certification.” 
 “Certifications can be bought.  You can pay someone; get a stamp on a piece of paper.  
But I want to know how you will ensure that this project won’t damage the ecosystem.”  Pyotr 
looked helpless. 
 “Here is what I will do,” Marina said at last. “I am going to give you one point.” She 
marked a “1” on the score sheet and Pyotr’s face fell and darkened.  “I can’t give you any more 
than that.  I am worried that you go to the taiga and all you see is your raw materials.  You don’t 
see the system and how it all fits together.  You need to be the expert.  You are the one 
responsible, so you have to know more than the experts.” 
 At the end of the day, all the projects were listed with the points they received at each 
station.  Of all projects, Eco-field had the second lowest score for eco-certification. 
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Day 4 
 Today was the culmination of all our hard work – the Big Day – presentations before the 
final jury.  In the morning, the restaurant was still in disorder.  People with disheveled hair and 
dark circles under their eyes were frantically finalizing their slides or practicing their 
presentations before their fellow group members.   
At noon, the final jury was brought in and introduced.  These were five new faces, 
individuals who were unfamiliar with our projects and how they had developed over the course 
of the school.  For that reason, it was said, they could be expected to provide an unbiased 
assessment of our business proposals.  The jury included local investment bankers, a member of 
the Small Business Administration, and the director of public relations from En+.   
 Each team took turns making a presentation before the jury.  Our team presented last.  
Generally, our performance proceeded as the others had, but one moment stood out.   The eighth 
slide showed the project’s budget.  All the other projects had anticipated annual net profits that 
ranged from 500,000 to 1.5 million rubles, but Eco-Field’s estimated net profit read 5 million 
rubles annually.  When this slide appeared on the screen, all five judges leaned forward intently, 
almost in unison, physically reacting to a profit margin that was five times that of the other 
contestants. 
We took a recess while votes were tallied. Marina Petrovna and I found each other, and 
she asked how I had enjoyed the school.   
“It was very interesting,” I said.  “But I am curious why there are no environmentalists on 
the jury.”  She looked surprised, as though this had not occurred to her. 
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 “I wonder why?” she asked aloud, and peered over at the jury for a moment. There was a 
pause, and then she answered herself.  “We ask uncomfortable questions.” She gave me a tight-
lipped smile. 
We all gathered back in the restaurant to learn the final results. Elena Alexandrovna gave 
a small, congratulatory speech.  
“The future of the planet depends upon you,” she reminded us.  “No investor can tell you 
what you can do.  Whatever you decide to do with your project after the school, keep believing 
in it.  Put your heart, your soul, and your time into it.” 
And then the results were announced.  First, they displayed the results from the previous 
night. A bike trail project was in the lead, followed by a souvenir shop, and then Eco-Field.  
Once the jury points were added, though, Eco-Field handily won first prize.  
 
Analysis of SHEPR 
SHEPR is built upon the “fourth wave” of environmental activism that emphasizes the 
creation of a “green economy.” Although operating in the same vein as this international shift 
toward “green capitalism,” the School for Environmental Entrepreneurship offers much more 
“entrepreneurship” than it does “environmentalism.”  Despite its name, and despite the 
involvement of committed and knowledgeable environmental activists, SHEPR offers only the 
most rudimentary acknowledgement of environmental concerns.  Those entering the school 
without an environmental consciousness can “graduate” with their ignorance fully intact.   
What is at stake in in the School for Environmental Entrepreneurship is a stratification of 
values.  Environmentalists and corporate interests come together to enact a project such as 
SHEPR.  When working together by mutual consent, environmentalists’ and corporations’ value-
222 
 
systems are not considered to be in conflict.  But as the description above makes clear, these 
values are not shared evenly in the socialization project of environmental entrepreneurship. 
Examples of the weighting of business concerns over environmental ones are numerous. 
Business experts who taught business Master Classes generally did not integrate environmental 
concerns into the subjects they were invited to address.  Division of the two topics was the norm 
rather than the exception.  There were only three events that took place over the course of the 
five-day school that were explicitly environmental. Importantly, none of these activities awarded 
any points, which further underscores their lesser value.  Student projects were rated according to 
a pre-determined list of measures.  At every reckoning, the environmental impact of a project 
comprised only one measure, while the entrepreneurial topics ranged from 6 to 11 different 
measures, each of which awarded points.  A project that received no points for environmental 
stewardship could still outperform a project that received the highest markings for protecting the 
environment. 
To understand the level of entrepreneurship’s dominance over the environmental in 
SHEPR’s design, it is helpful to imagine what the school might look like if the tables were 
turned.  It is possible to conceive of a program that would take a potential business plan through 
an intensive incubator to strengthen its environmental record while giving a tip of the hat to its 
profit-generating potential.  Rather than looking at the plan’s budget, marketing, personnel and 
logistics, the school could study its effect on water, air, carbon, toxics, and habitat destruction.  
Points awarded to a successful environmental business could be based upon metrics such as 
those in the hypothetical column of Table 1.  
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Table 1: Actual and Hypothetical Balance between Environmental and Business Metrics  
Actual Expert-Conveyor Metric Hypothetical Expert-Conveyor Metric 
Human Resources Material Usage & Reduction 
Media Kit Energy Usage & Reduction 
Website Water Usage & Reduction 
Attracting Resources Minimizing Transportation 
Risks and Risk Minimization Carbon Neutrality 
Marketing Greening Office Space 
Case Pollutants 
Location Toxics 
The Break-Even Point Other Waste 
Competences and Plan of Development Environmental Justice Considerations 
Environmental Impact Overall Business Plan 
 
Perhaps the most important factor driving home the stratification of value between the 
environmental and entrepreneurial was the composition of the final jury.  There was not a single 
environmentalist or environmentally-knowledgeable individual on the final jury.  As the program 
designers explicitly stated on the evening of the penultimate day, the final jury determines the 
outcome of the competition.   The final jury collectively awards hundreds of points, more than 
enough to counteract the points earned during the school itself.  The jury’s composition, crafted 
solely of bankers and marketing executives, silently signaled to everyone present what is most 
important.   
The result of this design structure dictated the outcome of the school, as well as the 
lessons students likely learned.  Eco-Field was a raw materials extractive enterprise that received 
among the lowest marks for environmental sustainability and whose co-leader continued to insist 
through the end of the program that Siberia’s taiga was an inexhaustible resource.  The project’s 
projected profits alone (exemplified by the jury’s physical reaction to them) solidified its status 
as the best business proposal in the school.  Its poor environmental credentials paled in 
comparison to the projected 5 million rubles it would garner in its first year.   
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When I asked Tvorogova about the jury composition, she replied that she wanted students 
to know what they would be facing when they actually look for investors. “If they want to start 
their own business, they have to make their case before investors and before banks,” she told me.  
This same pragmatism percolates up in her talks during SHEPR.  As can be seen in her remarks 
on opening day, Tvorogova is always referencing the “real world” and what “real” entrepreneurs 
and investors are doing.  Since environmentalists hold no sway in determining which businesses 
are funded in the “real world,” neither would SHEPR grant them that privilege in their final jury.  
The unintentional effect of training individuals to navigate the “real world,” however, is 
socialization into and perpetuation of extant social structures that may be less than beneficial 
even to environmentalists’ own goals.   
 
Variable Socialization: Ideological Degrees of Freedom 
 Programs of socialization, education, and empowerment differ from one another in the 
basic assumptions under which they operate.  Socialization projects are always ideological; but 
they have greater or lesser degrees of freedom.  To better articulate this difference, let us 
consider two other environmental socialization projects being conducted in the Irkutsk region: an 
environmental summer camp designed and executed by En+ and “Eco-Schools,” which is part of 
an international environmental education program hosted at Baikal Environmental Wave. 
 
En+ Environmental Summer Camps 
 The En+ Department of Sustainable Development designed a summer camp for children 
from its “mono-cities” [monogoroda], which are, essentially, “company towns” such as existed 
in the United States in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries.  In acquiring old Soviet industries, 
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En+ also became the chief employer in several Soviet-era mono-cities, and the company has 
created an environmental summer camp for these youths.  The Director of Sustainable 
Development at En+ described it for me thus: 
“This is not your usual kids’ summer camp,” she said.  “It’s a social game. 
They create an environmental city.…We hold elections, for mayor, or president, 
ministers, legislators: that is, all government, business, courts, society and so 
forth. So the goal is to form a proper model of a city where each person plays a 
particular role [gde kazhdii zanimaetsya svoim delom].  
“Last year, our camp had an environmental theme. That is, businesses had 
to do an environmental project, like a waste treatment plant.  First the kids come 
up with the idea, then they have to draw up the design of the plant.  Next, they go 
before the legislature or the mayor and present it to these administrators [who 
have to approve the project]…The administrators should earn money from it – 
they receive taxes from each project.  If they approve the project, the kids have to 
make a real construction of it.  The constructs are made of large wooden sticks.  
For this, they are trained in tying knots and in how to build a model…So we get a 
big exposition of these real constructions.   Of course they are schematic models, 
but the kids explain what it is.  They learn skills such as making a presentation.   
“All these projects have some skill involved that they will learn.  For 
example, when it begins, the camp doesn’t have anything.  No discothèque or 
entertainment.  Someone will become the PR director of the camp, and he will put 
on the discothèque.  To do this, he needs to create a project – a business project – 
that includes the list of participants and explains their roles, bring it to the 
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government for approval, and then they can begin to earn money.  Because you 
get paid to conduct an activity and coordinate it. [He gets paid] with virtual 
money, not real money.   It goes in his account.  And each project, like if they 
want to go on an excursion to the shore of Baikal, they can’t just go, someone has 
to be the initiator.  He has to make a project on how to take the trip, where to go, 
how many people, for how long.  All this is to describe it and defend it before the 
government officials who have to approve the project.  Next he assembles a team. 
And then, when the project is completed, he receives a salary which he distributes 
to his employees, and so everyone accumulates points.  There is a Minister of 
Sport who conducts exercises every day.  There is a guard – police – who 
monitors safety in the camp and prevents fighting.  In the event that there is 
suddenly some conflict between students, they go to court…So it’s a direct model 
of contemporary society.” 
The Director of Sustainability explained the camp to me by saying that, when students 
arrive, the camp has nothing. The students themselves must create the “environmental city” in 
which they will live.  And yet, the terms of that city are already laid out for them by the camp 
organizers.  They are told they must elect an executive, legislators, judges and bureaucrats.  
There is no opportunity to re-imagine government, to experiment with different forms of rule, or 
even to divide the camp into different groups that select different governing structures for each 
group.   
Similarly, they are told that whatever they wish to do – be it a discothèque or a vacation 
to Baikal, it must be a profitable business that provides the service.  Notably absent from En+’s 
“environmental city” are nonprofit organizations or public goods and services.  Neither are 
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students free to re-imagine economic structures, to brainstorm how goods and services might be 
supplied to their “environmental city” other than through the capitalist marketplace. 
Economic inequality is written into the camp’s very structure through the virtual money 
students receive for their initiatives, given first to the “businessman,” who then disperses the 
earnings to his “helpers” and to the administration.  Curiously, “taxes” from these businesses go 
into the administrators’ accounts.  Although some sardonic observers may agree that this is, in 
fact, a direct model of the Russian state, it does not show its young participants the redistributive 
role of taxes in the economy.  Finally, the system of “virtual money” that is allegedly merit-
based has very real rewards.  As the En+ Representative explained to me: 
“At the end of the camp, we want to give gifts to the children, but so as not to just 
give them stuff, we hold an auction. We teach them the skills of an auction: what 
it is and how it is properly done.  So at the auction, those kids who earned some 
money – virtual, not real money – have the opportunity to win something.  
Someone will get a notebook computer, someone will get a pen.” 
 
The camp re-affirms and rewards the virtue of capital accumulation and, in so doing, reinforces a 
meritocratic outlook on economic inequality. Meanwhile, the most tenuous component of the 
“environmental city” summer camp that En+ created is its environmentalism.   
 
Eco-Schools 
Eco-Schools is an international program that grew out of the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.  Overseen by the Foundation 
for Environmental Education, the program operates through nonprofit organizations in 33 
countries, including Russia.  Baikal Environmental Wave is a host-site for the Eco-Schools 
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project, and Zinaida serves as the liaison and certifier for projects in the Irkutsk oblast [region].  
There are 70 Eco-Schools in her jurisdiction, approximately half of the total number for Russia 
as a whole.  She described the program for me as follows: 
 
“[Once the school signs up for the program], they choose a topic. There are four 
topics: Water, Energy, Climate Change and Waste; but if the school wants to 
choose some other topic, they can. Many choose "Healthy lifestyles," some 
choose "Biodiversity." …. So, essentially, there are seven steps in this program. 
There is nothing specific spelled out, the program just stipulates that you need the 
first step to be the creation of an Environmental Council. That is, the whole 
school should be involved, but you need an Environmental Council with 
representatives from students, teachers, parents, sponsors; basically, there just 
need to be some kind of council. The Council selects the topic on which the 
school will work: for example, Water. Then, they study the situation: what 
happens to water in the institution, how does the school use water? So, kids learn 
where water is leaking, where it drips, where they use too much, these kinds of 
studies. Next, they draw up an action plan - what they can do to reduce excess 
water loss, that is, to reduce water use. Drawing up an action plan is not only 
necessary to know what has to be done to reduce water usage, but it is also the 
educational part. So the third and fourth steps, once the plan is already underway, 
is monitoring and evaluating the plan, that is, they constantly keep track of how it 
is working, evaluating where it is  successful or unsuccessful, whether there is 
some component that should be added or taken out. Obviously, there should be 
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some outcomes. Then, there is the integration of the selected topic in all 
educational courses. For example, you have to look at water in mathematics and 
physics and chemistry - what is it, and in biology and physical education and in 
some extracurricular activities. Water, water, water. That is, they, they need to 
study it a little bit. And then they need to share it with others, that the school is 
dealing with this topic, what they learned, and with whom they cooperated. That 
is, they have to share with others about what they are doing.  Maybe someone will 
be interested and something else will come out of it. And the last, seventh step is 
to prepare an environmental code for this topic. So they draw it, how to save 
water, or write about it, some have written poetry, some list concrete steps of the 
different ways [to save water]. They can do it however they like. And that's it!” 
 
Participating schools are instructed to create an Environmental Council, but how it is structured, 
its means of decision-making, and its role in the school-wide project is left to the schools 
themselves.  There is even flexibility on the choice of topic under the large umbrella of 
environmental concerns.  The project attempts to empower youth by showing them their ability 
to tackle concrete problems and to enact measurable change – but how they choose to do so is 
self-directed.  The terms of nature protection, or even for collective self-management, are not 
laid out a priori, but are in service of the overarching goal, for instance water-use reduction.   
*** 
 Both the summer camps and the Eco-Schools project are geared toward youth 
socialization and empowerment.  Both claim to be teaching young people important life skills, 
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and both profess an environmental focus.
58
  Each may be considered an ideological project; but 
they differ dramatically in the ideological degrees of freedom they offer their young charges in 
crafting their respective projects.   
Eco-Schools allowed variance in the means to further the environmental end.  This 
contrasts with the En+ summer camp, which offered little coherence on the end of their 
environmental city, but regimented the means – stratified class economies, capitalist business 
enterprises and bureaucratic government.  Environmentalism at the En+ summer camp is 
something that exists within the confines of its pre-established set of social structures, which are 
presented to students as immutable. 
Eco-Schools has built into its design wide latitude in the choice of theme, the structure of 
oversight and stated ends.  The flexibility does not necessarily mean that the project will be 
better or that students will actually take on the opportunity provided to them to reimagine their 
structured environment. Teachers at various schools could dictate terms to the students, even if 
the program itself does not. But ideological flexibility is built into the program’s structure.   
 
Bringing Hegemony Back In 
Through its sponsorship, En+ gained access to the operations of environmental 
organizations, and this power play granted them influence to steer the direction of environmental 
activities.  Specifically, this hegemonic role for En+ in shaping the form of environmental 
activism can be seen in what they did not fund.  In an interview I conducted with the Tvorogova 
after the conclusion of SHEPR, we addressed the topic of “unfunded” projects. 
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 Although “motif” might be a better word for the En+ summer camp. 
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Kate: So you already had the idea [for SHEPR] before En+ [came], and you said, 
‘Here, I have an idea that I would like [to do].’ 
Tvorogova: Actually, we suggested to them a choice of several ideas.  They chose 
this one. 
Kate: That means that you had other projects that you wanted to do, but did not 
get the money for. 
Tvorogova: Yes. 
Kate: For example? Shall we dream? 
Tvorogova: Let’s dream.  There is a long-standing dream that is shared by 
everyone in the [organization]....[to create] a Center for Alternative Technology.  
That is when, on an actual plot of land, there stands an actual house, which uses 
functioning alternative technologies…So this center – on the one hand, it’s a 
testing ground, on the other hand it’s an educational center, where people can 
come and hear all about it, see it, hold it, touch it. This is a very important point. 
They can see the calculations: so if we cultivate the land in this way, then what 
we get here is such-and-such results. And it costs this much. Same with the 
building itself: [this is what happens] if we stand solar panels and use energy-
efficient materials there and such.  [In Russia] such experience is catastrophically 
lacking. That is, we already have a business structure on the market that could be 
promoting this economy. But we can’t just coerce businesses to do it, so it is 
necessary to create these Centers. Because to promote these technologies and 
these ideas to consumers – that is, to actual purchasers – people need to see for 
themselves with their own eyes that it works, and that it is sufficiently effective. 
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[The Center is necessary] so people can come once, have a look, leave, think 
about it more, then come back again. Do you understand? It's a complex process 
to change consciousness, to change priorities, etc. So my idea was precisely such 
a creation – one of the projects that I proposed – was the creation of a Centre for 
Alternative Technology somewhere in the southern Baikal area.  
 
Like her “fourth wave” counterparts in the West, Tvorogova’s environmentalism seeks to 
harness the power of the market to shift practices of production and consumption into something 
sustainable.  Her greatest dream is a socialization project that would allow consumers to gain 
hands-on experience with alternative energy and energy efficiency.  With a wide array of 
products and real-time comparisons in outcomes, her vision would have ideological degrees of 
freedom while drawing attention to environmental protection. 
 En+, on the other hand, was not ready to support this type of socialization.  The company 
is glad to make minor accommodations for environmentalism, but to re-imagine power sources 
or to limit the use of natural resources is not a positive goal for them, a fact that was made clear 
to me in my interview with the Director of Sustainable Development at En+ in Moscow.  
Throughout our conversation, the Director was bright, pleasant, and enthusiastic as she described 
the multitude of programs sponsored by En+, both in Irkutsk and elsewhere.  There was only one 
moment when this sunny façade was broken. 
Kate: Of course, there is a huge international conversation about global warming. 
I’m curious how you would answer environmentalists who said that your 
company was selling coal to China and… 
At this question she visibly bristled and shot back:  
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En+ Representative: Where do you live? In a building? Do you use light?  Do 
you use dishes? Cups? Spoons? Do you want to live in a tent? We produce light. 
We make, what? Coat-hangers! Everything that is metal.  It seems to me that the 
real question is that large industrial enterprises are the main source of 
environmental harm; that's alright, that's understandable. In order to do this 
business correctly, we're going to engage environmentalists from the point of 
view of industry. How can we properly industrialize, so that plants can work 
better?  And we are trying to build these processes at our factories from a more 
correct environmental point of view. For that reason, we call in 
[environmentalists]… To an environmentalist who says – “Close the plant!” I say, 
“Fine, go live in a tent. Eat with your hands. You’re not doing that.”…. So, I 
believe that you must be reasonable.  
 
The En+ Representative essentially breaks down environmentalism into two camps: the 
reasonable and the unreasonable. In so doing, she defines the boundaries of legitimate 
environmentalism.  Environmentalism is good when it works to help En+ make its practices 
more efficient; but environmentalists are not to call into question what those practices should or 
could be.  They can “green” what is already being done, but they have no legitimate voice if they 
question whether contemporary practices should be done.  Promoting alternative pathways 
toward economic development is beyond their legitimate sphere of influence, according the 
representative from En+.  Environmentalists can assist, but cannot hinder, the course of action 
that En+ chooses on its own, for its own purposes. 
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 Yet, because En+ is footing the bill for environmentalist work, its definition of legitimate 
environmentalism becomes dominant.  In activism as elsewhere, the question is not simply 
whether resources matter in movement mobilization; less acknowledged but equally important is 
the question: whence those resources? The source of one’s money has an impact on the 
ideological content of one’s activities (see also, Berman 2014, Oreskes and Conway 2011). In 
the classic model of Gramscian hegemony, civil society consents to this dominance because the 
partnership offers them empowerment and expanded capacity in their own field of action.  But 
the expansive empowerment that comes through this consensual contract is simultaneously 
constrained in scope. 
 
Conclusion 
 Civil society has the power to mobilize bodies and shape minds, and that ability can be 
threatening to other elites within the field of power. Alternately, civil power can be beneficial to 
these other power holders. In their interactions with civil society, therefore, they can work to 
encourage civil society to uphold rather than counter their own power sources.  In the case of the 
economic power elite, financial aid to civil society organizations operates to further their 
hegemony in the field of power as a whole.  Civil power is strengthened, but not deployed 
against its benefactors. Instead, economic elites are granted access to help guide the direction of 
civil power. 
 One of the more effective directions toward which economic elites may steer civil society 
is toward the enactment of “empowerment” programs that encourage young people to become 
leaders in society, while simultaneously socializing them into the values of that society. These 
socialization programs can vary in the amount of social imagination they allow their participants: 
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they have different ideological degrees of freedom.  Those programs put forward by En+ have 
minimal flexibility; they further a symbolic power system that reifies extant power relationships 
as normative. Corporate sponsorship produces hegemony within civil society, which leads to the 
promotion of certain types of socialization programs over others – namely, those less threatening 
to the hegemon. 
*** 
 Hegemony is a necessarily ambiguous form of power because it lacks the weight of law.  
Power in physical force, and power in legal determinism, is more visible and direct.  Bourdieu 
recognized that power may be executed in myriad ways – hence his claim that capital comes in 
many different “species.”  However, even he came to the conclusion that plays in the field of 
power were, fundamentally, struggles over the right to control the state.  He writes:  
“A good number of struggles within the field of power are of this type, notably 
those aimed at seizing power over the state, that is, over the economic and 
political resources that enable the state to wield a power over all games and over 
the rules that regulate them”(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 99-100). 
Just as bodies, minds, and money have currency in all social fields, the power to set the rules and 
to mete out rule enforcement offer the state a privileged position in the sphere of power. It is this 
power and the interaction between the state and civil society to which we shall turn our attention 
next. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
STATE SUPPRESSION OF BAIKAL ACTIVISM 
 
The state occupies a unique place in the social world.  It is the sole sovereign over a particular 
territory, and all actors within it are accountable to its dictates.  The state sets the rules that 
govern all social fields within its purview.  When considering the field of power, and the arsenals 
available to actors within the field of power, control over the apparatus of the state may be the 
ultimate trump.  Economic elites seek to use their power source – money – to alter the legal 
system by financing political campaigns or buying off corrupt state officials.  Actors in civil 
society likewise seek to control the legal apparatus, by using civil power to mobilize movements 
and encourage the public to withhold its consent.  But these tactics are, at best, a mere proxy to 
wielding power over the rule-making machine.   
 But state power is limited by geography.  While civic and economic power may be 
strengthened by globalization and its concomitant access to transnational networks of people and 
resources, the state has a more ambiguous relation to the global field of power.  External political 
players do seek to influence or pressure a state, either through treaties or incentives; but a state’s 
territorial sovereignty generally remains inviolate. With the rise of globalization, however, there 
is greater need to legitimate state authority in the global community, and citizens are more likely 
to judge their leaders based upon global benchmarks.  The resulting “isomorphism” in 
governance may be seen as a boon or a burden for domestic subjects, as these isomorphic laws 
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can be seen in such a wide array of areas as human rights laws (Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004) and 
austerity measures (Babb 2003).  
 In this chapter, we will examine a play in the field of power by the Russian state in 
response to the growing power of civil society.  As we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, access to 
transnational activism strengthens and enlivens local civil society.  Increased civil power 
becomes threatening to the state within the broader field of power.  In response, the Russian 
state, under President Vladimir Putin, used its legal authority to curtail access to these 
strengthening forces from abroad.  The “Foreign Agent” law rendered transnational ties a 
liability for local NGOs, and was used to specifically target those organizations most threatening 
to its regime.   
 
*** 
Every year, Irkutsk is host to the “People and Nature” film festival, an international 
festival that specializes in documentary and popular science films involving the natural world.  
At the close of one of the round-table sessions at the festival in 2012, one of the featured 
directors of a documentary on alternative energy – a man from Germany – asked to say a few 
words.  He addressed the audience in English, and Lusiya, a volunteer with the Great Baikal 
Trail, translated his comments into Russian.   
“If I may, from my experience, offer three pieces of advice,” he said.  “First, decrease 
demand for energy.  This is something we all can do, it is a way we can all participate, especially 
the poor. Decreasing demand also saves money on energy, and everyone can do it.  Second, 
focus on coal. This can be done where you have district heating, such as you have here…Finally, 
if you are going to go the political route, then you need to have a feed-in tariff law.  You must 
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elect representatives who support this law. Those countries where you see change,” he went on 
to say, “are those where the people voted for people who work for change and voted out those 
who did not!” 
His comment was met with chuckles, smirks and exchanged glances in the audience.  
Lusiya, while translating this well-intentioned advice into Russian, looked embarrassed. She 
added her own addendum to the translation: “I know that there are some people smiling out 
there, and we all know why.  But in Germany they have a very strong Green Party, and they were 
able to vote for them and create these laws.”  
The director then closed with an emphatic line: “If you believe in democracy, you have to 
do this.”  
With a pained expression, Lusiya translated his closing statement. People in the audience 
started to laugh.  One young man laughed ostentatiously, slapping his knee, and then got up and 
left the auditorium.  Lusiya turned to the director and said in English, “In case you are wondering 
what is going on here, you have to understand that democracy is a painful question in Russia.” 
 
Democracy in Russia 
 Democracy has never successfully taken root in Russian soil.  For some observers, this is 
due to an intrinsic aspect of Russian national culture that demands a “strong leader” rather than 
wide participation (Keenan 1986).  For others, authoritarianism is like a bad habit that Russian 
society keeps returning to for want of alternate experience (Figes 1996).  It is a well-trodden path 
to which it is easy to find one’s way (Paxson 2006). 
 Russia was the last autocracy in Europe.  Beginning with the Magna Carta in England in 
1215, European monarchs were slowly pulled, prodded and pushed into accepting some form of 
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formal citizen input into the government of the state.  Not so in Imperial Russia, which, aside 
from a few abortive reforms under Alexander II, held tight-fisted to its absolutism, even as the 
pillars of its power crumbled beneath it with the growing pressure of modern social forces (Figes 
1996). With no democratic structures in place, the Provisional Government was ill-prepared to 
wield authority, and unable to counter the Bolshevik coup.  Lenin saw democracy as an 
instrument of the bourgeoisie (Lenin 1917) and the new Soviet government would be run by 
Party faithful and under Party control. Thus did Russia fall again under an emperor, where it 
would remain for seventy more years. 
 While the Russian Federation that emerged from the ashes of the RSFSR was democratic 
in constitutional form, the state was mired in dysfunction.  State capacity in the newly 
transitioned country was insufficient to meet the multitude of problems brought about by 
privatization, hyperinflation, asset stripping, payment arrears, corruption, fraud, and a massive 
sovereign debt crisis (Hamm, King and Struckler 2012). A majority of Russians were optimistic 
about democracy in the last years of the Soviet Union, but it did not take very long for bitter 
experience to sully its reputation.  
 From Yelstin’s dissolution of parliament, to the re-written constitution, and loans-for-
shares campaign funding scandal, democracy stood on shaky foundations even before the rise of 
Vladimir Putin to the Presidency, unelected and seemingly out of nowhere on New Year’s Eve 
1999.  Once in power, Putin began the process of reconsolidating state power under the Kremlin.  
First came the creation of the United Russia party in 2001 through a merger of two large centrist 
parties to provide a majority party in parliament to support Putin’s agenda.  Next, Putin 
streamlined the bureaucratic structure of the government to eliminate waste, red tape and 
duplication of services – although, critics noted, some of the eliminated departments were among 
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the more independent voices, such as the State Committee on Environmental Protection (Henry 
and Douhovnikoff 2008).  Oligarchs were brought to compliance, both through an enforceable 
flat tax (Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, Peter 2009) and by a spate of criminal cases, which 
signaled to oligarchs the new limitations of their reach. Oil and gas were brought largely back 
under state control with the seizure of Yukos.  Putin eliminated elections for regional governors, 
creating a system of appointments, beholding to the Kremlin.  And, as years passed, international 
election monitors became more and more concerned with fraud and abuse (Mendelson 2008).  
Today, Russia is best described as a “managed democracy” (Colton and McFaul 2003), where 
elections are used to legitimate an essentially authoritarian regime. Regardless of whether 
Russians prefer democracy or a strong leader, only the latter is now an option for them. 
  
Threats from Below 
 On December 4, 2011, the Russian Federation held its quinquennial legislative election 
amidst simmering, albeit subterranean, political discontent.  Putin’s popularity was falling, 
although still well above the 50 percent mark.  Frustration with corruption and bureaucracy was 
percolating through a middle class now grown accustomed to Western business practices.  At the 
United Russia party convention, one-term president Dmitri Medvedev announced that he would 
not seek re-election so that Putin could take on the title for a third term. The back-door decision 
to have no primary election in the overwhelmingly dominant ruling party suggested that the 
presidential election was already over before the campaign, and Putin’s re-ascendancy was a fait 
accompli. Whatever their personal feelings about Putin, the move angered many Russians who 
felt they had been denied the right to select their own president.  These feelings of dissatisfaction 
and betrayal were brought to the ballot box in December 2011. 
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 In a fair contest, there is little doubt that United Russia would still have taken the 
majority of seats in the legislature.  Nonetheless, the election was highly suspect.  There was 
ample evidence of elections fraud and over a thousand official reports were filed citing voting 
irregularities (Schwirtz and Herszenhorn 2011). 
 Opposition groups began protesting on Election Day and continued throughout the week, 
culminating in a massive demonstration on December 10, 2011.  Tens of thousands poured onto 
the streets of Moscow for what was the largest protest since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
The demonstrators were a diverse group, coming from different age levels, social classes and 
political affiliations, but they were united in their call for fair and transparent democratic 
elections and the end of Putin’s long reign (Barry 2011). 
 Moscow’s reaction varied.  Elites in United Russia, including Putin and Medvedev, made 
crude and disparaging remarks about the protestors and their leadership in an attempt to ridicule 
them and undermine their legitimacy (Elder 2011).  But these comments only seemed to further 
enrage the movement.  United Russia began calling on its supporters to pose countermovement 
mobilizations (Schwirtz 2011).  Anti-Putin demonstrations continued through the winter, with 
protesters braving sub-zero temperatures to publicly display their discontent.  The state did make 
some (short-lived) concessions to the protesters, but demobilization in March 2013 was not the 
result of victory.  Putin handily won reelection for a third, six-year term, and demoralized 
protestors simply stopped showing up to scheduled rallies.  As opposition numbers diminished, 
the monthly demonstrations became increasingly marred by violent confrontations between 
protestors and police (Elder 2012). Leaders’ homes were raided (Lally 2012).  Mass arrests, 
including of opposition leaders, also worked against the continued mobilization.  New laws 
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curtailed the freedom of assembly (Bryanski 2012).  By mid-summer, the “Russian Spring” was 
over with little to show for its efforts. 
 
Threats from Abroad 
 For some, the winter protests in Russia were reminiscent of the “color revolutions” that 
swept through the former Soviet bloc in the early 2000s, a comparison particularly pointed when  
demonstrators adopted the color White as their unifying symbol.  In 2002, pro-democracy 
protestors overturned the established ruling regimes in the “Orange” (Ukraine), “Rose” 
(Georgia), and “Tulip” (Kyrgyzstan) Revolutions. Many remaining post-Soviet governments, 
including Vladimir Putin’s, were concerned that their regimes could meet a similar fate. 
 Importantly, ruling elites in the former Soviet Union did not think that the color 
revolutions were simply the expression of domestic discontent, but rather that their citizens were 
being manipulated and motivated to action by foreign elements.  Namely, they professed that 
Western governments were making use of NGOs to enact their values and preferences 
domestically (e.g. Traynor 2004).  Nonprofits became suspect in the minds of elites as 
geopolitical stool pigeons.  Among the main culprits called out were George Soros’ Open 
Society Institute and USAID, both well-known for funding pro-democracy and human rights 
organizations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
 Partly in response to the color revolutions, the Putin government passed a law in 2006 
that sought to restrict foreign influence on the NGO sector.  In its original form, the law would 
have created a separate status for registering and monitoring NGOs that received foreign funds, 
but in the face of domestic and international pressure, the law was softened.  Still, it imposed 
tough audits and reporting requirements on domestic civil society organizations and gave the 
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state the right to deny official registration to organizations whose mission appeared threatening 
or whose personnel were deemed problematic by the state.  It also allowed the federal 
government to tax grants from foreign entities at a rate of 26 percent, which severely limited the 
number of foundations willing to operate in Russia
59
 (Crotty, Hall and Ljubownikow 2014).  
Several of the more restrictive aspects of this law were repealed in 2009 under the Medvedev 
presidency, but registration and auditing have remained a complicated bureaucratic difficulty for 
many Russian NGOs in the early 21
st
 century. 
 
The 2012 Foreign Agent Law 
One of the more lasting effects of the pro-democracy/anti-Putin demonstrations that 
began in December 2011, and the embodiment of the Putin regime’s apparent fear of threats 
from abroad, was the so-called “Foreign Agent Law.”  The law was adopted by the Duma on 
July 13, 2012 and approved by the Federation Soviet on July 18, 2012.  President Putin signed it 
on July 20, 2012 and it went into effect 120 days later on November 17, 2012. 
 The text of the law requires non-profit organizations “receiving cash and other assets 
from foreign sources…and participating in political activities carried out in the territory of the 
Russian Federation” to register with the state as a “foreign agent.”60  Doing so gives the state far 
more reach and oversight into the operations of that organization.  Nonprofits in Russia already 
have strenuous reporting and auditing requirements, but “foreign agents” would be subject to 
additional scrutiny.  They must report to the state: “the amount of cash and other property 
                                                 
59
 There was a list of foreign foundations who were except from the tax, but the requirements to join this list were 
highly restrictive. Small sums could be re-named “charitable donations” rather than “grants,” and circumvent the 
tax, but these restrictions still limited the power, strength and growth of the nonprofit sector in Russia. 
60
 The text of the law can be found at: http://ntc.duma.gov.ru/duma_na/asozd/asozd_text.php?nm=121-
%D4%C7&dt=2012 (Accessed November 17, 2013).  The translations are the author’s. 
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received from foreign sources…, the purposes of expenditure of these [assets]…, and their actual 
spending and use…” 
 These reporting requirements not only give the state a great deal of insight into the 
operations of particular NGOs, they also add a significant burden in time and organizational 
resources.  As the law states:  
“Non-profit organizations that act as a foreign agent shall submit to the competent 
authority: documents containing a report on their activities and on the personnel 
composition of its governing body every six months; documents on the goals of 
expenditure for the use of cash and other assets, including those received from 
foreign sources – quarterly; and, finally an annual statutory audit.”   
These various reporting schemes – quarterly, semiannually, and annually – greatly exceed the 
already strenuous reporting requirements for regular NGOs, with money, time and resources 
diverted from projects toward the bureaucratic maintenance of the organization itself, which can 
itself dampen mobilization and protest (Piven and Cloward 1977).   
 More troublesome than the bureaucratic reporting of income and expenditure is the 
increased governmental oversight of organizational activities outlined in the new law.  The law 
states that, for registered foreign agents “to participate in political activities in the territory of the 
Russian Federation, [they] shall, prior to attending said political activities, apply to the 
[regulatory authority].”  In other words, the state has essential veto power over the activities and 
actions of NGOs, particularly those that may be deemed “political,” broadly defined.  The law 
gives the state an ability to suppress assembly and speech that is unprecedented since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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 In addition to these significant concerns, there is also an undercurrent to the law that 
seems deliberately designed to portray civil society as the Other: it portrays certain independent 
associations as “un-Russian.”  Not only are these domestic groups classified as “foreign agents,” 
but they are required by law to have the moniker attached to all their public materials.  As the 
law states:  
“Materials published by a non-profit organization acting as a foreign agent, and/or 
distributed by it, including through the media, and/or by use of the information 
and telecommunications network called ‘the Internet,’ must be accompanied by 
an indication of the fact that these materials are published and/or distributed by a 
non-profit organization that fulfills the functions of a foreign agent.”   
Organizational representatives of designated nonprofits cannot speak publicly without making it 
known that they are agent of a foreign interest.  In such a manner, Russian citizens’ groups can 
have their voice de-legitimated in the domestic public sphere. 
The law is also sufficiently punitive.  It establishes certain conditions that entitle the state 
to conduct unscheduled checks and audits of NGOs who are suspected of acting as foreign 
agents.  If a nonprofit is found to be in violation of the law it can have its operations suspended 
for up to six months.  Organizations and their leadership who do not comply with the law 
governing the registering and monitoring of “foreign agents” are subject to a fine of up to 
300,000 rubles, up to 400 hours of compulsory work, or imprisonment for up to 2 years. 
 
The Turn of the Screw 
 Despite this potentially worrisome and problematic new legal framework, the nonprofit 
organizations I studied in Irkutsk were surprisingly unconcerned with the new law when it went 
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into effect in the fall of 2012.  To the extent that they thought about it at all, it was scoffed at as a 
paranoid reaction to the anti-government protests six months prior.  It was generally assumed 
that the law had been created to target Golos, the election-monitoring organization whose work 
helped spark the December uprising with evidence of widespread election fraud.  Although I 
knew that both GBT and the Wave were recipients of foreign funding, neither considered the law 
to apply to them. 
 The reason was a paragraph in Article 2, Section 2 of the law that listed certain 
exemptions and exclusions.  Some organizations were simply not covered by the law, and these 
included: religious organizations, political parties, government-affiliated organizations (e.g. 
VOOP), corporate-affiliated organizations (e.g. Volnoe Delo, Defend Baikal Together), 
chambers of commerce, and international nonprofits that are registered abroad (e.g. WWF, 
Greenpeace).  Other exclusions are found in the definition of “foreign funds” and “political 
activity.”  While the definition of foreign funding is fairly self-explanatory, the definition of 
“political activity” is both broad and vague. The law defines political activity as: activities 
conducted with a goal “to influence the decisions of public authorities, aimed at changing their 
work on public policy, as well as to influence public opinion for the same purpose.” Essentially, 
organizations who receive any money from abroad cannot also attempt to influence public 
opinion or policy without being designated a “foreign agent.”  However, the law also states that 
certain activities are excluded from the definition of “political activity,” and one of these is “the 
protection of flora and fauna.”61  The organizations I studied in Irkutsk, as environmental 
organizations immediately concerned with the protection of flora and fauna, saw themselves as 
                                                 
61
 The full list of exemptions is as follows: “By political activities, not included is activity in science, art, culture, 
health care, prevention and protection of public health; social support and protection; protection of motherhood and 
childhood, and social support to the disabled; promotion of healthy lifestyles; physical culture and sports; protection 
of flora and fauna; charity activities, as well as activities to promote philanthropy and volunteerism.” 
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exempt from its oversight.  For at least one organization in my study, this self-assurance in the 
apolitical nature of nature protection proved to be a dangerous delusion. 
 
March 26, 2013 
 “I heard on the radio this morning that they are cracking down on NGOs,” Jennie said to 
me from behind her computer while we were working at the office of Baikal Environmental 
Wave.  “They had a representative from three organizations on a talk show.  The prosecutor is 
accusing them of being foreign agents.  There are some others, too.  Only one is an 
environmental organization – one I’ve never heard of in Krasnoyarsk.” 
 “You think the Wave will be next?” I asked her. 
 “Maybe!” she answered laughing. “We’ll see,” but her tone suggested that her concern 
was more intellectual than existential. 
 
April 1, 2013 
 In the afternoon, the Wave received a phone call from the prosecutor’s office altering the 
staff to a coming fax.  The fax, which arrived at 3:44 p.m., stated that, in fulfillment of the law 
“on combating extremism” in public, religious and other noncommercial organizations, the 
nonprofit was being “checked.”  The letter demanded that the Wave provide the prosecutor’s 
office with a copy of 1) their organizational charter, and 2) “documents confirming the sources 
of funds and other assets (from which organizations, from which actual persons), their 
nationality, the general purposes for which these funds were allocated, the total amount of money 
raised by the organization in 2010, 2011, and 2012, and on which goals the funds were spent.”  
The letter stated that the documents were to be delivered to the prosecutor’s office by April 2, 
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2013.  The date was printed in bold and underlined.  “By 11 a.m.” was scrawled in pen beside 
the date. 
 With less than 20 hours to collect the requested paperwork (and most of those after 
business hours), they set to work, prepared to burn the midnight oil. The Wave staff was up until 
one o’clock in the morning photocopying documents, but managed to compile the needed 
materials in time for the 11 a.m. delivery. 
 “Success,” the Wave announced on its website, following the midnight photocopying 
frenzy. The posting even took the occasion to sympathize with the staff at the prosecutor’s 
office, reminding readers that: “They, too, are now hard at work and facing sleepless nights.”  
 
April 4, 2013 
 In the office, everyone was back at work, as though the proverka (check) had never 
happened.  The Wave’s staff was already busy focusing on its latest projects.  Marina was 
planning the conference that would be the culmination of the Tahoe-Baikalsk-Goloustnoe grant.  
Artur and Zinaida were busy hauling pieces of the Interactive Education program to the Siberian 
Convention Center for an education fair to which they had been invited. 
 “Are you worried about the proverka?” I asked Jennie as we sat behind our respective 
computers. 
 “No,” she replied. “I don’t think they will call us foreign agents.” 
 “Why not?” I asked. 
 “Because they know that if they do, it will make a big stink!” she said smiling.  
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April 11, 2013 
 At noon, the prosecutor’s office called after sending a fax to the Wave office, requesting 
additional materials.  Specifically, the Wave was to collect and copy: 
 
1. Grant agreements, invoices, payment orders, and reports provided to foreign 
funders 
2. If the money was spent on workshops, their goals and objectives must be 
specified (provide handouts, presentation material, and presentations made at the 
workshop) 
3 . Specify whether Baikal Environmental Wave conducted public events (actions, 
protests) 
4 . Indicate whether Baikal Environmental Wave carried out the preparation and 
publication of printed materials, published articles in the media, including on the 
Internet, and other media projects (indicate which documents were produced by 
which activities), and submit a copy of the published material 
5 . Copies of orders for business trips make by the Wave staff 
6. Accounting documents confirming the costs incurred on business trips, and all 
travel reports 
7. Reports to foreign funders on the progress of project implementation 
 
 Baikal Environmental Wave was given five hours to assemble and deliver the above list 
of documents for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013. 
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 When I arrived at the Wave office there were three heads bent down over three desks, 
keyboards tapping, papers shuffling, and otherwise an unusual and tense silence.  For the first 
time in all my visits to the Wave office, the overhead lights were on during the day. 
 “I brought some sugary energy,” I told Marina, offering her a package of merengue 
cookies. 
 “In a moment,” Marina smiled, and I set them on her desk. 
 Upstairs, Katya, Artur, and Jennie were sitting around the table, having just finished 
lunch. 
 “I think Putin is crazy. I can’t explain it otherwise,” Jennie said to me in English. “How 
does he think this will go over in this modern world?  Is this really how a serious country acts, 
spending its time, resources and energy on small nonprofits like the Wave?  How can anyone 
take this seriously, take Russia seriously? I heard on Ekho Moskvy someone suggesting that 
NGOs simply register as foreign agents and be done with it.  But I don’t think that is the right 
track to take.” 
 “Why not?” I asked. 
 “Because it is not true!” she answered emphatically. “It’s a lie!  I don’t want the Wave to 
sign something that is a lie!  And besides, what happens the next time they want to put an oil 
pipeline by Lake Baikal, and when we say no, they will say we are foreign agents, sabotaging 
Russia’s advancement!” 
 At this point, Zinaida came up and asked for help finding a receipt for one of her projects. 
We all headed downstairs. 
 “Marina, you still haven’t eaten lunch,” Jennie said. “Go eat something.” 
 “I’ll eat at home,” Marina answered placidly. 
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 Now there were seven heads bent over seven desks.  Sounds resumed: the whir of the 
printer, the chink-chink of the Wave’s official stamp on duplicate documents. 
 “I can’t find the report on the bio-toilets,” Artur called out.  Meanwhile, there was a 
trading of places while Zinaida moved to Artur’s computer in order to print.  Temporarily 
displaced, Artur paced the room.  It was a tense game of musical chairs. 
 Suddenly, the office was filled with the electronic tones of a Beethoven sonata – Vera’s 
phone was ringing. 
 “Hello? No we are still working, gathering everything,” she said to what was evidently 
the prosecutor’s office on the other end of the line. “There is no way we will finish by 5 p.m.  
That’s in fifteen minutes. How late will you be in the office?” 
 The prosecutor’s agent apparently suggested the Wave just bring them the originals, but 
Vera would not allow it, saying the originals were not to leave the office.  Artur said he would be 
willing to take the originals and stay all night watching the prosecutor’s staff photocopy them.  
At a quarter after five, Vera and Artur left with what they had managed to collect thus far, 
planning to finish the rest the following morning.   
 
April 12, 2013 
 Jennie was still smarting from the proverka.  She continuously bemoaned the waste: the 
wasted paper, ink cartridges, and the wasted time.  It was evident that she was fighting her 
natural instinct toward civil disobedience, and not to comply with the prosecutor’s demands. 
“I wanted to fight,” she said, “but I had to step back. I can’t put my neck out there 
because, at the end of the day, I’m not the one who would get hurt.  Vera, Artur and Lev are the 
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co-directors, so if it comes down to it, they would be the ones to go to jail, not me.  They would 
be the ones with a huge fine.  Of course, the organization will support them with that, but still.” 
When she learned later that certain other organizations in Russia in her social network 
had, in fact, decided not to comply with the proverka, she worried that she would be judged 
harshly by her NGO peers for capitulating.   
 “[But] there is a big difference between submitting documents and registering as a 
foreign agent,” she said, comforting her conscience. “We’ll never do the latter.” 
 Vera, meanwhile, had been helping a woman from the prosecutor’s office create a table 
of the Wave’s various grants.  Apparently, the woman informed Vera that the FSB was unhappy 
that the Wave had been discussing the proverka on its social media websites. 
 
April 15, 2013 
 A three page letter arrived by post to the office of Baikal Environmental Wave.  It was 
from the office of the prosecutor.  Its conclusion: the organization is a foreign agent and must 
register as such.  The Wave was given one month to respond. 
 
April 16, 2013 
 I learned about the letter the next day from Jennie. 
 “I thought you said they wouldn’t do such a thing because of the big stink it would 
cause,” I said. 
 Jennie paused for a moment. “I was mistaken.” 
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April 18, 2013 
 When I arrived at the Wave office today, I noticed something unfamiliar about the 
building front and did a double-take.  Scrawled across the building in black spray paint were the 
words: “Foreign Agent ♥ USA”62  
I hurried inside where I was greeted by Jennie and Yulia.  
“Did you see our new decoration?” Jennie asked, with a laugh.   
“I did!” I said “It’s incredible!” 
“You saw it?” she confirmed, “Because we all walked right by it. Zinaida was the one 
who noticed it.” 
“I took a picture of it,” I said.  
“So did we!” she said. “It’s already up on the Internet. We called the police, and they 
were here, writing everything down. And the TV station has been out. And another is coming.  
Of course we will paint over it, but we have to wait until it is all reported.” 
 I handed her the cookies I had brought as a gift, and Artur said, “Uh-oh. That’s help from 
a foreign agent,” with a mischievous grin. 
                                                 
62
 Literally: “Inostanii [sic] agent <heart> USA” [roughly: forein agent <heart> USA]. “Foreign” was misspelled, 
and while “foreign agent” was written in Russian Cyrillic letters, “USA” was written in Latin lettering, as opposed 
to the Cyrillic translation: “США.” 
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 I learned later that the exact same phrase had been spray-painted on the front of 
Memorial, a nonprofit organization in Moscow. 
 
April 25, 2013 
When I came into the office today, I heard that Reviving Siberian Land is now being 
checked by the prosecutor.  While everyone sat at the table for tea, Elena Alexandrovna came 
into the room looking pale and exhausted.  She was invited to sit, but she refused, saying she had 
been sitting all day. Instead she stood, rocking back and forth, foot to foot, while she nibbled on 
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sliced fruit. We talked about her son and his work on robotics until the rest of the Wave headed 
downstairs, back to work.  Once we were alone, I asked her about the proverka. 
 She said she had finally finished delivering a stack of papers “this big,” holding her hands 
about two feet apart and making a frustrated face. I asked whether she had counted the cost of all 
that paper and ink.  
“It’s not the paper and the ink,” she dismissed with a wave of the hand.  “It’s the time!  
All those things that I couldn’t do while I was having to do that.” 
“What do you make of it all?” I asked her. 
She paused, then said, "It isn't pleasant.  I love my country, my region. I love Baikal. And 
to have the prosecutors spending their time and resources looking at me...  There are real 
criminals out there, people doing really bad things, but the prosecutors are looking at me.” 
She was staring out the window while she spoke with a sad expression, as though it sat 
heavily on her shoulders that the country she loved and worked for would repay her efforts thus. 
*** 
Its text alone suggests that the “foreign agent” law is intended to curtail the power of 
resurgent civil society.  But the manner in which the law was implemented and enforced also 
signaled the power of the state and the relatively powerless position of civil society vis a vis the 
law.  The proverka seemed designed to repress and intimidate, rather than merely implement a 
federal law. The Wave was asked to compile three years’ worth of documents overnight, and 
then in five hours’ time.  There was no legal justification for requesting such a quantity of 
materials with such a short turn-around; the timeframe alone guaranteed that the organization 
would fail to fully comply. The prosecutors’ reference to the FSB is suggestive, as is the 
comment’s unveiled attempt to limit the Wave’s public voice on the foreign agent law. 
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Perhaps the most disturbing of these intimidation tactics was the slogan sprayed across 
the office storefront. While no hard evidence can be mustered to tie this act of vandalism to the 
state, the Wave was convinced that it was not the work of a rogue hooligan.  First of all, the 
Wave had only been notified of the prosecutor’s decision two days before, and they had not 
reported it online or in the media.  Public knowledge that the Wave had been determined a 
“foreign agent” was limited.  More telling still is the fact that the exact same phrase had been 
spray-painted on the office front of another targeted NGO thousands of kilometers away from 
Irkutsk. If indeed conducted by the state, such a tactic would suggest extra-legal intimidation and 
harassment, designed to persecute or frighten the Wave members into conformity with the state’s 
agenda. 
 
Theater of the Absurd 
 While Irkutsk NGOs struggled to understand and comply with the new law and the 
accompanying proverka, there were a number of questions that were circulating among activists 
that could only be answered by authorities.  For example, why were NGOs required to provide 
documentation of foreign funding that occurred prior to the passage of the new law in 2012?  
Why were environmental organizations being checked at all if activities “protecting flora and 
fauna” were considered exempt?  I had questions of my own, also, regarding the order that 
organizations were checked, and why some were organizations were checked and others were 
not.  Amongst the NGOs and their online discussion boards and list-serves, stories fluttered 
around, full of rumor, speculation and supposition.  If answers were to be found, it was not 
amongst the NGOs, but with the prosecutor. 
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May 6, 2013 
 I walked to the city prosecutor’s office, arriving just as it opened at 9 in the morning. The 
office is located in the center of town on a pedestrian street surrounded by shopping boutiques.  
Pulling the heavy outside door, one is immediately greeted by dark, heavy stairs with a thick 
wooden railing.  At the top of the stairs, a heavyset young woman in uniform was perched in a 
guard booth.  I explained to her who I was and what business I had there.  Her eyes did a 
fluttering roll when I mentioned the proverka, but she took my passport information for her 
record. The windowless lobby for the city prosecutor was small, dark and drab. Old brown sofas 
lined the beige walls.  More than half the bulbs were out of the overhead chandelier and the wall 
lights. After logging me into the directory, the security guard directed me down a dim corridor 
and to the second door on the right.   
  Entering, I met three women, in their 30s, chattering happily as they removed their coats.  
The room was somewhat cheerier than the lobby, with two long windows illuminating cheap 
desks and tables covered with boxes and stacks of papers.  The women looked up at me with 
surprise.  I repeated for them who I was and why I had come.  At the word “proverka,” they also 
rolled their eyes.  They told me to return in an hour. 
 When I returned, I was taken to a different room that was occupied by two other women 
who sat at desks that were facing one another.  The woman on the left had dyed blonde hair and 
a uniform with shoulder boards.  The other had light brown hair and wore feminine, flowing 
professional attire.  I told them that I was a researcher, studying environmental movements 
around Baikal; that a few of the organizations in my study were now being checked as foreign 
agents; that there were many questions that local activists were asking, and I hoped to hear how 
the prosecutor’s office would answer them. 
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 The meeting lasted approximately 25 minutes and was only productive as a lesson in 
evasion.  Much of the time, the three of us were all talking at once.  I would start a question, but 
before I had finished, the two women would interrupt and speak back at me.  When I asked a 
question, they would give an answer that did not fit the question.  When I would repeat the 
question, they would say that they could not answer it.  When I insisted that they could, they 
would direct me elsewhere.  While it is difficult to capture such an awkward encounter in text, I 
have reproduced parts of our discussion below. 
 
 Kate: I wanted to know how it was decided which organizations would be checked? 
 Clerk: Any organization that collects money from abroad and that participates in political 
activity is deemed a foreign agent. 
 Kate: Yes, I know, but I want to know how you decided which organizations were to be 
checked, because not all nonprofit organizations in Irkutsk were checked. 
 Clerk: You can go to the federal prosecutor’s website and there you can see a list of those 
organizations that have been designated as foreign agents. They are all posted online. 
 Kate: I don’t need to know which were designated foreign agents, but rather how you 
decided which ones check. 
 Clerk: We are not at liberty to discuss the particulars of any organization.  We can only 
discuss information about an organization with that organization itself. Which organization do 
you represent? 
 Kate: I don’t represent any organization. I don’t want to know about any particular 
organization. I want to know about the process.  How did you decide who to check? 
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 Clerk: You would need to talk to the Oblast prosecutor’s office. It is the Oblast 
prosecutor that is ordering the check. 
 Kate: But it is the city prosecutor that is actually doing the check, right?  The check is 
being done here in this office? 
 Clerk: Yes. 
 Kate: So then you had to have a process and you would have to know what that process 
was.  I just want to know the process of how you decided who would be checked first, who 
second… 
 At this point, the woman in uniform got a little flustered.  “I’m telling you, you would 
need to ask the Oblast prosecutor.  All we do is fulfill the orders of the Oblast prosecutor.  We 
received a list of organizations and we checked them.”  And I quickly jotted in my notes that 
there was a list provided to the prosecutor of which organizations to check.  But the origin of the 
list remained obscure. 
 Kate: Some activists are suggesting that the checks are illegal because the documents 
they had to submit are from times before the law was in effect. How would you answer them? 
 Clerk: The job of the prosecutor is to fulfill the Constitution of the Russian Federation, 
which is the law. So whatever the prosecutor does is fulfilling the Constitution, so it is legal.  
And so the dance continued with questions and deflections for some time.  Usually, the 
two women talked to me pedantically, as though everything were a legal matter far above my 
comprehension, or with some annoyance, hinting that my questions were stupid and a waste of 
their time.  Suddenly, the woman with the shoulder boards switched personalities and began to 
speak to me in a sweet and conciliatory voice.  
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 “There is nothing wrong with being a foreign agent,” she said, smiling and talking gently, 
as though to a frightened child.  “It is just a legal term.  It isn’t bad.  No one is saying that it is 
wrong to be a foreign agent, that organizations shouldn’t do it.  It is just one legal designation as 
opposed to another.  There is nothing wrong with registering as a foreign agent.”  
I left the prosecutor’s office in a daze. I turned my steps toward the river, trying to 
process the conversation that had just taken place.  I walked, lost in thought, along a street named 
Dzherzhinsky, which, at that moment, seemed perfectly appropriate. 
 
Legal Nihilism 
 Corruption has long been a part of Russian bureaucracy.  Rule of law was not an accepted 
tenant of the Imperial autocracy (Hosking 2001); and systems of exchanged favors greased the 
gears of Soviet society throughout the regime’s life (Ledeneva 1999).  In the 1990s, with its 
concomitant institutional collapse, corruption blossomed into a scale and form unprecedented in 
Russian history.  Bribery, graft and kickbacks became the accepted norm.  The law was, as one 
Russian lawyer once told me, “artificial,” because there was always a means to meet your 
desired end.  Enormous fortunes sprang out of lawless activity, and such actions often went 
unpunished.  Foreign companies seeking to do business in Russia have complained or even 
withdrawn in the face of stifling corruption (Meyer 2011). 
 After succeeding Putin to the Russian presidency in 2008, Dmitri Medvedev continued an 
anti-corruption campaign that he began in his days as First Vice President.  He vehemently railed 
against the problem of “legal nihilism” in Russia, by which he meant the epidemic of corruption 
and bribery in the state bureaucracy.  Taking up the issue, legal scholars have examined 
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Russians’ willingness to disobey laws to measure the mood of “legal nihilism” in the country 
(e.g. Hendley 2012).   
However, the phrase “legal nihilism” may be differently and better applied to the 
application of law, rather than its reception.  Nihilism is a strong word.  As a philosophy, 
nihilism suggests that life is inherently without any value, object, or purpose.  Legal nihilism, 
then, would be belief that the rule of law has no inherent value, object or purpose. For 
individuals on the receiving end of law’s authority, their actions constitute a choice – to follow 
or not to follow the law; but individual disobedience does not necessarily equate to any obvious 
answer to the question as to whether the rule of law is of value or serves a purpose.  Indeed, 
anyone with a speeding ticket and any activist committing civil disobedience would, by this 
definition, be considered a legal nihilist.  
 More appropriate to the term “legal nihilism” is the production of law. Are laws 
produced with the intent that they govern as the highest authority?  To what extent is the law of 
the land expected to be universally applicable?  The value of the rule of law is first and foremost 
found in the creation of law and its expected intent.  In the case of the law on “foreign agents,” it 
is manifestly clear that the law was created to serve as a weapon of the powerful against the 
insurgent powerless.  In addition, the law was not executed by the state in accordance with 
universal applicability.   
 
 The proverka was accompanied by a great deal of uncertainty, confusion, and rumor 
amongst non-governmental organizations.  One question loomed especially large: why were 
some organizations checked and others not?  The letter of the law states that, if an organization 
received funds from abroad and took part in political activity, then they would be considered 
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foreign agents, but many Russian NGOs who receive foreign grants were not checked, and the 
definition of political activity was sufficiently vague to warrant confusion both by those who 
were checked and those who were not. 
 In April, I traveled to Ulan-Ude, the capital of the Republic of Buryatia, which borders 
the eastern shore of Lake Baikal.  Ulan-Ude is also home to environmental organizations and 
initiatives, and these frequently cooperate with groups in Irkutsk.  I found myself in the tiny 
office of an environmental advocacy group that occasionally partners with Baikal Environmental 
Wave.  There I spoke to Yegor, an older man with salt-and-pepper hair and a heavily lined face.   
While we were speaking, the subject of “foreign agents” came up without my prompting, 
and I asked whether his organization had been affected by the checks. 
 “No, no one has made any such mention of us,” he answered. “Of course, if you look at 
the law and what makes foreign agents – getting foreign funding and political activity and such – 
then we meet all those requirements.  We are the perfect candidate for such a law, but no one has 
said anything to us.  Which is why I think that they didn’t just look at all organizations that fit 
the categories, but instead had certain organizations in mind who for whatever reason they found 
bothersome, and they targeted those.” 
 Reviving Siberian Lands was checked and received an official warning.  While not 
prosecuted as a “foreign agent,” the organization was told that it was at risk should it continue to 
conduct its affairs as it has.  The rationale, Tvorogova explained, was that they held a workshop 
and invited local representatives to attend, and that it receives money from En+. 
 “What?!” I exclaimed when I heard the news.  “But that is a Russian corporation.” 
 “Yes, it is a Russian business, owned by a Russian oligarch, and its headquarters are in 
Moscow,” she said.  “But like all big businesses, their bank account is in some island 
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somewhere.  But the prosecutor just sees the black and white.”  Here she acted the part of the 
prosecutor, pretending to read documents with squinted eyes and a sour face.  “They say, 
‘Registered in such-and-such island.’ So, we have this situation where a Russian nonprofit can be 
troubled for taking money from a major Russian corporation.”    
 But if association with En+ were the source of their trouble, it raised a new quandary.  
Every environmental organization in Irkutsk except for Baikal Environmental Wave received 
funding from En+, and yet only the Wave and Reviving Siberian Land, were subject to the 
checks.  Where were the others?   
Not only was GBT among the most visible of En+’s partner organizations, it also 
receives support from many of the same foreign channels as the Wave – particularly since both 
organizations receive assistance from Gary Cook (see Chapter 4).  Money from the US Forest 
Service supported one of the main winter projects that GBT undertook in 2012, developing 
brochures and interpretive materials for two of its most popular trails.  It also has received funds 
from Pacific Environment and GlobalGreen Grants.   Were one to consider the donations that 
foreign volunteers make, which are bundled into the cost of a summer trip, then GBT receives 
most of its operating expenses from abroad. 
 One afternoon, shortly after the Wave had its first notice from the prosecutor, I had lunch 
with Marat from GBT and I mentioned the proverka.   
 “What do you think,” I asked him, “will GBT be checked?” 
 “No,” he said. “GBT is not that kind of organization.” 
 “What kind?” I asked. 
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 “The Wave is a protest organization,” he said.  “They are always against something, 
against some development. GBT…I don’t know how to say it.  We aren’t really against 
anything.” 
 Marat was not alone in his assessment.  In Irkutsk, the Wave had a reputation as a rabble-
rouser.  GBT was generally perceived as kind, fun-loving, outdoorsy volunteers, largely young 
people, doing work projects in the spirit of the Soviet subbotniki.  However, had the prosecutor’s 
office actually audited the organization – as it did Baikal Environmental Wave and Reviving 
Siberian Lands – there would have been ample evidence to brand the Great Baikal Trail as 
participating in “political activity.” 
 GBT has, as an organization, signed petitions and published open letters on political 
topics, including closing the paper mill, rerouting the planned oil pipeline, and for the creation of 
new regional protected territories.  GBT is also on an official list of nonprofit organizations who 
may participate as organizations in political campaigns.  They have been involved in conferences 
and workshops with government officials.  Had the prosecutor’s proverka been non-
discriminatory, GBT could have been easily caught in a dragnet.  Instead, there is reason to 
suggest that the law was designed to target particular nonprofit organizations who had been 
especially meddlesome in the affairs of the state and business elites. 
 
The only organization in Irkutsk that was determined to be a “foreign agent” was Baikal 
Environmental Wave. And the two organizations who were checked and received official 
“warnings” were their close collaborators and associates: Reviving Siberian Land and the Center 
for Independent Social Research.  Baikal Environmental Wave has long proved to be a thorn in 
the side of the state and corporate interests.  They were often the frontrunner and coordinator of 
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protest actions against the paper mill, planned oil and gas pipelines, and other threats to Baikal 
and its watershed.  All told, the Wave has not been endearing itself to the state. 
Unsurprisingly, the Wave is also no stranger to state suppression.  Since it took on protest 
activities in addition to its educational work in 2000, the Wave has been on the radar of powerful 
interests.  During the protest against the Yukos pipeline, Jennie Sutton came home to find her 
apartment ransacked, and several days later, her car was stolen.  While it is not known that these 
were done by the government, Sutton clearly believes they were, and similar tactics have been 
reported by other dissidents in Russia.  Around the same time period, the organization’s bank 
account was frozen.  The tax office sent a letter to the bank to shut down the account, and the 
bank briefly complied, despite the fact that the letter bore no signature. 
 In 2002, the FSB raided the office and confiscated the Wave’s computers and its Internet 
server.  The pretext on this occasion was the claim that the Wave possessed classified maps.  The 
organization had hired two geologists to help them create maps of radioactive pollution in the 
Angarsk region.  Baikal Environmental Wave insists that the information used was already 
available to the public, but their computers and internet server were taken all the same.   
 The Wave’s computers were confiscated again in 2010, this time under suspicion of 
copyright infringement.  The organization provided the boxes of their version of Microsoft’s 
product, including the sticker showing it was legally purchased, but again lost their computers 
for a period of six months.   Jennie Sutton tells the story thus: 
Jennie Sutton: There was one police officer from the Extremism division, and 
three from the commercial police. What was the officer from the extremism 
bureau doing there, if this was about Microsoft? We even had the boxes showing 
the software was purchased legally.  And you could tell that the three from the 
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commercial division were uncomfortable. They knew that what they were doing 
was illegal. But the one from the Extremism division seemed to be in charge and 
was telling them what to do.   They sent the case to the police in the Sverdlovskii 
district. We went to the police station and they gave us a good moral scolding 
about copyright infringement, and then we showed them that we had bought our 
software legally and that this was all cooked up. And after that, [the chief of 
police] was on our side! The prosecutor was working for the higher ups and he 
said, ‘We have to continue this case,’ and the police chief said, ‘You have no 
case. I’ve already given them back their computers.’ Which is why I think, at 
certain moments, everything depends on the individual: how an individual decides 
to behave in a certain moment.  
 
Importantly, despite the legal nihilism of the Russian state in the enactment of the foreign 
agent law, the position of those caught in its net remains, fundamentally, a legal problem.  
Regimes of legal nihilism may not abide by the rule of law, but neither is it rule without law.  
Once the Wave was determined by the prosecutor to be a foreign agent, the organization began a 
lengthy process of legal battles.  Members were constantly consulting lawyers and seeking for 
legal precedent in crafting their defense. 
At the same time, there were additional difficulties that the Wave faced beyond the most 
basic question of whether or not it was, in fact, a foreign agent.  Once the prosecutor’s original 
decision had been made, the Wave held two meetings – a staff meeting and a general assembly 
for all the membership – to discuss options.  At both meetings, members affirmed that registering 
as a “foreign agent” was off the table.  The group decided that they would “fight till the end,” as 
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Artur stated, to give the Wave “a beautiful finish,” as another long-term member put it.  Having 
made this choice, adherents faced the very real possibility that Baikal Environmental Wave, one 
of the oldest environmental advocacy organizations in Siberia, may be forced to close.  This led 
to another legal problem, one which had immediate implications: what to do with the Wave’s 
property. 
Baikal Environmental Wave received bountiful support in the mid-1990s from the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation of Germany, which enabled them to purchase a spacious, two story 
office in the Akademgorodok section of Irkutsk.  As real estate and rent skyrocketed in the city 
in the 2000s, the Wave was able to stay afloat with its permanent residence intact.  Moreover, it 
was able to rent office space on the second floor for added income in lean times.  In many ways, 
the Wave office was its life-support. Should the Wave refuse to register as a foreign agent, this 
property would undoubtedly be lost to it. 
 “I’m thinking of starting a new organization,” Jennie announced one day over tea, about 
a week after the prosecutor’s letter. I raised my eyebrows enquiringly.  “I already know what I’m 
going to call it,” she said, with a sparkle in her bright blue eyes that suggested something 
mischievous. 
“What will you call it?” I asked, taking the bait. 
“Vtoraya Volna!” she said: the Second Wave.   
The prospect of a new organization was brought up at the Wave staff meeting as they 
considered their options in light of the prosecutor’s decision.  There seemed to be much 
enthusiasm for the possibility.  The new organization could write a charter that would be less 
susceptible to prosecution for political activity, or it could strive to possibly eschew foreign 
funding.  There was even some discussion of creating a commercial organization, rather than 
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another NGO, that was geared toward micro-credit for environmental businesses.  Marina was 
the most excited about getting into the business of environmental entrepreneurship. 
“But where would we get the money for financing loans?” Jennie asked. 
“From foreign grants,” Marina answered. 
“Then we would be a foreign agent again,” Jennie replied. 
“But we would be a business, not a non-profit.” 
“So businesses can get money from abroad and be involved in politics, but social 
organizations cannot?” Jennie asked incredulously. 
“Yes,” Marina and Masha answered simultaneously. Jennie dropped her pencil. 
“Arghh!” she exclaimed shaking her two small clenched fists in frustration. 
The principle question revolved around whether the Wave could form a new organization 
and transfer its property to that new organization so as not to lose what had been the Wave’s 
greatest asset. 
At first, members were counting days – what was the maximum amount of time that it 
would take to officially register a new organization, and what was the minimum amount of time 
that the Wave could extend its legal battle in court before the property would be confiscated.  
Could such a property transfer be possible given the legally-stated time frames for each process?  
More research yielded additional legal and bureaucratic constraints on this potential trap-door 
solution to the “foreign agent” problem.  The new organization, whatever it would be, would 
have to pay sales tax on the property it received from the Wave at market price – money that 
simply was unavailable.  Finally, the office would likely have to be sold anyway to pay the fines 
that would be levied on the organization and its leadership – possibly 300,000 rubles each – 
should the court uphold the prosecution’s claim. 
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Despite the evident disregard for the rule of law in the proverka, law still defines the 
rules, and organizations are constrained in their own actions by legal requirements.  The 
necessity of democratic representation in legislation becomes obvious when the power to yield 
law is contrasted to the state of being bound by law.  There is no civil disobedience that would 
allow the Wave to retain its property – and obey it must, even if the law was unequally applied. 
 
Back in the USSR 
For those contemporary activists who remember the Soviet government, the new “foreign 
agent” law felt frighteningly familiar. As one person put it: 
In the Soviet Union there was no independence.  Just like what they are trying to 
do today.  They are trying to get their arms around social organizations again. In 
the Soviet Union, there were no independent organizations. Then in the1990s they 
started to appear and this was helped with financing from the West.  So now you 
have government-sponsored organizations and independent organizations.  This 
law is aimed at bringing those independent organizations back into the fold.  
 Another organization that went through the prosecutor’s proverka and emerged with a 
warning was a research center that produces reports for scholars, businesses, nonprofits and 
others who commission their work. The organization also conducts some local projects on its 
own, organizes conferences, and maintains an active research profile. Baikal Environmental 
Wave is among their regular clients.  When I discussed the proverka with one of their lead 
researchers, he was also reminded of the Soviet period. “I think [the proverka] is a prophylactic 
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[measure].  The result will be that social organizations will be more careful about what they do 
and say regarding the powers that be.”  
  
*** 
Baikal Environmental Wave fought the designation of “foreign agent.”  On October 17, 
2013, a judge heard their case, and upheld the prosecution.  The Wave would have to register as 
a foreign agent or close its operations.  The organization immediately appealed, but again lost in 
a higher court.  Despite these rulings, the organization continues on.  Court battles draw out, and 
the prosecutors check in occasionally to ensure the Wave does not lose sight of the sword of 
Damocles that hovers precariously above it.    
 
Conclusion 
 The Soviet state maintained its supremacy by attempting to monopolize the field of 
power.  It sought to control the production of goods and services, the opportunities for social and 
civic engagement, and the power to dictate and enforce law. The monopoly of power was made 
possible by a two-pillared system of apparatus and force (Kotkin 2001).  The immense 
bureaucracy ran the state institutions and the Communist Party, backed by the secret police, 
provided incentive for its proper functioning under threat of force. 
 In the final years of the Soviet Union, this dual structure was weakened, and then 
annihilated in 1991; the consequence was state collapse.  The implosion of the Soviet Union and 
outlawing of the Communist Party left a power void – but simultaneously opened opportunities 
within the newly released social and economic fields.  In 2000, with the ascension of Vladimir 
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Putin to the presidency, the Russian state set about regaining its strength within the field of 
power.   
 The government of the contemporary Russian Federation has divested itself the large and 
cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus that was required to run a national economy and provide 
myriad outlets for sanctioned social activity in the populace.  Allowing the existence of 
competing powers in the overall field of power is risky, but the Russian state maintains the 
knowledge base for widespread social control.  Oligarchs were allowed to dominate the 
economic field and enjoy limited play in the field of power, but these were soon disciplined to 
refrain from threatening the state by the arrest and exile of over-reaching oligarchs such as Boris 
Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky. 
 But civil society is also a power that threatens political elites.  The ability to mobilize 
bodies and sway minds can accumulate to such a degree that control over the legal apparatus can 
be taken from the hands of those who wield it.  The passage of the Foreign Agent Law is a play 
within the field of power, directly targeting the source of civil society’s growing strength: 
transnational connections.  We have seen in Chapters 4 and 5 how important these global ties are 
for the creation of a robust civil sphere; the Foreign Agent law changes this strength into a 
liability.  Importantly, the law is not actually intended to remove access or influence from 
abroad.  It is only in place to curtain the reach of civil society within the field of power.  Like the 
oligarchs before them, key figures are singled out to serve as examples to others: Golos, 
Memorial, and Baikal Environmental Wave. 
 In the transition from the Soviet regime to Putin’s Russia, the political elites learned an 
important lesson: they do not need to dominate the social and economic fields in their entirety to 
maintain their position: they need only dominate the field of power. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In order to conduct extended research in the Russian Federation, an American scholar 
must receive visa sponsorship from a research institution.  As I planned to embark on the present 
study, I sought affiliation with a major university in the region.  Everything appeared to be 
proceeding as planned.  I had a faculty collaborator, a department that agreed to host me, and the 
necessary documentation was working its way up through the bureaucratic channels of official 
affiliation.  Then, one day, I received a message from a colleague with distressing news: 
somewhere higher up in the administration, my proposed affiliation had been denied.  The reason 
was that my research “might pose a threat to Russian national security.”  What was so 
threatening, apparently, was my proposed intention to study “civil society.”  Fortunately, I found 
affiliation with another research university (after omitting the offensive term and replacing it 
with “environmental protection”), and soon I left for Irkutsk with a visa in hand. 
 “Civil society” is a freighted word in Russia; the government views the very concept as 
threatening – so much so that visa affiliations can be denied on the basis of it.  In the Western 
world, civil society is viewed as generally benign; Americans especially pride themselves on 
their personal initiative and their volunteer spirit.  But for Vladimir Putin and his government, 
the term “civil society” brings up unpleasant connotations: on the one hand, it reflects discourse 
coming from the Solidarity movement in Poland and other dissidents of the 1980s, whose words 
and deeds helped the Soviet Union reach its ultimate end; on the other hand, promotion of “civil 
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society” is the stated aim of many Western aid organizations, and this adds a foreign connotation 
to contemporary perceptions of the civil sector.  With this legacy in mind, “civil society” is not 
seen as a contributor to a functional, productive society, as it is in the West; “civil society” is a 
vehicle for government overthrow.  Every time a group speaks out against the state, it is not only 
an irritating impediment; it represents a chink in the armor of a government that rules by 
hegemony.  
 Despite a tendency in Western scholarship to herald civil society as the purveyor of 
democracy, and extol the rise of transnational connectivity amongst actors in the civil society 
optimistically as a united front against the powerful, it is worth remembering that democracy is 
not always welcome in the eyes of political elites, and transnational connectivity has limited 
efficacy in a world still governed by sovereign nation-states.  Moreover, members of civil society 
are not the only parties globalizing, strategizing and learning; so too are political and economic 
elites, who sometimes stand in opposition to their aims.  Civil society, made up of a complex 
web of associations and initiatives, is highly contingent – partially dependent upon the 
institutional environment in which it operates.  Tracing this contingency has been a central aim 
of this dissertation. 
  
Summary of Major Findings 
This dissertation studies civil society through an in-depth examination of 
environmentalist communities in the Lake Baikal region of Russia.  Russian civil society is 
generally described as anemic, but in Irkutsk environmental groups have built a rich network of 
organizations, institutions, and practices geared toward citizen involvement in the realm of 
nature protection.  Nourished by the pure water of Lake Baikal, an indigenous environmentalism 
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sprung up in its rocky soil, adapting and evolving to meet the changing opportunities and 
constraints that surround it.  Beginning in the Soviet Union and persisting into the present day, 
environmentalist communities coalesced around the shared goal of protecting Lake Baikal, a 
natural wonder of the world, from anthropogenic harm.  This dissertation has considered the 
formation of environmental civil society in Irkutsk over time, from Iron Curtain to globalization.   
 
Civil Society through the Looking Glass 
 The Soviet Union was described as “totalitarian” because the Communist Party sought to 
insinuate itself throughout the entire social fabric.  Only the most intimate level of social life, the 
proverbial “kitchen table,” was free from its oversight.  Individuals could form groups or 
associations to advocate for particular causes, but only under the auspices of the Party.  While 
the Party could outright forbid certain issues from gaining public attention, environmentalism 
was permitted because it was generally seen as apolitical.  As discussed in Chapter 3, the All-
Russia Society for Nature Protection (VOOP), as an officially-sanctioned organization, reaped 
the benefits of wide membership, abundant resources, and access to the government presses. 
However, despite the presence of these factors – which would signify strength in the context of 
Western organizations – VOOP  was constrained and channeled by the hard and firm ideology of 
Soviet communism.  Presses were censored, knowledge was compartmentalized, and the levers 
of power were outside the influence of all but a few.   
 However, there was also some independent organizing within the Soviet Union in 
response to industrial overreach that threatened Lake Baikal.  Although this movement did not 
form as an official organization, it made use of several opportunities that leant it advantages.  
First, it was primarily a movement of scientists and intellectuals.  Although science was not free 
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from the grasp of ideological correctness, it held a privileged place in Soviet society.  Scientists 
in the Soviet Union had resources and respectability.  Their regular conferences and publications 
allowed for a space in which to question state decision-making when it came to Lake Baikal. 
Also, scientists and supporters could leverage the uniqueness of Baikal when pressing for its 
protection; it is worth bearing in mind that few other environmentally-degraded locales in within 
the Soviet Union could replicate such a powerful claim. 
 Despite the spontaneous activism that erupted around the protection of Lake Baikal in the 
mid-twentieth century, little progress was made in hindering the creation of polluting industries 
in the Baikal watershed.  Those scientists most committed to documenting the human impact on 
Baikal’s unique ecology, such as Grigori Galazii, found their careers halted.  Importantly, 
however, these voices were never completely silenced, especially on the local level.  The 
persistent presence of environmental civil society – either in the Party-guided VOOP or in the 
community of activist science – helped to maintain public awareness of the uniqueness of Baikal 
and its endangerment so that when perestroika and the right to protest finally arrived, the Baikal 
Movement would be the first group in the Soviet Union to act and utilize this newfound freedom. 
 
“Evangelical” Transnational Civil Society 
 As the Soviet Union began its collapse, what had been a closed society opened up.  
Environmental activists in Russia and abroad wasted no time in reaching out to establish ties 
between their formerly closed-off countries.  Because of the Party’s dominance over all social 
activity within the Soviet Union, Russians had no experience in forming independent 
organizations, and other sectors of society similarly did not know how to relate to them.  Chapter 
4 shows how, in such an environment, transnational civil society actors provide knowledge to 
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help create a nascent nonprofit sector.  Importantly, without a history of philanthropic giving – 
and in a period of economic collapse – foreign supporters can fill the niche, allowing new 
organizations to weather crisis and even thrive.   
However, Western models cannot be simply transplanted to Irkutsk wholesale; and even 
well-meaning attempts to transmit cultural practices from one context to another can fail 
dramatically.  As Chapters 4 and 5 make clear, cross-national exchange, particularly from the 
democratic West to post-, semi- or fully authoritarian countries not only face the usual barriers of  
cultural mismatch, they also must overcome entrenched fatalism and a perceived lack of 
efficacy.  But even if an actual technique, organizational form, or social practice from one 
country does not take root in its new soil, the very act of sharing across boarders has value.  
Cross cultural exchange can spur creative thought, shifting mental boundaries, spurring new 
local organizations, practices and possibilities. Interaction with transnational activists can inspire 
individuals to create their own organizations, putting new skills and ideas to work, broadening 
the boundaries of citizen activity.   
 
Globalizing Hegemony in the Civil Sphere 
 As the Iron Curtain rapidly corroded, it was not only activists who began to straddle the 
borders between East and West.  Business and capital likewise began to seek out markets and 
opportunities.  And just as transnational activism brought the knowledge of a nonprofit sector to 
local Russian activists, Russian businessmen, whose eyes turned to the horizon of the global 
marketplace, were learning the already established norms of global corporate capitalism.  As 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, the oligarch Oleg Deripaska, head of the En+ Group, has striven 
to bring the practices of Western business to his home soil.  Among these practices are those of 
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Corporate Social Responsibility and a cause-marketing campaign to align his enterprises with 
environmental civil society.  The relationship between corporations and civil society benefits the 
image and reputation of the corporate brand; while environmentalists must justify to themselves 
that their financial gain does not come at the expense of their own reputation and “brand.” 
 Moreover, corporate philanthropy in the environmental civil sector affects the type of 
social programs and public demands that are offered.  Environmental activists find themselves 
passing over more progressive projects that they would prefer in order to conduct the relatively 
tame projects put forward by their corporate sponsors.  Transnational social learning occurs in 
both directions: just as local activists are strengthened by their peers abroad, so do Russian 
oligarchs learn from the battles already fought by Western corporations how to maintain 
dominance through hegemony in civil society.  The rapidity by which Corporate Social 
Responsibility came to Irkutsk, and the form that it took, show that the window of opportunity 
that opens to civil society in the post-Soviet world may only open as far as it does in Western 
world, which is itself still constrained by the counterforce of corporate hegemony. 
 
Globalized Politics, National Polities 
 Interconnectedness defines the lived experience of citizens in a globalized world.  
Transnational civil society and multinational capitalist enterprise weaves between spatial scales; 
local activity occurs in dialogue with transnational actors, in response to extra-local trends, and 
in concert with a multitude of players worldwide that each exerts its own influence.  In an era of 
globalization, politics, too, become globalized.  And yet, there remains a critical actor whose 
relationship to the global is more ambivalent: the national state.  As a territorial sovereign, the 
modern state represents the limits of globalization for its subjects.  How this limit is negotiated 
278 
 
differs across countries; in Russia the state has taken transnational connectivity to be a threat to 
its power and has used legal means to curb its influence domestically.   
The “foreign agent law” discussed in Chapter 8 shows how, in a globalized world, the 
state can still exert its authority against influence from transnational forces.  Although embedded 
in a web of interconnections, local civil society still subject to a territorially-bounded legal 
system, and horizons of activity are differentially delimited by political borders.  Environmental 
activists in Irkutsk now confront a hostile state that works to curtail expansive citizen efficacy, 
reminiscent to some of the previous Soviet regime.  Control over law provides a means to target 
and taint individuals and organizations within civil society when they deviate too greatly from 
the Kremlin’s desires and dictates.  The Putin regime does not seek to win the war of ideas in the 
public sphere, but aims to avoid the battle altogether by eliminating its challengers a priori.  The 
“marketplace of ideas” is too risky when one is striving to “manage” democracy.   
 
What Does Civil Society Do? 
The Soviet Union and the neoliberal reformers who structured the post-Soviet transition 
each made their bids for legitimacy based in the classic poles of 19th century ideology: socialism 
and liberalism. Each of these ideologies proposes a competing vehicle for societal betterment: 
the regulatory state and the free market, respectively.  Socialism and neoliberalism each had an 
ascendant moment in Russia, and neither proved effective in producing anything that could be 
called the “common good.” The societal catastrophe that resulted from Russia’s turbulent 
transition rendered “ideology” a dirty word.  The public was to be won, not by any powerful 
idea, but by an effective executive who could return the country to a semblance of stability.  
Vladimir Putin provided this leadership.  Putin’s unexpected appointment to the presidency on 
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New Year’s Day of the new millennium represented a shift in national direction.  Putin’s 
government reconsolidated power that had been diffused by the transitional period.  Rights and 
freedoms were rolled back, but at the same time the standard of living rose, the economy grew, 
and crime fell.  The specter of instability buoyed the Putin presidency even as the 
authoritarianism of his state continued to increase. 
From Soviet socialism, to transition neoliberalism, to Putin’s “civic authoritarianism,”63 
the collection of citizen initiatives that is generally referred to as civil society has faced different 
opportunities and constraints.  Its actions within these various versions of Russia, and its role 
within them, suggest more generalizable knowledge that can be gleaned from this case about 
civil society. 
The Soviet Union was ideologically premised upon the creation of the common good; 
and yet, from gulags to shortages, from suppression to pollution, the regime spectacularly failed 
to live up to its promises.  One reason for this failure was the difficulty that citizens faced in their 
attempts to act independently of the state.  Individuals living in the Soviet Union, whether they 
were biologists working in the field, industrial workers in a factory, teachers in a school, or 
construction workers building skyscrapers  – people going about their daily lives – were aware of 
problems, but the Soviet Union offered no legitimate means for them to fix these problems.  
There were few opportunities for public initiative.  Knowledge and expertise was 
compartmentalized, and the levers of power were highly concentrated, with long, cumbersome, 
and often self-interested bureaucratic channels standing between daily life and the means for 
change.  Without the openings for individual input into society, problems that might have been 
fixed in a freer regime compounded, producing more destruction and difficulty than the 
optimistic ideology professed, particularly when compared with its Western opponents. 
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 The credit for this term belongs to Francis Wciso. 
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The freedom that came to Russia in 1991 took the form of chaos and collapse; neoliberal 
ideology offered little emphasis on strong institutions, relying on the market to re-make the 
region in the image of the West.  But despite the social collapse, local civil society groups in 
Irkutsk were able to leverage this opportunity to build local organizations that flourished. 
Combining resources and support from peers abroad – an opportunity unavailable in the shadow 
of the Iron Curtain – local groups fleshed out new mechanisms for citizen input in the society in 
which they were embedded.  The decade of neoliberal structural adjustment in Russia is 
generally perceived as a disaster: a free-for-all of unregulated capitalism in which the nation’s 
wealth of natural resources and industrial infrastructure were carved up among a small handful of 
ruthless oligarchs while the vast majority fell victim to poverty, unemployment and crime. And 
yet, this same period also saw the nascent formations of new civil mechanisms, whose activities 
would bear real fruit in the coming years. Environmental activists in Irkutsk were no longer as 
impotent as their Soviet predecessors.  Among their notable accomplishments: the designation 
Lake Baikal a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1996; the creation of “Baikal Day” as an official 
holiday in 1999; the prevention of proposed pipelines through the Baikal watershed, including 
against Yukos in 2002 and against TransNeft, a struggle that continued from 2005-2008; the 
suspension of the Baikalsk Pulp and Paper Mill in 2008, and its final closure in 2013. 
And these large accomplishments are only the beginning: their offices show evidence of 
myriad day-to-day victories.  One example comes readily to mind.  During my first month in 
Irkutsk, a volunteer with GBT asked me to translate a few paragraphs of nature interpretation 
into English. I later saw my translation on large, permanent signs that were to be placed within 
Pribaikalskii National Park.  Realizing that trails were sometimes difficult to find and navigate, 
and to heighten visitor appreciation and experience, GBT began a program to create interpretive 
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signs.  The national park office – hamstrung by tight budgets and federal dictates – had not itself 
provided these.  Great Baikal Trail members saw a problem, and they acted to resolve it.  It may 
be only one small deed, but all of these actions taken together provide a dynamic social ecology, 
that, while perpetually changing, provides stability in a dynamic world.  Capitalism has been 
called a mechanism for “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 2008); civil society may be 
considered a mechanism for “creative alteration,” as members of the social body work toward 
fixes, large and small to myriad problems that are differentially defined. 
While the empirics of this study support a beneficent role for civil society in the co-
construction of a common good, the worldview that governs the Kremlin does not share this 
conclusion.  Those voices that heralded civil society in the Soviet Union were the same ones that 
cried for the government’s dissolution.  Civil society is not a partner in a perpetual project for 
societal betterment for Putin – it is a force that ends governments.  From this perspective, 
permanent social organizations would be the equivalent of “sleeper cells,” awaiting the 
opportunity to rise up and topple existing authorities.  Civil society as a social sector is not to be 
trusted. 
 However, unlike its Soviet predecessor, Putin’s government does not outlaw independent 
activity outright.  Rather, the state uses legal regulation to monitor the terrain of civic activity 
and then root out those individuals and organizations that might bring trouble to the regime.  At 
the time of this writing, reports on Russia’s civil sector are not encouraging.  The state has 
continued its legal campaign to root out “foreign agents” and to bring charges against its more 
outspoken critics.
64
   
                                                 
64Recently one of Putin’s more vocal challengers, opposition leader Boris Nemtsov, was assassinated in Moscow. 
Putin announced that he would personally oversee the investigation, which does little to quell the suspicions of 
Russia’s dissident community. 
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Moreover, the Putin government has made it difficult for transnational linkages to assist 
Russian social organizations.  Long-standing restrictions on foreign funding remain in place, and 
the foreign agent law symbolically taints organizations receiving help from abroad.  Meanwhile, 
the regime has begun actively espousing a nationalist ideology that was largely absent from the 
early years of Putin’s presidency, when his legitimacy rested on the return to stability.  While 
whipping up anti-Western sentiment at home, Putin also sparked a rift with Europe and United 
States by annexing Crimea and supporting separatist fighters in Eastern Ukraine. Relations 
between East and West have reached their lowest point since the Cold War.  Stigmatizing the 
West, and suppressing those groups who look abroad for help, the Russian government under 
Putin have developed a strategy to meet the threat posed by globalization, internally and 
externally.  Despite many euphoric claims that are made about the power of transnational civil 
society in Western literature, Russian activists must suffer the consequences of their territorial 
embeddedness alone.   
 The question that remains for the future of independent activity inside Putin’s Russia 
involves the progression of globalization more generally.  Putin has signaled that he intends for 
Russia to be a major player on the global stage.  At one time, this meant seeking entry into the 
World Trade Organization and participating in the G8.  More recent moves hint that Putin hopes 
to place Russia in the role of hegemon to other, parallel multilateral political and trade groups.  
The Eurasian Union, enrollment in whom sparked the recent Ukrainian revolution and 
subsequent civil war, is an example of Putin’s vision for a Russia-led regional power coalition to 
rival Europe.  However, it could be that the benefits that accrue to playing in the pre-established 
fields of global economic and power will be too enticing to keep Russia isolated for long.  
Russian business will still be reaching across borders.  Study and scholarship abroad are key to 
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the scientific advancement and recognition.  International tourism is unlikely to abate simply by 
virtue of ideological nationalism.  Linkages will remain, and their ability to inspire agency and 
imagination will also continue.  All these forces will impact the potential for domestic activism 
within the Russian Federation. And Baikal specifically will continue to draw a disproportionate 
amount of international attention.  Despite its rhetorical hostility to the West, the Russian 
government should not wish to curb the inflow of tourists to the “Pearl of Siberia.”  The lake will 
continue to draw researchers and scientists from around the world.  Perhaps a young social 
scientist will be denied a visa to study environmentalism there, but an in-flow of people, ideas 
and resources will keep portals open between Baikal and the global community. 
However, should the current Russian government succeed in constraining civil society to 
such an extent that only the safe, non-threatening organizations survive, the story of 
environmental activity to protect Lake Baikal can offer some limited hope. Although unable to 
prevent the construction of the paper mill or to alter the course of industrial development pushed 
by the Soviet state, even at its most limited, environmental civil society kept the conversation 
alive.  Hands tied and speech censored, Irkutsk environmentalists in bygone years used what 
voice they had to say again and again that Baikal was special and worthy of protection. They 
maintained Baikal’s prominence of place in the public mind, so that, when new opportunities 
finally arose, people were ready to meet it. 
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